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Introduction
It was the dream itself enchanted me:
Character isolated by a deed
To engross the present and dominate memory
—W. B. Yeats, “The Circus Animals’ Desertion”
WE THINK OF the nineteenth century as an active age—the age of revolu-
tions and railroads, of great exploration, colonial expansion, and the Great
Exhibition. Yet reading the works of Romantic and Victorian writers, one
notices what amounts to a crisis concerning the role of action in literature.
The crisis manifests itself regularly in authors’ critical reflections: from
Wordsworth’s claim in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800) to have writ-
ten a new kind of poetry in which “the feeling therein developed gives
importance to the action and situation, and not the action and situation
to the feeling”; to Arnold’s dismissal of Empedocles on Etna (1852) because
in it “suffering finds no vent in action”; to Henry James’s discussion of
“nefarious” plot in his Preface (1908) to The Portrait of a Lady (1881), in
which he explained his decision to focus on character from the first, mak-
ing an “ado” out of very little to do, replacing external action with “an
‘exciting’ inward life.”1
These writers were all responding to, and frequently reversing, the
familiar dictum set out by Aristotle in his Poetics:
1
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All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which
we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qual-
ities, but it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the
reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to portray the
Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action.2
In the nineteenth century, Aristotle’s statement about the relative impor-
tance of action and character in drama was transformed into a critical bat-
tleground. Writers involved in the struggle over these two categories
effected a revolution in literature. In what follows, I will map out the ter-
ritory of the conflict by focusing on four participants in the combat—
William Wordsworth, Arthur Hugh Clough, George Eliot, and Henry
James. I will trace the course of the debate from its origins in the sea of
Romantic poetry, through the hills and valleys of Victorian narrative verse,
up into the highlands of the great Victorian psychological novel. But I will
also show how difficult the terrain proved to be and at what cost the
ground was gained.
I begin here with Aristotle because that is where so many of the writers
of the nineteenth century, trained in the classical traditions of the univer-
sities, themselves began. In Lothair (1870), when the General declares his
conviction that “Action may not always be happiness, . . . but there is no
happiness without action,” he demonstrates Disraeli’s discipleship under the
great Greek philosopher.3 It is the very frequency of such allusions that first
led me to see the problem of action as a central concern of the post-Romantics.
The generic division of the novel into novels of plot and novels of charac-
ter shows the dominance of the debate over action and character in the Victorian
age; it was in this period that these two Aristotelian categories became indis-
pensable tools of the critical trade. But they became so for a reason—or rather,
for many reasons. So my story is also one of the hows and whys that lie
behind the crisis in action.
Aristotle’s belief in the primacy of action stands behind his description
of the relative importance of character (ethos) and action (praxis) in drama.
Because action is prior to character (rather than character to action), it is
the more essential category. As his Nicomachean Ethics makes particularly
clear, morality cannot be achieved without action: “of all the things that
come to us by nature [such as the senses] we first acquire the potentiality
and later exhibit the activity . . . ; but the virtues we get first by exercising
them.”4 But his definition of character (at least in drama) as “that which
reveals the moral purpose of the agents”5 also demonstrates his belief in the
2 Introduction
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lucidity of the moral life. We can see what a person is like by looking at
what he or she does—“character isolated by a deed,” to use Yeats’s formu-
lation.6 By the time Yeats and his generation were writing, though, such clar-
ity had become the stuff of dreams. In the modern world, the relationship
between the internal and external had gained significantly in complexity,
clouding over the moral mechanism.
The problem is one most famously addressed by Kant. His quest to under-
stand the connections between things visible and invisible (phenomenal and
noumenal) lies behind his most powerful thought. But in the Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant described an immovable veil obscur-
ing the face of virtue: “even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely
behind the secret incentives, for, when moral worth is in question, it is not
a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner principles which one
does not see.”7 A seemingly benevolent deed may mask vicious purposes,
and those purposes—rather than the actions they result in—determine the
virtue of the agent. With the increased emphasis on the role of the will in
determining morality, action lost its ability to signify character; people’s deeds
need not fully reveal their essential selves. As Angel Clare reflects in
Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891), “The beauty or ugliness
of a character lay not only in its achievements, but in its aims and impulses;
its true history lay, not among things done, but among things willed.”8
In fact the source of the modern dispute about action and character can
be found in the context of Romantic poetry—that is, in the context of post-
Kantian thought. And for all the emphasis on Aristotle, the terms of the
nineteenth-century debate have little to do, finally, with the ancient Greek
distinctions. Even as they invoked the inventor of their critical tools, the
writers of the period were refashioning his instruments to suit their mod-
ern needs.9 So I want first to reflect briefly on both the process of transla-
tion and what was lost in it.
Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads serves as a convenient starting point.
There Wordsworth not only replaced the Aristotelian triumvirate of
action, character, and situation with his own action, feeling, and situation,
he also accorded the new category of feeling the eminent position Aristotle
had given to action. Character and feeling would seem to fit into different
categories of things, and it is hard to see how Wordsworth can have made
this change. But his substitution of the more explicitly internal feeling for
the Aristotelian ethos has some historical legitimacy: ethos is a notoriously
difficult concept to translate, and the English word character seriously atten-
uates its meanings. One root of the confusion lies in the relationship between
3Introduction
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ethos and pathos (generally translated as suffering, a kind of feeling).
According to Quintilian, the ancients divided emotions into two classes:
“the one is called pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed
in Latin by adfectus (emotion): the other is called ethos, a word for which
in my opinion Latin has no equivalent: it is however rendered by mores (morals).”10
Yet the two forms of emotion can also be thought of in terms of their rela-
tionship to external action; “ethos results from the successful translation of
the will into an act, verbal or physical, whereas pathos ensues where there
is failure to translate will into act.”11 So when Wordsworth chose to write
poetry focusing on feeling, he may well have wished to suggest the exis-
tence of a form of character that bears the same relationship to pathos that
ethos bears to praxis; something analogous to character can be generated by
suffering (as character is generated by action for Aristotle), and this some-
thing (which I would argue comes to be called consciousness) is of great value
to the moral life.
Inaction—both frustrated external action and heightened internal
action—fascinates the writers I consider. But for Aristotle, both ethos (“that
which reveals the moral purpose of the agents”) and pathos (“which we may
define as an action of a destructive or painful nature”) are produced by action.12
For something to matter morally, it must involve action of some sort, and
that action must be external in nature. This is why in works of art, plot ranks
above character in importance; if we are to learn of the good, we must see
characters do good (and bad) deeds. So if one believes Aristotle’s position
regarding the role of action in the moral life, the elevation of character (and
corresponding demotion of plot) in many works of post-Romantic litera-
ture has troubling implications. As Robert Caserio puts it in Plot, Story, and
the Novel, “when writers and readers of novels lose interest in plot and story,
they appear to lose faith in the meaning and the moral value of acts.”13 This
study owes a great debt both to the ethical philosophy of Aristotle and to
Caserio’s translation of that philosophy into the literary realm. Its central
concern is in the interplay of literature, action, consciousness, and the moral
life. What creates the sense of a self, in life and in art? Must one do the
right thing, or is it enough to will it? How does literary work connect to
this question? Can thinking ever be doing, as so many nineteenth-century
authors seem to hope? What would a character built by such thinking look
like?
Examining texts that thematize versions of the struggle with action, one
notices the frequent recurrence of two narrative trends: frustrated marriage
plots (either courtships that fail to reach marriage, like that of Claude and
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Mary in Arthur Hugh Clough’s Amours de Voyage [written 1849, published
1858], or marriages that entrap those in them, such as Dorothea’s to Casaubon
in Middlemarch [1871–72]), and frustrated revolutionary or social reform
plots. Moreover, with surprising frequency, these two plotlines are conflated—
as in Amours, where the failed courtship plot takes place against the back-
drop of the French siege of Rome in 1849. The connection between marriage
and politics is an old one; Paradise Lost (1667) provides a model for how
the marriage contract can represent the social contract. Marriage is also rife
with the language of philosophy of action: intentions, proposals, “I will”s
or “I do”s.14 Such words represent paradigmatic speech acts, a feature that
makes them of particular interest to writers who wish to see in their own
words a potential for an alternative form of political action. Finally, in an
age before easy divorce, the decision to wed forms a perfect lens through
which to view the arbitrariness and irrevocability of deeds.
Revolution, on the other hand, stands for the kind of wide-scale politi-
cal activity that should form a modern counterpart to the nation-building
activities of the epic heroes. But all too frequently, revolutionary activity
disintegrates into riots in works of the period, to be replaced by “inward
revolutions” such as Wordsworth’s in The Prelude (1805; 1850), Esther Lyons’s
in Felix Holt (1866), and Hyacinth Robinson’s in The Princess Casamassima
(1886).15 Alternatively, revolution becomes a dramatic presentation viewed
by tourists standing on the sidelines: Wordsworth in Paris or Clough in Rome.
In the works of Clough and Arnold, heroic combat devolves into versions
of the Battle of Epipolie (described by Thucydides), where “ignorant
armies clash by night.”16 While the plotlines of marriage and revolution are
traditionally representative of specifically gendered activity—marriage for
women, heroics for men—many nineteenth-century authors reverse this pat-
tern. The hero of Amours de Voyage finds himself entangled in the marriage
plot, while James’s Princess Casamassima, having given up on her marriage,
seeks the thrill of revolutionary activity. All in all, marriage and revolutionary
plots provide convenient mechanisms through which to explore aspects of
the crisis of action.
I must state up front a few general positions, although I hope my rea-
sons for assuming them will become clearer in what follows. First, what do
I mean by action? Kenneth Burke calls “the human body in purposive motion”
the basic unit of action, and this seems to capture the externality of action
that is its Aristotelian (and epic) core.17 I choose the word advisedly—agency
is the more favored academic term—because I intend to invoke explicitly
the connections between actions of characters and the structures of plot used
5Introduction
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by authors. Moreover, while I am interested in passivity (and its relation-
ship to passion), I will often refer instead to inaction (the OED’s first cita-
tion is from 1707) in order to stress the link between not doing and inner
doings, between inaction and character. My claim is that on some level, in
literature at least, if not in life, we are who we are, not by virtue of what
we do, but by what we have failed to do. Frustrated action—inaction—is
character building. The “growth” of “one’s imagination”18 (the phrase is James’s
in the Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, but naturally harks back to
Wordsworth’s Prelude) is produced when the chance for outward action is
stunted. Conversely, an excess of action can endanger the development of
consciousness. So, for example, Dickens’s highly engaged and active plots
can be seen to result in his famously flat characters. The “round” excep-
tions, such as Arthur Clennam in Little Dorrit (1857) or Pip in Great Expectations
(1861), tend to be marked by their passive, will-less natures.19
I also want to emphasize the political implications of the word action:
many of the authors I treat are deeply concerned with the relationship between
a poetics, a plot, and a politics. I should stress, though, that the political
valence of the crisis is never straightforward: the increased emphasis on char-
acter in the period is neither strictly liberal nor conservative as an impulse;
how it functions depends very much on the circumstances. So, for exam-
ple, it opened the door to a variety of action that was available to women,
even as it closed off the possibility for more radical forms of change that
could enlarge their sphere of opportunity. I may argue that Wordsworth’s
politics become more conservative in response to his disavowal of action,
but George Eliot’s conservatism merely serves as a kind of fire shield, pro-
tecting her from the effects of a fundamentally liberal understanding of the
world. And a writer like Joseph Conrad will be labeled as liberal by one critic
and reactionary by the next, in part as a result of the ambiguities produced
by his participation in the crisis of action. Similarly, the desire to view lit-
erature ethically has no particular political valence: it is suggestive that both
conservative (Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre) and liberal (Martha
Nussbaum, Jil Larson) philosophers and critics of today have insisted on
the relationship between narrative (that is, plot) and ethics.20
Second, what do I mean by character? Like most of the writers I am con-
sidering, I take the term from translations of Aristotle. But as I have sug-
gested, both they and I mean something different from Aristotle,
something more like that “surplus of humanness” recognized by Bakhtin as
an essential product of the conflict between character and situation in the
novel,21 something more like what we would call consciousness. It is that which
6 Introduction
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makes us believe in the life of a character, at times even outside of the text,
in the way one thinks of some Shakespearean characters. The move from
character to consciousness is, I would argue, an essential corollary to the rede-
finition of action (especially heroic action) that occurs in the literature of
the nineteenth century—one nicely suggested by Wordsworth’s revision of
the epic in The Prelude. Whereas the emphasis with character is on acts, the
emphasis with consciousness is on thoughts. But there is a continued moral
charge that is implied in the close etymological ties between consciousness
and conscience. Nevertheless, this revision of heroism internalizes moral-
ity in a way that can—and, I think, should—be deemed suspect.
Although many have noticed the passive drift of nineteenth-century fic-
tion before, approaches tend not to focus on historical circumstance.22 As
Caserio acknowledges, “it is possible to argue that in every literary era nar-
rative and antinarrative impulses coexist, so that the conflict over plot and
story is atemporal and formal, not in fact timely and historical.”23 But while
the many references to Milton and Hamlet that appear in the texts I con-
sider demonstrate this atemporality, I want to emphasize the historicity of
the struggle over action. The very frequency of nineteenth-century writers’
allusions to works from the past that exhibit tendencies toward internal action
(or inaction) suggests that there is something particular to the age’s obses-
sion with the debate.24 So does the constant attention given to Aristotle’s
proclamation about the status of action; Wordsworth’s Preface can be thought
of as groundbreaking in this respect, as in so many others. While (as I go
to some pains to emphasize) it is true that both narrative and antinarrative
impulses can be found in the period—there are as many Victorian novels
of plot as there are novels of character—the presence of the contest is par-
ticularly strong. For each “Ulysses,” there must be a “Lotos-Eaters” (1842).
Moreover, most critics interested in the phenomenon of internalization
choose to concentrate on novels and prose.25 Studies of Romantic and Victorian
poetry often note poets’ complicated attitudes toward action in general and
political engagement in particular, but they do not look forward to draw
links between the verse and the subject matter of novels. By disregarding
the connection between Romantic poetry and novels of consciousness demon-
strated by their mutual concern with inaction, critics have underplayed the
relationship between inaction and consciousness.26 Theorists of genre like
Lukács and Bakhtin (who discusses the novelization of poetry in “Epic and
Poetry”) may have hinted at the kind of links I am suggesting, but they
did not address them in any detail. My analysis is structured in a chrono-
logical fashion (somewhat artificially: Richardson’s Clarissa [1747–48], the
7Introduction
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first great novel of consciousness, predates Wordsworth’s poetry) in order
to emphasize its generic thrust, to show how the novel of consciousness
develops in part out of Romantic poetry and its concerns with inaction.
The corollary to this claim is my argument that the debates over Victorian
verse narrative—which I treat in the chapter on Clough—act as a visible
locus of generic unease. While most of the poetry considered here is either
narrative or closet/monodrama, I ultimately wish to suggest that those most
antithetical of genres, lyric and the novel, actually share concerns; Pound’s
desire to reproduce the complexity of a Henry James novel in verse in Hugh
Selwyn Mauberley (1920) resembles George Eliot’s efforts with regard to
Wordsworth.
Naturally, I have chosen the four authors on whom I concentrate
because I believe them to hold particularly revealing stances toward action.
But they are also representative. There are many more writers that have been
left out of this study than have been included. For every Wordsworth there
is a Byron, who fights actively for his causes even as his characters (most
famously, Don Juan) drift passively through his narratives. For every
Clough there is an Arnold, for every Eliot a Hardy, for every James a Conrad.
This abundance of examples only strengthens my sense of the usefulness of
action as a category through which to approach writers of the period. Of
course, as the example of Byron shows, the two camps of action and char-
acter are not always easily distinguished. Indeed, works can be as hard to
place as authors: a novel with a passive hero (Pip, say) can display a par-
ticularly active plot. So when I speak of writers as belonging to one or the
other side, I am talking about how they have generally been considered by
their audiences, and in particular by many of the contemporary critics that
I quote in my discussions.
And while the writers with whom I engage tend to belong in the camp
of character rather than of plot, they have been selected in part for the ambiva-
lence of their allegiances. This ambivalence resonates not only publicly (through
their work) but also privately (in their lives), and what follows is historical
in part by being biographical. By examining the cases of these four writ-
ers, we can see how reactions to a series of specific historical contingencies—
including the response to the French Revolution, laissez-faire economic practices,
changes in religious belief and scientific knowledge, and shifts in the role
of women in society—made people in the nineteenth century particularly
sensitive to the status of action and its reflection in the literary realm. Note
that the focus of this study will be on reaction rather than action, on what
was thought about what was done rather than on what was done. I do not
8 Introduction
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mean to suggest so much an argument about the level of actual activity in
the period as about the perceived state of action. Yet by concentrating on
the dispute over action, connections between many of the major critical debates
about the period become clearer: about individualism and doubt, internal-
ization, sensation, and repression, the epic and the domestic. My claim is
that in fact “action” spans all these categories. The crisis of action can be
seen as the crux of nineteenth-century anxieties.
F
I begin by looking at Wordsworth’s prototypically Romantic internalization
of action through his engagement (both his actions and—crucially—his
inactions) with the French Revolution. Nowhere is this strange, double-
edged quality more apparent than in the fraught treatments of action in
Wordsworth’s 1796–97 drama, The Borderers, and in his 1807 narrative
poem, The White Doe of Rylstone; or, The Fate of the Nortons. While neither
of these works, which span the period of Wordsworth’s greatest poetic pro-
duction, is explicitly autobiographical, both are steeped in an atmosphere
of revolutionary involvement that cannot be divorced from their author’s
experiences during the French Revolution. In fact, I read the poems as part
of Wordsworth’s grand revisionary autobiographical scheme. Moreover, in
each work the interest in revolution broadens into a general concern with
problems of action, in particular with what Wordsworth thinks of as
betrayals into action. And in both this concern has generic consequences,
not only for the poem in question, but also for Wordsworth’s wider pro-
ject—and for the course of English literature.
Chapter 2 turns to Victorian narrative verse and to the case of Arthur
Hugh Clough and his poem Amours de Voyage. I show how the work’s generic
hybridity (it is a mock epic, five-act epistolary novel-in-verse, written in hexa-
meters punctuated by lyrical elegiacs) is rooted in Clough’s complicated rela-
tionship with action, manifested both in his well-known crisis of faith and
his battle against laissez-faire government (what Carlyle called
“Donothingism”). Its struggle with genre underlying an obvious concern
with issues of action in its subject matter, Amours de Voyage provides a par-
ticularly revealing lens through which to explore the crisis in action in mid-
nineteenth-century thought and its influence on the literature of the
period. The chapter also explores the debate surrounding Clough’s friend
Arnold’s programmatic Preface to Poems (1853) and the issue of contem-
porary critical responses to the question of action in literature.
9Introduction
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The novelistic aspects of Clough’s poetry offer a transition into the realm
of the Victorian psychological novel. Chapter 3 looks at George Eliot, whose
oeuvre demonstrates her ongoing—and largely unsuccessful—struggle to
envision a safe and useful form of political action. Once again, the argu-
ment is biographical as well as generally cultural; I consider Eliot’s position
as a woman, her philosophical and scientific beliefs, and her interest in such
risk-free substitutes for action as duty, habit, and will. The novels show her
increasing sense of urgency with regard to the question of how to handle
action. While her early works suggest she felt relative complacency about
internalizing and suppressing action, her later works are much more
ambivalent about the ethics of doing. Eliot’s struggle culminates in Daniel
Deronda (1876), in which the nature and potential of action become the
dominant subject.
Chapter 4, on The Portrait of a Lady (1881) and The Princess
Casamassima (1886), shows how Henry James builds upon Eliot’s realiza-
tions by using the dangerous and obscured nature of action in modern soci-
ety to construct his own novel forms. In The Portrait, James subtly revises
Eliot’s position through his emphasis on freedom over duty, on conscious-
ness over the more deed-derived or Aristotelian character, and, above all,
through his self-consciously formal treatment of what he calls “nefarious plot.”
The concept is substantiated in the anarchist “plot” that stands at the cen-
ter of Hyacinth Robinson’s adventure in The Princess. I argue that this plot
can be seen as emblematic of the status of action toward the close of the
century, and that the oddly marital “vow” by which Hyacinth enters into
it demonstrates just how intimate is the link between the two kinds of action
(political and domestic) I have been examining. Moreover, James’s treatment
of a real underground plot in this work from his “middle period” antici-
pates the way in which his later works hide more ordinary happenings through
stylistic innovations. A coda on James’s late story, “The Beast in the Jungle”
(1902), offers a warning: taken to extremes, the demise of action entails
the demise of character.
Finally, I turn in conclusion to the other side of the story, to a brief con-
sideration of the role of the adventure novel or romance in the period. I
focus my discussion on Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island (1883),
which I read as a true example of the genre. But, I argue, this pure form is
achieved only by jettisoning morality and, indeed, the wider concerns of
adulthood.
10 Introduction
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F1f
Wordsworth’s Revolution: 
From The Borderers to The White Doe of Rylstone
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus, the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.
—William Shakespeare, Hamlet
IN THE PREFACE to Lyrical Ballads (1800), Wordsworth describes what
makes his poems different from “the popular Poetry of the day; it is this,
that the feeling therein developed gives importance to the action and sit-
uation, and not the action and situation to the feeling.”1 His ballads, a
genre usually associated with the bold adventures of knights, damsels, and
supernatural agents, will be lyrical, that is, nonnarrative and descriptive of
emotions rather than events, of inner reactions rather than outer actions.
The new emphasis is genuinely revolutionary—how much so can perhaps
be registered when one considers the internalization of epic that occurs in
The Prelude, the unnamed work referred to by Coleridge as “an unpub-
lished Poem on the Growth and Revolutions of an Individual Mind.”2
Revolution, in its specific historical sense, also lies behind Wordsworth’s
poetic endeavors. In 1798 Coleridge wrote to Wordsworth, requesting the
production of the work that was to become The Prelude: “I wish you would
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write a poem [reviving the spirits of those who] in consequence of the
complete failure of the French Revolution have thrown up all hopes of
amelioration and given themselves over to [solitude] and the cultivation of
the domestic affections.”3 Yet if the poem Wordsworth finally delivered
brings hope to its readers, it does so precisely by suggesting the powerful
benefits to be gained by cultivating the domestic affections. Here, as with
the other works I will explore, the most important revolutions turn out to
be internal ones, like the “turn of sentiment—that might be named / A rev-
olution” experienced by Wordsworth when he discovered that England
had declared war on France.4 Robert Browning’s judgment of “The Lost
Leader,” the youthful radical poet who subsequently forsook political
action in favor of establishment reactionism, demonstrates the strength of
the myth of revolutionary disenchantment coming out of involvements
with France.
The nature of Wordsworth’s own involvement remains a mystery.5
While his presence in France, first on an early walking tour with a
Cambridge friend in 1790 and then for a longer stay in both Paris and
Orleans for most of 1792, is sufficiently documented, the extent of his
active work for revolutionary causes is unclear. Undoubtedly Wordsworth’s
friendship with Beaupuy, the man so admiringly represented in The
Prelude as one whom “circumstance / Hath called upon to embody his deep
sense / In action, give it outwardly a shape” (Prelude IX.407–9), led at least
to some impassioned conversation. But for all Wordsworth’s later descrip-
tions of himself as an “active partisan” (Prelude IX.737), his only traceable
act of solidarity—A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793), an inflamma-
tory extended apology for regicide—was never published during his life-
time.
Moreover, Wordsworth carefully fostered the mystery of his activities
during the revolutionary years by his close editorial control over his past,
both in his writing and outside of it. So, for example, the now-infamous
affair with Annette Vallon, the royalist Frenchwoman who bore him a
child, Caroline, in the heady atmosphere of Orleans in 1792, is translated
in his poetry into the narrative of “Julia and Vaudracour” in The Prelude
(which he subsequently excised from the autobiographical poem, although
he published it separately).6 The affair remained the well-kept secret of a
select few during Wordsworth’s lifetime. Wordsworth’s reticence—even
concealment—is of course especially apparent and especially relevant
because of the autobiographical nature of much of his work. When an
admirer asked him in 1801 to provide an account of his life, he respond-
ed with a brief paragraph outlining the various places he had lived, notably
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amending his year-long sojourn in revolutionary France to “travel[s] on the
Continent.” Then he added a disclaimer: “but in truth my life has been
unusually barren of events, and my opinions have grown slowly and, I may
say, insensibly.”7
Such an organic, even Burkean, model of development accords well
with the poetics of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. But is it true? Had
Wordsworth really avoided the dangers of involvement in those “great
national events” that produced an unhealthy addiction to plot, a “craving”
for “incident” in literary work, or had he rather reacted against an over-
dose of events?8 Kenneth Johnston’s recent and adventurous biography,
The Hidden Wordsworth: Poet, Lover, Rebel, Spy, suggests the latter version
of the story, as its title implies. Yet even if one discards Johnston’s theory
of youthful sexual indiscretions and belief that the poet acted as a spy for
the British government during his 1799 stay in Germany, Wordsworth’s life
in the 1790s could hardly be described as uneventful. That “revolution” “in
sentiment” mentioned in The Prelude resulted from Wordsworth’s actions
during a political Revolution, and the depths of his despair back in
England must have stemmed in part, as Johnston argues, from his recog-
nition that the declaration of war between England and France would pre-
vent a reunion with his lover and daughter.9 Wordsworth had known the
excitement of event; he is, after all, the author of the paradigmatic descrip-
tion of youthful revolutionary fervor: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
/ But to be young was very Heaven!” (Prelude X.693–94).
Yet whatever his actions may have been, Wordsworth’s experiences with
the French Revolution also anticipate the two plotlines concerning inac-
tion on which this study will concentrate: the failed revolutionary plot (as
the Terror set in and Wordsworth’s faith began to falter) and the failed mar-
riage plot (Wordsworth eventually abandoned his attempts to marry
Annette—although Johnston is but the most recent and most ardent pro-
ponent of the theory that he returned to France in September of 1793 in
an effort, aborted by the escalation of the Terror, to “rescue” Annette and
their baby).10 In what follows, rather than pondering any specific actions
or inactions Wordsworth may have committed, I shall look at the way in
which his sense of guilt about the revolutionary period of his life affected
his treatment of action in his writing. But we should note that
Wordsworth’s guilt seems to have been as much about what he did not do
as what he did do, on both political and personal fronts.
Nowhere is this strange, double-edged quality more apparent than in
the fraught handling of action in Wordsworth’s 1796–97 drama The
Borderers and in his 1807 narrative poem The White Doe of Rylstone; or, The
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Fate of the Nortons. These works were written at the beginning and end of
what can be thought of as Wordsworth’s great decade of poetic production,
a fact that in itself suggests a connection between their concerns over
action and the development of Wordsworth’s poetic talents. While the
poems are considered minor in comparison to the greater achievements of
the Lyrical Ballads and The Prelude, I believe that their troubled surfaces
reveal depths that are concealed by the polished aspects of the more
canonical texts. Although neither work is autobiographical (perhaps in
part because neither work is autobiographical), both are steeped in an
atmosphere of revolutionary involvement and guilt that cannot be
divorced from their author’s experiences during the French Revolution.
Moreover, in both texts the interest in revolution broadens into a general
concern with problems of action, in particular with what Wordsworth
thinks of as betrayals into action, and in both this concern has generic con-
sequences, not only for the poem in question, but for Wordsworth’s wider
project.11
Wordsworth was himself the first to note the thematic connection
between the two works when in 1836 he appended as an epigraph to The
White Doe of Rylstone the most famous lines from The Borderers:
Action is transitory, a step, a blow—
The motion of a muscle—this way or that—
’Tis done—and in the after vacancy
We wonder at ourselves like men betray’d
Suffering is permanent, obscure and dark,
And has the nature of infinity.12
I cannot think of six consecutive lines in the collected works that contain
as characteristic a resonance. The passage, though not cited by Arnold, has
something of the quality of an Arnoldian touchstone. Hazlitt, when recall-
ing The Borderers in writing his 1825 essay on Wordsworth as a “spirit of
the age,” quoted it from memory, and Coleridge, as we shall see, also lift-
ed the lines from their context for the purposes of criticism.13 Yet the con-
text is all important. For while the important terms remain the
same—action, suffering, the permanent and the transitory, infinity,
betrayal, wonder, and the peculiar “after vacancy” that stands at the very
center of the quotation—how they relate to one another shifts subtly but
crucially by the end of the decade.
When Wordsworth took these words out of the mouth of his youthful
antihero, Rivers, and placed them at the head of a very different kind of
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work, he implied an authorial continuity—a stable poetic project—that
resembles the organically slow, insensible growth of the autobiographical
self Wordsworth described to his readers. Again, he kept the revolution well
under wraps; “I still stand now by what I said then” is the claim. Of
course, the addition represents but one small instance of Wordsworth’s
great revisionary scheme, his obsessive reworking of old texts, often with
the object of bringing them into accordance with his present lines of
thought.14 But it is an especially revealing example. At stake is the rela-
tionship between action and suffering and, more particularly, the relation-
ship between action and consciousness, the self-directed wonder that fills
the “after vacancy” of action. Is action necessary for the development of
human consciousness, or does suffering suffice? When Geoffrey Hartman
wonders whether “self-consciousness and Wordsworth’s lyricism are con-
nected in an intrinsic and more than occasional way,” he asks a version of
this question.15 Wordsworth himself pondered the connection, and as we
shall see in what follows, he came up with different answers for different
times.
The Borderers
Wordsworth sets The Borderers, his first and only drama, during the unrest
of the Barons’ Wars in the north of England in the thirteenth century,
when bands of robbers controlled the land. Among these bands is that
headed by Mortimer, the hero of Wordsworth’s play.16 Its antihero, Rivers,
tricks the benevolent Mortimer (who had saved his life in events preced-
ing those depicted by Wordsworth) into believing that the blind old Baron
Herbert, the father of Mortimer’s beloved Matilda, is not her real father.
Rather, Rivers contrives to suggest that Herbert has adopted Matilda with
the intention of selling her to the evil Baron Clifford. Mortimer is con-
vinced and, in the absence of ordered government, feels it his duty to
enforce justice himself. After much hesitation—mainly due to the confu-
sion generated by the old man’s seeming goodness—he abandons Herbert
upon a heath, crucially forgetting to give him his scrip of food. Herbert
dies from the ordeal. In the meantime, Rivers reveals his plot to Mortimer.
He explains that he had himself been betrayed into the commission of a
similar deed in his youth, when he was persuaded by his shipmates to
mutiny against their captain and leave him stranded on an island to per-
ish. Only later did his mates inform him that the captain was innocent of
the crime with which he had been charged. After this autobiographical
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interlude, Mortimer’s band arrives and kills Rivers as punishment for his
treachery. Finally, Mortimer resigns his leadership of the band, promising
to embrace a life of Cain-like wandering.
The idea of a betrayal into action stands at the center of the plot of The
Borderers and also at the center of Wordsworth’s relationship to his own
political doings. In The Prelude, Wordsworth tells Coleridge of his
romance with Godwinian rationalism during the early years of the
Revolution in France:
Time may come
When some dramatic story may afford
Shapes livelier to convey to thee, my Friend,
What then I learned of truth,
And the errors into which I was betrayed
By present objects and by reasoning false. (Prelude X.878–83)
Most critics take this as a reference to what will be the Solitary’s tale in The
Excursion (1814),17 but Wordsworth’s only truly “dramatic story”—his
only play—had already addressed the topic of Wordsworth’s “betrayal”
into the error of revolution. While The Borderers reads in many ways like
a bastardization of Shakespeare’s tragedies and a few other famous works,
the startling originality of the play has to do with the character of Rivers.
Wordsworth was himself so fascinated by his antihero that he felt com-
pelled to write a kind of apologia for him: the essay “On the Character of
Rivers.” The language of betrayal he uses there of Rivers reveals a reason
for Wordsworth’s investment: “Let us suppose a young Man of great intel-
lectual powers, yet without any solid principles of genuine benevolence.
His master passions are pride and the love of distinction. He has deeply
imbibed the spirit of enterprize in a tumultuous age. He goes into the
world and is betrayed into a great crime.”18
The obvious autobiographical reading of the drama would see
Mortimer (the hero facing a moral crisis) as Wordsworth’s stand-in. But
Mary Moorman has suggested that the opening lines of the essay on Rivers
are self-descriptive.19 The conflict resolves itself, though, when we recog-
nize that the two characters are versions both of each other and of their
poet. The complex nature of Wordsworth’s activity during the 1790s
forced him to create not only a “second” but also a third “self ” through
which to reenact his experiences.20 This proliferation of selves should come
as no surprise from the poet who requires four narrators—the Solitary, the
Wanderer, the Pastor, and the Author—to negotiate the autobiographical
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Markovitz_CH1_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:25 PM  Page 16
terrain of The Excursion. But what Charles Rzepka has called “the extend-
ed, but hardly suspenseful psychomachy” of the later narrative pales in
comparison with the profound self-searching that characterizes The
Borderers.21
Wordsworth himself provides us with another clue to the autobio-
graphical impulse behind his play. Many critics have noticed how the
Godwinian rhetoric of Rivers’s rationalist creed,
You have obeyed the only law that wisdom
Can ever recognize: the immediate law
Flashed from the light of circumstances
Upon an independent intellect (III.v.30–33),
turns up again almost unaltered in The Prelude in reference to the poet’s
own romance with Godwinianism:
The freedom of the individual mind,
Which, to the blind restraints of general laws
Superior, magisterially adopts
One guide, the light of circumstances, flashed
Upon an independent intellect. (Prelude X.826)
In the Fenwick Note to The Borderers (1843), Wordsworth recalls that he
wrote the essay on Rivers in part to show the kinds of thoughts that could
lead a character like Rivers to act as he does, “but still more to preserve in
my distinct remembrance what I had observed of transition in character
& the reflections I had been led to make during the time I was a witness
of the changes through which the French Revolution had passed.”22 One
must ask, whose “transition in character”? Part of the answer must be, I
think, Wordsworth’s own.
The burden of the passage from the essay on Rivers, and of The
Borderers, too, rests on the threat posed by forgetting how to trace the
changes in character that occur during a “tumultuous age” marked by “a
spirit of enterprize,” a period of what the Preface to Lyrical Ballads will call
“great national events.”23 In other words, such times demand actions that
endanger the very idea of a knowably coherent identity. “I cannot paint
what then I was,” Wordsworth laments in “Tintern Abbey,” another poem
that obliquely retraces his involvements in France.24 But in the essay, we
are told how a character who has once been seduced into committing a
great sin will discover autobiography as a form of coping mechanism: “in
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sudden emergencies when he is called upon by surprise and thrown out of
the path of his regular habits, or when dormant associations are awakened
tracing the revolutions through which his character has passed, in paint-
ing his former self he really is great.”25 It is hard to read the emphasis on
that “is” as entirely ironic. The revolution through which Wordsworth
passes enables revelations of character. Rivers’s autobiographical tirade to
Mortimer in IV.ii, in which he shows his disciple how they share a bond
in their crimes, may represent the raving of an egomaniac, but it is also
proof of a solidly constructed ego, for whom past, present, and future
form a coherent picture.
For Wordsworth action almost always takes the form of transgression:
just think of the early stealing episodes in The Prelude or of poems like
“Nutting.” Rivers’s sense of his own agency connects ineluctably to what
he calls a “salient spring of energy,” with which he “mounted / From action
up to action” (IV.ii.119–21). One is reminded of what Coleridge famous-
ly termed Iago’s “motiveless malignity.” Iago considers virtue to be “a fig,”
a hindrance to that true freedom of will by which, as he puts it, “’Tis in
ourselves that we are thus or thus,” and Wordsworth indicates his debt to
Shakespeare’s archvillain in the essay.26 But the rhetoric also resembles that
of Milton’s Satan, who notoriously asserts the connections among sin,
agency, and selfhood.
Wordsworth clearly means to portray Rivers as fallen, yet he implies that
his loss of innocence may be accompanied by some form of gain.
Suggestively, he again echoes Rivers’s discourse about the “light of cir-
cumstances” flashing upon an “independent intellect” in his description of
the operations of the Imagination in the crossing of the Alps passage of The
Prelude: “in such visitings / Of awful promise, when the light of sense /
Goes out in flashes that have shown to us / The invisible world, doth
greatness make abode” (Prelude VI.535). Sense replaces circumstance,
indicating the shift in the paradigm from action to vision, but the point in
both passages is the flash of recognition, a recognition of an imaginative
power that can exist even within the limiting structures with which we are
surrounded. Such recuperation forms the second movement in the
Kantian experience of the sublime: after we face up to our inability to
comprehend the phenomenal world, we grasp the existence of a noumenal
self superior in its freedom to such circumscription.27 The resemblance
between the Godwinian intellect and Wordsworth’s hallowed Imagination,
the fount of his poetry, supports David Bromwich’s claim that Mortimer
can reconstruct his own fall, so similar to that of Rivers, as a happy one on
the basis of an argument about selfhood. Bromwich posits that because the
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fall is his (because it has made Mortimer who he is) and because “he is
interested in having a continuous identity,” “a devious logic may bind his
self-love to any act he finally chooses to perform.” In other words, “Any
act whatever may be supposed partly good for the agent who has come to
associate it with himself.”28
Bromwich’s argument rests on a sequential reading of the “Action is
transitory” passage. Transitory action may be inferior to infinite suffering,
but it also causes it. There is an inherent connection between doing and
being. When “we wonder at ourselves like men betray’d,” the “after vacan-
cy” of action fills up with self-consciousness. Compare the often-quoted
“two consciousnesses” passage from The Prelude:
A tranquilizing spirit presses now
On my corporeal frame, so wide appears
The vacancy between me and those days
Which yet have such self-presence in my mind,
That sometimes when I think of it, I seem
Two consciousnesses, conscious of my self
And of some other being. (Prelude II.27–33)
In these lines, a wider temporal gap takes the place of the “after vacancy”
of action, but both passages describe a threat to the concept of continuous
identity. Yet it is only because of his ability to recognize the connection
between those two seemingly separate consciousnesses that Wordsworth is
able to have self-knowledge—hence that strange phrase, “self-presence,”
which stands up against the sense of divided consciousness. The thought
process resembles Descartes’s central meditation on the wax: precisely
because Descartes knows that the wax is one and the same piece of wax,
regardless of the change in form over time, he can posit the existence of a
coherent self connecting the two observations. Without some change, the
implication is, we cannot see what remains the same. Tellingly,
Wordsworth goes one step beyond Descartes by suggesting that he does not
require the external evidence of some object like the wax but can generate
the same sense of identity of the basis of memories of himself.29
But the process is not always as tranquil as in this early childhood pas-
sage from The Prelude. In “Tintern Abbey,” which returns Wordsworth to
the period of his closest involvement with the Revolution, when like
Mortimer he was twenty-three and right in the thick of things,30
Wordsworth needs the memory aid of Dorothy’s presence as a vessel of his
former self (in whose voice he may still hear “The language of [his] former
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heart” and in whose eyes he can see his “former pleasures”) in order to ensure
his sense of continuity. Similarly, Rivers’s investment in Mortimer comes
from the younger man’s resemblance to his own earlier self. In the later ver-
sion of the play, he says as much to Mortimer when he reveals his plot:
Know then that I was urged,
(For other impulse let it pass) was driven,
To seek for sympathy, because I saw
In you a mirror of my youthful self. (1862–65)
But Mortimer has not had the life-changing experience of having been
betrayed into action. It is as though this difference between them poses a
threat to Rivers’s continuous identity; he needs to watch Mortimer com-
mit a version of his own crime in order to close the gap between his “two
consciousnesses,” his past and present selves. “I would have made you
equal with myself,” Rivers declares (IV.ii.200). If he can witness Mortimer
do the same thing he did and still remain the same person, then by anal-
ogy he will be assured of his own coherence.
Yet only great acts, such as those necessitated by periods of revolution,
cause a break in identity, what both the Fenwick Note and Mortimer him-
self (II.i.92–93) call a “transition” in character. Habitual action, on the
other hand, ensures our sense of a continuous self. Some lines from “The
Old Cumberland Beggar,” a poem composed in early 1798 (just a year
after the completion of The Borderers), suggest that Wordsworth was
thinking about the relationship between large and small actions. In the
later poem Wordsworth writes of the benefits brought to his community
by the presence of an old beggar:
Where’er the aged Beggar takes his rounds,
The mild necessity of use compels
To acts of love; and habit does the work
Of reason, yet prepares that after joy
Which reason cherishes. And thus the soul,
By that sweet taste of pleasure unpursued
Doth find itself insensibly disposed
To virtue and true goodness. (lines 90–97)
These small, habitual acts of love, because they are repeated over time,
stand in contrast with the transitory action portrayed by The Borderers.
They replace the “work of reason,” the labors of the “independent intel-
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lect.” Correspondingly, the “after joy” that results from such deeds
markedly opposes what the drama describes as the “after vacancy” of
action. In part, the emphasis on habitual action, which we shall see repeat-
ed in the works of Arthur Hugh Clough and George Eliot, represents a
conservative response to the kind of unconstrained activity characteristic
of revolutionary France, a place where, in the words of Mary
Wollstonecraft, “vice, or, if you will, evil, is the grand mobile of action.”31
While Wordsworth often links action to vice, he also commonly con-
nects virtue to habit.32 In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth
argues that poetry can provide a moral education by fostering habitual
contemplation in a process analogous to the acts of charity described by
“The Old Cumberland Beggar”: “by the repetition and continuance of
this act feelings connected with important subjects will be nourished, till
at length, . . . such habits of mind will be produced that by obeying blind-
ly and mechanically the impulses of those habits, . . . the understanding
of the being to whom we address ourselves . . . must necessarily be in some
degree enlightened, his taste exalted, and his affections ameliorated.”33
Just think of those “little, nameless, unremembered acts / Of kindness and
of love,” which in “Tintern Abbey” are said to make up the “best portion
of a good man’s life” (lines 34–36). Yet the fact that such acts are “unre-
membered” should make us pause, given the cult of memory that
Wordsworth embraces. Unremembered acts cannot be reflected upon and
so cannot provide the basis of self-consciousness. Wordsworth implies as
much in the essay on Rivers: “Perhaps there is no cause which has greater
weight in preventing the return of bad men to virtue than that good
actions, being for the most part in their nature silent and regularly pro-
gressive [like the unremembered acts of “Tintern Abbey”], they do not
present those sudden results which can afford a sufficient stimulus to a
troubled mind.”34 If one asks, “What needs stimulating?” the only satis-
fyingly Wordsworthian answer is self-awareness.
The Borderers suggests that while uncharacteristic acts, such as those we
are betrayed into by revolutionary times, may pose a threat to our sense of a
continuous self, they also set off their own healing mechanism: reflection.
Macbeth, right after the murder of Duncan, lets out a cry of shame for his
act: “To know my deed, ’twere best not know myself.”35 Wordsworth revers-
es this formula; his claim is rather: “To know myself, ’twere best to know my
deed.” The reversal comes with his recognition that action causes suffering,
and suffering entails self-consciousness. This is why right after having aban-
doned Herbert, Mortimer can describe an odd feeling of succumbing to a
vast sense of calm: “I could believe that there was here / The only quiet heart
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on earth.—In terror, / Remembered terror, there is love and peace”
(III.v.2–4). If one capitalizes those t’s one can transform Mortimer’s statement
into Wordsworth’s response to his revolutionary involvement.
Yet the emphasis this argument places on the role of action in the produc-
tion of self-consciousness leads me to another question: If action is so
important, where is the action in this play? The center of the drama regis-
ters this ambivalence. It portrays a great crime that is hardly a crime at all,
not only because Mortimer has been betrayed into it, but also because it is
at most a crime of omission, an abandonment rather than a stabbing, a fail-
ure to do rather than a doing. Even the omission is twofold; that strange
insistence on the forgotten scrip of food—and surely to abandon Herbert
even with it would have been to consign him to death—must in part be
intended to further narrow the gap between Mortimer’s guilt and inno-
cence.36 Consider Mortimer’s own analysis of his deed:
A hideous plot, against the soul of man:
It took effect—and yet I baffled it,
In some degree. (2113–15)
Note the passive construction applied to the crime: the plot “took effect.”
Mortimer reserves the active voice for his partial baffling of Rivers’s plan, pre-
sumably referring to his decision to desert Herbert on the heath rather than
kill him. Yet Wordsworth knew that crimes of omission are still crimes. In fact,
in A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff  he made precisely this point in reference
to the lack of action on issues of reform that prevailed in English politics:
As a teacher of religion your lordship cannot be ignorant of a class of
breaches of duty which may be denominated faults of omission. You pro-
fess to give your opinions upon the present turbulent crisis, expressing a
wish that they may have some effect in tranquilizing the minds of the peo-
ple. From your silence respecting the general call for a parliamentary
reform, . . . what can be supposed but that you are a determined enemy
to the redress of what the people of England call and feel to be grievances?37
Still, Wordsworth himself maintained his silence with regard to reform, not
least by withholding the publication of this very pamphlet. Crimes of inac-
tion play as great a role in his story in France as those of action: just think
of his abandonment of Annette and Caroline. This failure to act must have
stood as one of the psychologically most devastating aspects of his involve-
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ment in France and must in part lie behind the crime of abandonment in
The Borderers.
Many critics have compared The Borderers to Othello, and Wordsworth
(as the essay on Rivers makes clear) has Iago in mind when forming his
antihero’s character. But his play also bears traces of reflection on Hamlet,
and the parallels between Mortimer and the Prince of Denmark, who both
believe they must murder to secure justice and do so only after much hes-
itation, bring to the foreground a new set of concerns. While Rivers’s rela-
tion to Iago makes sense of Wordsworth’s position regarding his
revolutionary actions, Mortimer’s similarity to Hamlet provides a better
entrance into an exploration of his guilt about his revolutionary inactions.
Looked at through the lens of Hamlet, The Borderers urges audiences to
reconsider their understanding of action in a manner that will allow
Wordsworth to redefine its nature, with important consequences for his
poetic project. Wordsworth’s play hovers between asserting a connection
between action and self-consciousness and asserting a connection between
inaction and self-consciousness. To say this is to claim that Wordsworth was
not resolved in his attitudes toward action when he wrote the play. But it
is also to suggest that the process of writing The Borderers helped him to
formulate the question as one concerning action.
Wordsworth greatly admired Hamlet. The poet who claimed “the mind
of Man” as his “haunt and the main region of [his] song” said of the
tragedy, “There is more mind in Hamlet than in any other play, more
knowledge of human nature.”38 Hamlet’s infamous “conscience”—really
his consciousness, the quality of mind that here refuses to embrace that
which it cannot know—causes the currents of enterprise to “turn awry, /
And lose the name of action.”39 But critics since Coleridge have argued that
Hamlet’s self-consciousness is both product and cause of his delay.
Coleridge actually quotes the “Action is transitory” passage from The
Borderers in a lecture on Hamlet, after noting the Prince’s “great, enor-
mous, intellectual activity, and a consequent proportionate aversion to real
action, with all its symptoms and accompanying qualities.”40 While
Coleridge sees inaction as a consequence of Hamlet’s reflectiveness, we get
the soliloquies that give us such a powerful sense of Hamlet’s identity
largely because of his inaction. So if we saw previously how action could
lead to self-consciousness, the connection of The Borderers to Hamlet sug-
gests that inaction can foster reflection.
The comparison to Hamlet can also help make sense of the crime at the
heart of The Borderers. In Wordsworth’s tale, Mortimer’s hesitation at
killing Herbert involves conscience in its modern sense:
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I cannot do it:
Twice did I spring to grasp his withered throat,
When such a sudden weakness fell on me,
I could have dropped asleep upon his breast. (II.iii.195–98)
The image is startlingly vivid: the enraged Mortimer, about to pounce on
the fatherly figure of the old man, collapses into a desire to return to the
comforts of infancy. This wish to regress to the natural state of dependence
upon the parent supplants the unnatural act of parricide. Faced with the
need to serve as Herbert’s judge and executioner, Mortimer desires the
escape of sleep. While Hamlet fears his dreams, Mortimer embraces them,
almost narcoleptically. Hamlet’s situation is of course different: he is
required to kill the unnatural father in order to avenge the natural. Yet each
man refuses to act, attempting to avoid the pressures of political account-
ability. Moreover, for both protagonists, the act of parricide relates to
issues of memory—not least because as David Erdman has pointed out in
relation to The Borderers, it stands in place of regicide (in Hamlet, the “par-
ricide” is literally also a regicide).41 The father represents the past, so for
Wordsworth, parricide represents the ultimate crime: a break with one’s
own past, a refusal of memory.
A casual allusion in The Prelude emphasizes how Wordsworth uses
Hamlet to demonstrate his personalized sense of history and accountability:
I thought of those September massacres,
Divided from me by a little month,
And felt and touched them. (Prelude X.63–66)
That “little month” refers to the small space of time between Hamlet’s
father’s death and his mother’s remarriage. Like Hamlet, Wordsworth is
horrified by how much can change in a brief period, about how easily
the rest of the world can forget.42 As Hamlet must watch helplessly while
Claudius takes from him, in the month following his father’s death, both
crown and mother, Wordsworth waits powerlessly on the sidelines dur-
ing the French Revolution, divided by accidents of time and the fact of
his foreignness from the history that rages about him.43 And like
Mortimer, Wordsworth is unable to act, but his very impotence becomes
a form of action for which he holds himself liable—he should have done
something. Although the danger for Mortimer lies in a temptation to
action (that is, to the murder of Herbert), his eventual crime is one of
inaction. Incapable of attacking the old man physically, he leaves
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Herbert to the elements, abdicating responsibility by declaring him
God’s victim, not his own:
Here will I leave him—here—All-seeing God!
Such as he is, and sore perplexed as I am,
I will commit him to this final Ordeal! (1391–93)
Mortimer stands with Hamlet on the border between action and inaction.
In this way, he expresses the duality of Wordsworth’s guilt: on the one
hand, the complicity in action he feels for having supported the
Revolution; on the other, his shame of inaction for not having worked to
stop the Terror and for the abandonment of Annette and Caroline.
By making the action that lies at the very heart of his drama a kind of
nonaction, Wordsworth, even as he writes The Borderers, has already
aligned himself with the inward focus of his later poetry, in which concern
for the “moving accident” is replaced by an interest in “silent suffering.”44
Wordsworth cares as much about inaction—internalized action—as about
action, as his play’s well-documented relationship to closet drama (that
favorite Romantic genre) indicates.45 While he seems originally to have
intended the play for production, in the 1842 Note about the work, he
(rather defensively) insists that “it was first written . . . without any view
to its exhibition upon the stage.”46 Wordsworth’s one drama thus presents
a fitting contribution from one who will later disparagingly dispense with
“sickly and stupid German Tragedies.”47
Charles Lamb argued that the Romantic love of closet drama stemmed
from a fear of closure, from a longing for an infinitude that is incommen-
surable with the transitory nature of action. He described his response to
having seen a great performance of a play by Shakespeare in his youth:
It seemed to embody and realize conceptions which had hitherto assumed
no distinct shape. But dearly do we pay all our life after for this juvenile
pleasure, this sense of distinctness. When the novelty is past, we find to
our cost that instead of realizing an idea, we have only materialized and
brought down a fine vision to the standard of flesh and blood. We have
let go a dream, in quest of an unattainable substance.48
Wordsworth expresses the same sense of disappointment upon first seeing
Mont Blanc, when he “grieve[s] / To have a soulless image on the eye /
Which had usurped upon a living thought” (Prelude VI.453–55). The
sublime is incompatible with embodied action, the province of the theater.
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Lamb wrote of the characters of Shakespeare (and he might well have had
Rivers and Mortimer in mind, too) that they
are so much the objects of meditation rather than of interest or curiosity
as to their action that while we are reading any of his great criminal char-
acters,—Macbeth, Richard, even Iago,—we think not so much of the
crimes which they commit, as of the ambition, the aspiring spirit, the
intellectual activity, which prompts them to overleap these moral fences.
. . . But when we see these things represented the acts which they do are
comparatively every thing, their impulses nothing.49
Intellectual activity is what matters, not action. Self-consciousness repre-
sents the ultimate human experience, and self-consciousness is an act of
mind, not of body.
So the mind can be a center of its own kind of drama—a psychic one.
In the nightmare trial sequence from The Prelude, Wordsworth describes
his response to his involvements in France as an internalized dialogue in
which he plays the roles of accused and judge, defense and prosecution:
Through months, through years, long after the last beat
Of those atrocities . . . 
I scarcely had one night of quiet sleep.
Such ghastly visions had I of despair,
And tyranny, and implements of death,
And long orations which in dreams I pleaded
Before unjust tribunals, with a voice
Labouring, a brain confounded, and a sense
Of treachery and desertion in the place
The holiest that I knew of—my own soul.50 (Prelude X.371–72, 374–81)
What he recounts bears some resemblance to the two-in-one of thinking
that Hannah Arendt discusses in The Life of the Mind:
Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly that man exists essentially in the
plural than that his solitude actualizes his merely being conscious of him-
self . . . into a duality during the thinking activity. It is this duality of myself
with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the
one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical
and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering
process.51
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Thinking is a “true activity” because soliloquy is dialogue. Out of this dia-
logue, both consciousness and conscience develop.52 For Wordsworth, the
activity often has to do with memory—a conversation takes place between
present and past selves—as in “Tintern Abbey” or the “Two conscious-
nesses” passage of The Prelude. Bromwich has remarked that “About the
time that he completed his work on the Lyrical Ballads, [Wordsworth]
began to see that the link between one moment and another in a single
mind could have the resonance, and oddly something also of the moral
weight, of a revelation between moments in two minds.”53 I believe that he
realized this even earlier, when he was working on The Borderers. In this
play, as in Hamlet, the dialogue between me and myself—soliloquy—
stands behind much of the dramatic dialogue. The conversations between
Rivers and Mortimer, Rivers’s “shadow” (V.i.33), are versions of a deeper
conversation Wordsworth is having with both past and present selves.
And this conversation has lasting consequences for both Wordsworth’s
poetry and his politics. In 1798, Coleridge sent a letter to his brother, con-
cerning his dismissal of politics: “I wish to be a good man & a Christian—
but I am no Whig, no Reformist, no Republican.” He had retired to the
country “to muse on fundamental & general causes.” Then he added an
extraordinary claim:
I love fields & woods & mounta[ins] with almost a visionary fondness—
and because I have found benevolence & quietness growing within me as
that fondness [has] increased, therefore I should wish to be the means of
implanting it in others—& to destroy the bad passions not by combating
them, but by keeping them in inaction.54
Coleridge sounds much more like Wordsworth than himself here. The let-
ter testifies to his friend’s remarkable powers of influence. Yet inaction can
be a public virtue as well as a private one—in fact, it can be public by virtue
of its privacy, by virtue of its independence. Consider Hannah Arendt’s
thoughts, arising out of the ashes of a Holocaust so much more devastat-
ing than the Reign of Terror. She sees thinking as being able to “prevent
catastrophes” caused by the bureaucratization of cruelty by providing us
with a stopping point. Paradoxically, thought becomes a form of action pre-
cisely in its tendency to oppose action:
When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does
and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their
refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. In
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such emergencies, it turns out that the purging component of thinking . . .
is political by implication.55
For Wordsworth, though, thinking has as much to do with suffering as
with action. When Rivers reveals his plot to Mortimer, he tells him that
his sin will be his salvation: “Enough is done to save you from the curse /
Of living without knowledge that you live. / You will be taught to think”
(IV.ii.204–6). The later version of the play replaces the final line quoted
with “Now you are suffering,” as though thought and suffering were
equivalent processes. In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth reflects
on the symbiotic relationship between thought and feeling: “our contin-
ued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which
are indeed the representatives of our past feelings.”56 Emotions (and suf-
fering in particular), Wordsworth seems to want to argue, can be composed
of ideas as forceful—as difficult and worthy of consideration—as those of
any “independent intellect.” It is a belief worth keeping in mind when we
consider his attitude toward characters like Johnny, the idiot boy, or
Margaret, or the Leech Gatherer. And as Lionel Trilling points out, “if
between sentiments and ideas there is a natural connection so close as to
amount to a kind of identity, then the connection between literature and
politics will be seen as a very immediate one.”57 The idea must have struck
Wordsworth, also.
Yet while Wordsworth’s interest in internalization in The Borderers
seems to suggest the moral possibilities of inaction and suffering in a time
of revolutionary fervor, at the same time he is critical of such a stance.
Because Mortimer does nothing, he kills a good man. Wordsworth’s con-
fusion yields inevitable frustration. If we are not to act, what are we to do?
Unlike Coleridge or Keats or Shelley, Wordsworth rarely strikes a con-
vincingly sustained note of self-criticism. Usually, moments of doubt are
quickly followed upon by compensatory recognition, as in “Resolution
and Independence”; often, one gets the sense that Wordsworth is secretly
proud of what he presents as a flaw. But in The Borderers, the critique feels
very real, a fact that stands behind the genuine force of the work.
Wordsworth articulates his frustration through Mortimer’s awareness of
the apparent impotence of verbal appeals—like, for example, those made
by poetry:
Why may we speak these things, and do no more,
Why should a thrust of the arm have such a power,
And words that tell these things be heard in vain? (2237–39)
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Hence Mortimer’s envy of the worm
that, underneath a stone whose weight
Would crush the lion’s paw with mortal anguish,
Doth lodge, and feed, and coil, and sleep, in safety. (1794–96)
The intensity of Mortimer’s desire to be outside of the political fray must have
some source in Wordsworth’s experiences in France. Note again the longing
that Mortimer expresses for sleep, the ultimate in (living) physical inactivity.
At the end of The Borderers, when Rivers expresses his wish to go with
Mortimer to Palestine, where they will find a less “paltry field for enter-
prise” (2251), Mortimer proves that he has learned his lesson:
Men are there, millions, Rivers,
Who with bare hands would have plucked out thy heart
And flung it to the dogs: but I am raised
Above, or sunk below, all further sense
Of provocation. (2260–64)58
This is not simply Christian quietism, a “turn the other cheek” mentality.
Mortimer now recognizes his capacity for action, but he also knows his
duty: “there lies not now / Within the compass of a mortal thought, / A
deed that I would shrink from;—but to endure, / That is my destiny”
(2267–70). The field of action no longer appeals to him, although
Mortimer seems unsure whether the change in him is a noble one—
whether he has been “raised above” action or has “sunk below” it—as I
have argued that Wordsworth is unsure in this play as to whether action
or inaction is the best route toward self-consciousness. The play concludes
appropriately with a final bow and flourish to Hamlet. Mortimer calls on
Lacy, his Horatio, to “Raise on that dreary Waste a monument / That may
record my story” (2294–95). Words take over from deeds as the curtain
falls on the scene. It is as though Wordsworth were fulfilling the prophesy
of the epigraph from Pope that he appended to his play:
Of human actions reason though you can,
It may be reason, but it is not man;
His principle of action once explore,
That instant ’tis his principle no more.59
Having explored the principle of action, Wordsworth abandons it.
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The White Doe of Rylstone; or, The Fate of the Nortons
If The Borderers allows for two mutually exclusive and yet coexistent analy-
ses of the relationship between action and consciousness, The White Doe of
Rylstone also incorporates two perspectives on issues of action, indicated
already by the titles Wordsworth offers for his poem. The preferred title
suggests a lyrical treatment similar to “Hart-leap Well,” another poem by
Wordsworth about a place in which a deer is the genius loci. But the alter-
native title hints at the action-filled ballad “The Rising in the North” that
served as Wordsworth’s source for his tale, which he notably (given the epic
intents of his poem) considers to be “much better than Virgil had for his
Aeneid.”60 The split parallels the narrative’s two strands, one of which stays
with Emily (whom the story associates with the Doe) in her sufferings at
home, while the other follows her brother Francis’s participation in the
revolt that brings on his family’s fate. Wordsworth’s ordering of his titles
should be taken as a normative judgment about the relative importance and
success of both the two plot lines and the kinds of action—or inaction—
they portray.
Like The Borderers, The White Doe takes on the theme of revolution by
representing a conflict far in the past, in this case the Catholic uprising
against the Protestant Queen Elizabeth. Again, the locale is northern, and
again we are presented with two main characters—here a brother and sis-
ter—who are versions not only of one another but also (as we shall see) of
their poet. The opening canto of the poem provides a frame to which
Wordsworth never returns that introduces the reader to the Doe and her
environment in Bolton Priory and describes, in the manner of “The
Thorn,” a series of interpretations of her presence offered by a collection
of churchgoers.61 The narrator then promises an accurate interpretation,
and the tale proper commences with a description of Emily, the sole
daughter of the Norton household, who has been forced against her reli-
gious conscience to embroider a banner for the Nortons to take into bat-
tle. While her father and most of her brothers are Catholic, Emily, like
Francis and their deceased mother, is Protestant. Francis also faces a crisis
of conscience. At first he refuses to join his father and brothers in the
revolt, trying instead to persuade Norton of the folly of his cause. But
when this attempt proves unsuccessful, he succumbs to his sense of loyal-
ty to family and decides to follow them into battle. He insists, however,
that Emily stay at home, despite her desire to join the rest of her family;
“Her duty is to stand and wait,” Francis declares, invoking Milton’s reflec-
tion that “They also serve who only stand and wait.”62
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The remaining five cantos alternate loosely between relating the story
as Francis experiences it on the field of battle and as Emily hears it told
back in Rylstone-hall by an old man whom she sends out as scout. Francis
finds that his family has been imprisoned. His father makes of him one
request: that he take from the enemy the banner that Emily had embroi-
dered and return it to Bolton Priory. While Francis rescues the banner, he
is killed before he can fulfill his mission. The final canto tells Emily’s
response to the tragedy. Initially, she succumbs to complete despair and—
like Mortimer—“wander[s], long and far” (1630). Eventually Emily
returns to the Priory, where she reencounters the White Doe. The Doe
becomes her constant companion, giving her a renewed feeling of kinship
with the world, to which she is again “tied” until her death (1883). The
poem concludes by describing the Doe’s loyal vigilance over Emily’s
grave.
As readers have argued from the start, Wordsworth ran into problems
balancing the two strands of his narrative. In the initial version of the
poem, Emily’s role seems to have been much more limited in the opening
cantos. For Coleridge, advising his friend in 1808 on the draft he had been
sent, the imbalance was linked to what he called “a disproportion of the
Accidents to the spiritual Incidents” in the work; in other words,
Wordsworth’s interest in the “filial Heroism” of Francis and his brothers was
too divorced from the almost “separate (& doubtless most exquisit Poem)
wholly of [Emily].”63 While Coleridge’s complaint about disproportion in
the poem targets its lack of outward action (what he calls “Accidents”), he
seems nevertheless to prefer Emily’s lyrical, “spiritual” portion of the nar-
rative. Compare Geoffrey Hartman’s assessment of Coleridge’s comment:
“Coleridge saw at once that there were really two stories: the ballad of
Emily (almost totally Wordsworth’s own) and the ballad of the revolt
(based on historical tradition).”64 Both Coleridge and Hartman imply that
there is something un-Wordsworthian about Francis’s story. In part, in
what follows, I am trying to revise this estimation of especially that latter
“part” of the poem by suggesting that in The White Doe of Rylstone, we have
in fact not two but three very Wordsworthian narratives (adding the story
of the Doe herself, with whom the poem begins and ends): the first, of
Wordsworth of the period of the French Revolution, as he actually had
been; the second, of Wordsworth as he wished to be known, as he came to
mythologize himself; and the third, of Wordsworth as he would strive
(almost incomprehensibly) to become.
An earlier letter to Coleridge suggests Wordsworth would have been pre-
pared for his friend’s objection:
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I also told Lamb that I did not think the Poem could ever be popular . . .
because the main catastrophe was not a material but an intellectual one; I
said to him further that it could not be popular because some of the prin-
cipal objects and agents, such as the Banner and the Doe, produced their
influences and effects not by powers naturally inherent in them, but such as
they were endued with by the Imagination of the human minds on whom
they operated.65
In both of these points, Wordsworth calls attention to his poem’s interest
in the inner life—the intellectual, the imaginative—rather than its outward
manifestations. In this, it represents a narrative parallel to the closet
drama. Note how no mention is made at this point of his human actors.
Instead, Wordsworth writes first of two things at the center of the narra-
tive that are important not because of their material nature but because of
their effect on the subjects who encounter them.66 Moreover, Wordsworth
describes the banner and the Doe as not just objects, but also “agents,” as
though the agency of the people in his tale had been displaced onto them.
This choice of words makes sense, as Wordsworth recognized that the
problem with his poem was one of action. He continues his letter:
further, that the principle of action in all the characters, as in the Old Man,
and his Sons, and Francis, . . . was throughout imaginative; and that all
action (save the main traditionary tragedy), i.e., all the action proceeding
from the will of the chief agents, was fine-spun and inobtrusive, conso-
nant in this to the principle from which it flowed, and in harmony with
the shadowy influence of the Doe, by whom the poem is introduced, and
in whom it ends.67
In calling his principle of action “imaginative” and his action “fine-spun
and inobtrusive,” Wordsworth suggests that the Doe, in her very ghostli-
ness, represents the principle of action expressed by the narrative as a
whole. In part, Wordsworth wanted to distinguish the action of the poem
from the action of traditional ballads—his own ballads are lyrical. As a
reviewer in The Eclectic put it, in terms remarkably similar to
Wordsworth’s description of his work, the reader expects “some busy nar-
rative of lofty adventure, such as Walter Scott’s tales had led us to associ-
ate with the metre,” but instead is “forced to stand in Rylstone
Church-yard and look all the while at a White Doe, and listen all the
while to a rhapsody . . . upon its whiteness, and brightness, and famous-
ness, and holiness.”68 In other words, the poem forces us to assume
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Emily’s position in regard to its events; like hers, our duty is to stand and
wait—and think.
So when in 1843, in the Fenwick Note to the poem, Wordsworth
reflected back on his work, his comments contain a certain ambiguity.
“Everything that is attempted by the principal personages in ‘The
White Doe’ fails, so far as its object is external and substantial,” he
admitted, but “So far as it is moral and spiritual it succeeds.”69 On the
one hand, Wordsworth is giving us an assessment of his poem as a lit-
erary work: like Coleridge, he seems to have thought he had succeeded
with Emily’s plot but failed with that of the Norton uprising. But on
the other hand, the passage can be read as an indictment of outward
action in the world: “moral” in this analysis is the opposite of “external,”
in the same way that “spiritual” obviously stands in contrast with “sub-
stantial.” So attempts at external acts will necessarily fail, because the
structure of action contains inherent flaws. Consider, for example, the
bind in which the narrative places Francis: he must betray either his
family or his God; anything he does will involve him in sin.
Wordsworth’s remark calls to mind an observation from The Convention
of Cintra (1808) (ironically, a political pamphlet arguing for English
activism in fighting French oppression of the Spanish): “The true sor-
row of humanity consists in this;—not that the mind of man fails; but
that the course and demands of action and of life so rarely correspond
with the dignity and intensity of human desires.”70 Both passages point
to the necessary failure of action in comparison to possible successes in
the mind of man. Action inadequately represents the mind, just as
Wordsworth’s poem inadequately represents action. Thus when in 1836
Wordsworth declared that The White Doe was “in conception, the high-
est work he had ever produced,” he was really arguing for its achieve-
ment in the only realm in which genuine success is possible: the mind.71
As Hamlet’s Player King declares, “Our thoughts are ours, their ends
none of our own.”72
In the Fenwick Note, Wordsworth related his success in the poem to its
interest in the will rather than action: “The mere physical action was all
unsuccessful; but the true action of the poem was spiritual—the subduing
of the will and all inferior passion, to the perfect purifying and spiritualiz-
ing of the intellectual nature.”73 The subduing of the will is the subject of
Wordsworth’s great “Ode to Duty” (composed 1804–7), which resonates
deeply in Wordsworth’s treatment of Emily, as we shall see. But the com-
ment also recalls the sonnet Advertisement to The White Doe, added in
1820, only to be removed in 1827. The sonnet begins:
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“Weak is the will of Man, his judgement blind;
Remembrance persecutes, and Hope betrays;
Heavy is woe;—and joy, for human kind,
A mournful thing, so transient is the blaze!”
(p. 76; Wordsworth’s quotation marks)
Wordsworth somewhat counters this view in the rest of the sonnet, where
he discourses on the healing powers of Imagination and Faith that are so
central to his narrative. But in 1832, he replaced the prefatory poem with
the lines from The Borderers (followed immediately by their own parallel
religious appendix, describing the solace for suffering to be found by “toil-
ing” with “patient thought” or being “wafted” on “wings of prayer”). I
repeat them here for comparison:
Action is transitory—a step, a blow,
The motion of a muscle—this way or that—
’Tis done; & in the after-vacancy
We wonder at ourselves like men betrayed:
Suffering is permanent obscure & dark,
And has the nature of infinity. (p. 77)
The betrayal of action replaces that of hope, the transience of action stands
in for that of joy, and the persecution of remembrance gives way to won-
der at the after-vacancy of action.
Yet action differs from volition by its externality, by, to be precise, “the
motion of a muscle.” Only in a narrative in which the will is allowed so little
outlet in action can these passages be substituted for one another without a
shift in meaning; it is as though Wordsworth—and the poem as a whole—
forces volition and action to be equated: to will something (or even to hope
for it) is as much as to do it.74 To say this is to claim that The White Doe works
to push action off its narrative surface by internalizing it. I have argued for a
sequential reading of the above passage: action is transitory, but it causes per-
manent suffering, and hence self-consciousness. I have also shown how the
role of inaction in The Borderers complicates the connection between action
and self-consciousness by suggesting that an act of omission can also gener-
ate reflection. But now, I shall demonstrate that in The White Doe of Rylstone,
Wordsworth attempts to do away with the need for action altogether—just
as he kills off the Norton men, including even the Mortimer-like Francis—
and in the process rewrites his own history of involvement with the
Revolution. Action is transitory and suffering permanent. Why then act at all?
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FIf one were to search for a real proponent of action in Wordsworth’s White
Doe of Rylstone, it would be found in old Norton, a figure of patriarchal
heroism. Willard Spiegelman has argued that “thematically, the poem con-
cerns types of heroic behavior, one active, the other passive, and refuses to
acknowledge the superiority of either.”75 But Norton (whom Spiegelman
properly takes to be the work’s advocate of action) seems to represent the
impossibly simple, and therefore dangerously outmoded, virtue of a past
era, and his bold action leads his family to its disastrous fate, the “tradi-
tionary tragedy” of which Wordsworth wrote. Moreover, from the per-
spective of the poem, his Catholicism links his virtue inseparably to
superstition. So Wordsworth lacks interest in Norton; his real concern is
reserved for the comparison between the forms of action—or, rather, inac-
tion—proposed by Francis and Emily, the poem’s two protagonists.76
The first thing to notice is just how similar the state of affairs in the
poem is to that Wordsworth faced during the French Revolution.
Consider Old Norton’s remarks about the failure of the revolt:
Might this our enterprise have sped,
Change wide and deep the Land had seen,
A renovation from the dead,
A spring-tide of immortal green. (1276–79)
Such utopian hope was characteristic of France in the early 1790s, as expe-
rienced by the young Wordsworth. Yet Wordsworth’s position soon
became complicated by conflicting loyalties. In a scenario represented in
The White Doe by the split in the Norton family’s religious affiliations,
Wordsworth’s republican beliefs stood in opposition to those of his royal-
ist lover, who was increasingly endangered as the Terror progressed.
Moreover, Wordsworth’s loyalty to France alienated him from his fellow cit-
izens upon his return to England, as The Prelude movingly recounts.
Tempestuous times sever the organic self from its well-rooted past:
I, who with the breeze
Had played, a green leaf on the blessèd tree
Of my belovèd country, nor had wished
For happier fortune than to wither there,
Now from my pleasant station was cut off
And tossed about in whirlwinds. (Prelude X.254)
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Francis suffers just such alienation from his family and northern country-
men. They label him a “coward” (928) for standing by his beliefs and
avoiding the battle. And his religious brethren offer no alternative com-
munity. One recalls how in The Borderers Herbert had branded Mortimer
a “wild Freebooter,” one who “upon the borders of the Tweed, / Doth prey
alike on two distracted countries, / Traitor to both” (207, 208–10). Francis
soon discovers that Elizabeth’s soldiers despise him for his disloyalty to his
family:
He did not arm, he walked aloof!
For why?—to save his Father’s Land;
Worst Traitor of them all is he,
A Traitor dark and cowardly! (1482–85)
The sense of “treachery and desertion” (Prelude X.380) affects both
Wordsworth and Francis strongly as they find themselves taking sides in a
struggle against their compatriots.
So just as Wordsworth sits silently in church “like an uninvited guest . . .
/ Whom no one owned” (Prelude X.273–74), surrounded by his fellow
Englishmen but feeling only more strongly for that the divide between him
and them, Francis watches alone from above the field of battle, like
One
With unparticipated gaze;
Who ’mong these thousands friend hath none,
And treads in solitary ways. (760–63)77
The idea of “unparticipated gaze”—marvelous phrase—hints at the curse
of spectatorship that Wordsworth must have experienced while witnessing
the whirlwind of revolutionary activity surrounding him. It also calls to
mind what William Jewett has described in relationship to The Borderers
as “the failure of the specular mechanism of moral discourse”—that is, the
distinction between sympathetic spectatorship and action.78 Or as David
Marshall puts it, Wordsworth’s play “insists that the eyewitnesses of its
tragedy acknowledge their roles as eyewitnesses: in acting the role of an eye-
witness who cannot cross the border of the stage and leave the silence and
inaction, the audience enters the scene of the crime that the theater itself
compulsively returns to and repeats night after night.”79 Wordsworth
exhibits the compulsion of repetition in his work. He attempts to com-
pensate for his own “inaction” by filling the “silence” with his obsessively
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recurring memories. When he places Francis alone atop that hillside, gaz-
ing down upon the battle that rages below him, he is reliving the experi-
ence of his own Revolution.
Given that both Mortimer and Francis resemble Wordsworth, it should
come as no surprise they also resemble one another. The connection
between Wordsworth and his two heroes is hinted at by the fact that
Francis is almost able to persuade one of his brothers, suggestively named
Marmaduke—the name Wordsworth gives to Mortimer in the revised ver-
sion of The Borderers—of the hopelessness of the Nortons’ cause. The
“pensive” Marmaduke, who of all the Norton men is most like Francis,
seems at first to be “yielding inwardly” to his brother’s arguments (495).
The resemblance appears most distinctly, though, in the description of
Francis’s chief action in the drama: his retrieval of the banner. With “a look
of calm command,” Francis takes the banner from a soldier’s hand. But it
is not until later that he realizes his deed:
He marked not, heard not as he fled;
All but the suffering heart was dead
For him abandoned to blank awe,
To vacancy, and horror strong:
And the first object which he saw,
With conscious sight, as he swept along—
It was the banner in his hand!
He felt—and made a sudden stand.
He looked about like one betrayed:
What hath he done? (p. 129)80
Once again, the by-now-familiar collection of terms: the vacancy, the
blank awe, the suffering, and, above all, the betrayal into action.
Somewhere between unconsciously being swept along and consciously see-
ing the banner in his hand (the source and locus of action), Francis has
shared Mortimer’s experience in The Borderers. Wordsworth has com-
pressed the crisis of action explored by his earlier work into a few lines, and
his decision to annex the corresponding lines from the play to this new
poem shows his conscious recognition of the connection between the
texts.
Like Mortimer’s forgetting of Herbert’s scrip of food, Francis’s
“crime”—if in fact crime it be—is involuntary. And in a way, this excuses
it. Given that his loyalties are divided and that his duties to family and to
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his religion are irreconcilable, anything he could do would have to go
against his conscience. Again, we can see how Wordsworth’s revolutionary
experiences would have made him acutely aware of this difficulty. But to
do nothing would be a choice in itself, as Wordsworth would have recog-
nized. Wordsworth “saves” Francis by letting him act involuntarily. By
dividing action from intention, Francis can remain in some sense “true” to
both sets of responsibilities. Appropriately, he responds with his acts of
body to the demands of his father, the poem’s chief advocate of action, and
with his intentions to his religion, the internally driven Protestantism.
Wordsworth had already emphasized the involuntary nature of Francis’s
actions at an earlier point in the text—as in The Borderers, it becomes clear
that we are witnessing a tragedy of repetition. A remarkable sequence
shows just how complicated the path from intention to action can be and
demonstrates how the conflict Francis faces tears him apart, body and
soul. Wordsworth tells us how Francis “unknowingly” grabs a lance to
himself only seconds before declaring his inability to join his father and
brothers: “With theirs my efforts cannot blend, / I cannot for such cause
contend” (511–12). But pulled by love for his family, he revises his posi-
tion by drawing on the distinction between will and deed: “Their aims I
utterly forswear; / But I in body will be there” (513–14). Only after declar-
ing his intention to follow his family with “an empty hand” (519) does he
notice his hold on the lance. Immediately, he throws the weapon away:
“Spurned it, like something that would stand / Between him and the pure
intent / Of love on which his soul is bent” (522–24).
Both passage and poem demonstrate that pure intent and action can
never coincide, precisely because intentions necessarily become muddied in
the impure medium of the world; “the course and demands of action and
of life so rarely correspond with the dignity and intensity of human
desires” (as Wordsworth noted in The Convention of Cintra). Action fails
to represent intent. So we need some better source for the self than in
deeds—something more essential to it, less liable to the corruption that
comes from external circumstances. Robert Langbaum makes this point in
relation to The Borderers when he notes that although Rivers and
Mortimer “do” the same thing, our moral judgment of them differs: “The
difference depends not on what the characters do but on what they are.”81
Or consider Kant’s observation: “even the strictest examination can never
lead us entirely behind the secret incentives, for, when moral worth is in
question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner prin-
ciples which one does not see.”82 For Kant, the problem of recognizing
moral worth is rendered almost impossible because of the difficulty in see-
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ing behind the mechanism of action. Real worth lies veiled behind the acci-
dents of the phenomenal world. The incompatibility of ends—like
Francis’s desire to maintain loyalty to both his religion and his family—
further obscures our ability to see character through action. Whether or
not he joins in the battle, his actions will conceal an essential aspect of his
character.
Hence the uneasy split we see in Francis between his active Norton self
and his willing Protestant self. But the division between action and inten-
tion, while it rescues Francis from the dilemma in which he finds himself,
proves costly. After retrieving the banner from the enemy, Francis is left
wondering: “How has the Banner clung so fast / To a palsied and uncon-
scious hand” (p. 130)? As in The Borderers, a sense of self-consciousness
develops out of the wonder: “No choice is left, the deed is mine—”
(1448). His act is constitutive of his self—it is his. But divorced from
intention, it also creates a kind of emptiness in Francis, a loss of agency:
“No choice is left.” Instead of acting for himself, Francis seems to be pro-
viding the body for the enactment of the wishes of his dead relatives.
When earlier Francis had unconsciously grasped hold of the lance, he had
simultaneously remarked (twice) on the departure of his father and broth-
ers: “Gone are they” (459, 466). Now, as if to emphasize the parallels
between the two moments of unconscious action, Wordsworth repeats the
inverted word order. Francis turns from his admission of responsibility for
his act, “the deed is mine—,” immediately to his next task, “Dead are they,
dead!—and I will go” (1449). With his family “gone” in a deeper sense,
Francis must “go” himself. And the odd slippage of vowel sounds between
deed and dead proves prophetic. Having already relinquished his will, he
now must relinquish his body; having done, he now must die. In his final
act, appropriately committed “instinctively” (1505)—that is, once again,
without conscious volition—Francis seizes a lance from a pikeman who has
advanced to regain the banner only to be brought down in the general
onslaught.
I want to suggest that in killing Francis, Wordsworth attempts to lay to
rest the ghost of his revolutionary self and all that self ’s involvements,
however ambivalent, with the world of action. In place of that self he
offers us another, revised version of who he was during the last decade of
the eighteenth century: Emily. This might seem a curious claim, but we
have seen already how closely Wordsworth affiliated himself with the
poetics of her strand of The White Doe. The “passive stillness” (1090) she
displays should be compared to the “wise passiveness” Wordsworth argues
for in “Expostulation and Reply.” Moreover, for anyone acquainted with
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the odd sense of removal from his fellow men so characteristic of much of
Wordsworth’s mature poetry, his description of Emily’s self-containment
should resonate strongly:
Her soul doth in itself stand fast,
Sustained by memory of the past
And strength of Reason; held above
The infirmities of mortal love;
Undaunted, lofty, calm and stable,
And awfully impenetrable. (1642–47)
Wordsworth shares his heroine’s capacity for radical disinterestedness and
her tendency to retreat into memory. Like Emily, he has been “taught to
feel, perhaps too much, / The self-sufficing power of Solitude” (Prelude
II.78–79). Self-sufficiency puts, after all, a premium on the very selfhood
that has been so threatened by the turmoil of revolution.
The connections between Emily’s narrative and the “Ode to Duty,” a
poem so clearly written in Wordsworth’s own voice and completed at rough-
ly the same time he wrote The White Doe, emphasize the link between the
author and his creation. In the dedicatory poem to The White Doe,
Wordsworth compares Emily’s story to that of Spenser’s Una; both tell “Of
female patience winning firm repose” (p. 50). But in the Ode, in “long[ing]
for a repose which ever is the same,” Wordsworth proves his own desire for
such patience. In lines later excluded from the published poem, he puns on
the meaning of his Christian name: “Denial and restraint I prize / No farther
than they breed a second Will more wise”—wise, that is, in passiveness. With
Emily, as with Dorothy in “Tintern Abbey,” the vessel for Wordsworth’s sec-
ond self turns out to be female, and a sister. In “Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth
depicted Dorothy as possessing an animal-like innocence curiously like that
of the Doe, who seems to serve in the final canto of the work, like Dorothy
in the earlier poem, as a vessel for memories—“This lovely Chronicler of
things / Long past, delights and sorrowings” (1694–95). In contrast, Emily’s
womanhood does not detract from her rationality. Furthermore, her gender
constrains her action in a fashion that saves her from the kind of the dilem-
mas in which Francis finds himself embroiled; her place cannot be on the bat-
tlefield with her brothers.83 So in choosing a female self, Wordsworth helps
distance himself from his revolutionary actions and excuse his revolutionary
inactions. Because “Her duty is to stand and wait,” Emily can reflect on the
horrible events occurring around her without being implicated in them.
Instead, she can focus on her suffering and the suppression of her will to act.84
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In the “Ode to Duty,” Wordsworth quotes Raphael’s injunction to
Adam to be “lowly wise.”85 Milton’s influence is also pervasive in The
White Doe, in spite of the Dedication’s reference to Spenser. And this
makes sense if we consider that Wordsworth was thinking about his revo-
lutionary experiences. Milton’s belief that “They also serve who only stand
and wait” can be read to reflect and anticipate his own complicated rela-
tionship to political activity during a period of civil war and unrest.
Emily’s heroism exhibits Miltonic ideals of restraint and denial, of resis-
tance to the temptation of action. And like Milton, Wordsworth believes
that such heroism can be figured as epic. In fact, in the Fenwick Note he
quotes from Milton’s Invocation to book IX of Paradise Lost when refer-
ring to the superiority of mental struggle like Emily’s to the bodily battles
that make up standard epic fare: “How insignificant a thing, for example,
does personal prowess appear compared with the fortitude of patience and
heroic martyrdom.”86 Wordsworth begins his epic quest of self-exploration,
The Prelude, by alluding to the closing lines of Paradise Lost: “The earth is
all before me” (Prelude I.17), but Emily’s epic more closely resembles
Milton’s greatest poem of inaction: Paradise Regained. Geoffrey Hartman
compares the “triumph of privacy” in The White Doe to Christ’s at the end
of Milton’s poem.87 Like Christ, Emily must repeatedly resist tempta-
tions—“Ah tempt me not!” (1104)—first to act, by joining her brothers,
and finally, shockingly, to hope for their well-being (recall how the Son
must avoid even the temptation to charity). As Evan Radcliffe has shown,
her suffering—and Wordsworth frequently refers to her as “the Sufferer”
(1024, 1579, 1721)—emphasizes the degree to which her role should be
perceived as an “imitatio Christi.”88
Yet Emily does do something: she embroiders the banner. Like
Wordsworth, she is an artist.89 Wordsworth actually invokes Miltonic cre-
ation (“Thou from the first / Wast present, and with mighty wings out-
spread / Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss / And mad’st it
pregnant”90) in Old Norton’s representation of his daughter at work:
A maid o’er whom the blessed Dove
Vouchsafed in gentleness to brood
While she the holy work pursued. (673–75)
In implicitly comparing the banner to the poem on which so much of his
own epic writing is based, he also compares Emily’s art to his own.
But Emily’s work also parallels the more overt deed of her brother in res-
cuing the banner. Like Francis, she acts out of loyalty to her family, not from
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internal conviction. The will behind her deed comes from her father: “She
did in passiveness obey, / But her Faith leaned another way” (876–77). Her
completion of the task set her is subjected to narrative criticism; we are told
she fulfills her father’s “headstrong will” “Too perfectly,” as though she
should have indicated her resistance more forcefully (353–54). Yet in a way,
this resistance is encoded in the banner itself. As we shall see, “the banner
of battle”91 becomes a standard emblem for writers who wish to resurrect
the possibility of heroic action or lament its passing. But the symbolism of
Emily’s banner is much more mixed. In another example of the way
Wordsworth links Emily to Christ, the banner’s embroidered picture—the
five wounds of Christ—represents the Passion. The OED’s second defini-
tion for passion is “The being passive.” Wordsworth’s choice of image con-
fuses the symbolic value of the banner by making it combine a subject
closely affiliated with a suffering passivity with an object that signifies mil-
itary action. In a way, then, the banner can be aligned more properly with
Francis, who, like it, is caught between alternate impulses to action and
inaction, than with the other Norton men, who stand firmly in the camp
of action. Hence the graphic mingling in death of Francis’s blood with that
of Christ’s wounds on the banner; as Martin Price points out, “They are not
stained with Francis’s blood but ‘tinged more deeply,’” as though to suggest
a reciprocal ministering of a sacrament.92
Yet the conflation between active and passive significations of the ban-
ner need not indicate in Emily, as it does in relation to Francis, the pres-
ence of a lasting internal conflict. In fact, Wordsworth intends us to see a
more positive paradox in Emily’s passivity, which, he wishes us to feel, is
very much active. In the April 1808 letter to Coleridge, he told his friend
that Emily “is intended to be honoured and loved for what she endures, and
the manner in which she endures it; accomplishing a conquest over her own
sorrows.”93 Conquest implies activity. As Radcliffe puts it, her resignation
“appears as a willed choice, not as an abdication of will and choice”94; recall
how Wordsworth, in the “Ode to Duty” declares “That [his] submissive-
ness was choice.” Wordsworth argues for a connection between passion
and action in his “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface” (1815):
Passion, it must be observed, is derived from a word which signifies, suf-
fering; but the connection which suffering has with effort, with exertion,
and action, is immediate and inseparable. . . . To be moved . . . by a pas-
sion, is to be excited, often to external, and always to internal effort;
whether for the continuance and strengthening of the passion, or for its
suppression. 95 (original emphasis)
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In Emily’s case, her passion leads to an internal effort of suppression, as we
have seen, and—after some years of very Wordsworthian wandering—
yields the reward of her “lofty, calm, and stable, / And awfully impenetra-
ble” consciousness. Emily’s more resolute form of inaction, which finds
outlet only in artistic (as opposed to bodily) deeds, allows her to survive
intact the revolution that brought Francis to his death. Wordsworth disso-
ciates himself from the kinds of autobiographical conflicts he presented
through characters such as Rivers, Mortimer, and Francis, while Emily
becomes the true representative of the poet’s past: a revised “second self ”
who like her author has lived a life that “has been unusually barren of
events.”96
And her conquest proves to have generic ramifications. Wordsworth
defended Emily’s actionless story in the 1808 letter to Coleridge:
When it is considered what has already been executed in Poetry, strange
that a man cannot perceive . . . that this is the time when a man of genius
may honourably take a station upon different ground. If he is to be a
Dramatist, let him crowd his scene with gross and visible action; but if a
narrative Poet, if the Poet is to be predominant over the Dramatist,—then
let him see if there are no victories in the world of spirit, no changes, no
commotions, no revolutions there, no fluxes and refluxes of the thoughts
which may be made interesting by modest combination with the stiller
actions of the bodily frame, or with the gentler movements and milder
appearances of society and social intercourse, or the still more mild and
gentle solicitations of irrational and inanimate nature.97
Wordsworth’s Revolution is finally completed. Gone are the days of flirta-
tion with action, of forays into the dramatic; he has chosen the color of his
flag, and it is to be white, like the Doe after whom he entitles his poem.
From now on, his struggles, like Emily’s, will take place in the world of spir-
it. Yet the letter suggests a greater revolution already set into play, for in
those “gentler movements and milder appearances of society and social
intercourse,” one can glimpse an opening onto a new domain: the world
of the novel.
F
This is the world to which I wish to travel, although not before exploring
a darkened passageway leading up to it: that inhabited by Arthur Hugh
Clough and described in his “novel-in-verse,” Amours de Voyage. It is
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important to recognize, though, that for all the usefulness of his ideas to
the Victorian novelists, for all his influence upon them, Wordsworth has
little of their everyday familiarity. If we are to see in Emily Wordsworth’s
revisionist history of his revolutionary self, then the Doe herself surely
must represent some form of further apotheosis toward which he strives:
“the still more mild and gentle solicitations of irrational and inanimate
nature.” From human to animal (“irrational” nature), and even further to
mineral (“inanimate nature”), Wordsworth seems to be trying to extend to
its utmost limits our comprehension of what can solicit from us a moral
interest.
Emily already exhibits some of the genuine strangeness of Wordsworth’s
moral vision as it develops in response to his revolutionary experiences: his
sense that those who care about those who do are in some way more
admirable—and perhaps also more truly themselves—than those who do.
Initially, on her return from her wanderings, Emily is “held above / The
infirmities of mortal love” (1625–26). Wordsworth recognizes a sinister ele-
ment to her awful impenetrability that leads him to demand of her the
Mariner-like salvation in tears brought on by the ministrations of the Doe,
tears that once again tie her, albeit but “faintly, faintly,” to earth. Those
ties, and their connection to tears, matter to him; as Wordsworth tells us
at the start, he wishes to present us with “A tale of tears, a mortal story!”
(336). After all, he is the poet for whom happiness must be found “in the
very world which is the world / Of all of us, . . . / . . . or not at all” (Prelude
X.726–28), who wishes to show his readers how the “Love of Nature” can
“lead” to the “Love of Mankind,” as the subtitle to book VIII of The
Prelude puts it, and as the Doe, presumably, teaches Emily. Yet
Wordsworth’s morality can often appear a rather inhuman commodity.
The Wanderer of The Excursion (the Pedlar of “The Ruined Cottage”),
Wordsworth’s greatest purveyor of the milk of human kindness, can “afford
to suffer / With those whom he saw suffer” precisely because he has felt
“No piteous revolutions” (Excursion I.370–71, 359; original emphasis).98 It
is a strange vision of sympathy, one that lacks the reciprocity of emotion-
al experience one would expect from the poet who calls himself “a man
speaking to men.”99
Wordsworth seems to struggle over Emily’s humanity in a way that he
need not struggle with the Doe herself. As a creature of nature the Doe
requires no emotional ties to connect her to the earth; her very being
belongs to it. Nevertheless, Wordsworth clearly intends her to represent a
form if not of sympathy, at least of comfort. The Doe first appears to
Emily just after Francis has admonished her, twice, to “Hope nothing”
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(530, 532). We can think of her as a representative of a kind of pure hope,
one divorced from any potential for action—a passive hope that stands in
the same place in the building of the self that will and action might oth-
erwise have occupied. She is also a symbol of memory, as her ghostly pres-
ence in the poem, her lingering over Emily’s grave, attests. In The
Excursion, the Solitary expresses his desire for “The life where hope and
memory are as one” (Excursion III.400), a life without revolutionary tran-
sitions in character. Yet such a life would also lack the genuine sense of
time, of possible change, of action as an enabler of change. Where hope
and memory are as one, can either be said truly to exist?
Wordsworth concludes The White Doe of Rylstone by musing on the
Doe’s “smile” as she looks down upon Emily’s resting place: “Thou, thou
art not a child of time, / But Daughter of the Eternal Prime!” (1928–29).
Presumably, Emily’s humanity renders her time bound—that is, subject to
a death from which the Doe is protected by her lack of a distinct self. I am
reminded of Keats’s wonderful vision of “The vale of Soul-making”:
Call the world if you Please “The vale of Soul-making” Then you will find
out the use of the world . . . I say ‘Soul making’ Soul as distinguished from
an Intelligence—There may be intelligences or sparks of the divinity in
millions—but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one
is personally itself. I[n]telligences are atoms of perception—they know
and they see and they are pure, in short they are God—how then are
Souls to be made? How then are these sparks which are God to have iden-
tity given them—so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to each ones indi-
vidual existence? How but by the medium of a world like this?100
Keats’s humanism stands in stark contrast to Wordsworth’s moral vision.
Wordsworth suggests that death is desirable precisely because it presents a
release from human individuation as we understand it. He may yearn to
have his voice preserved in perpetuity upon the earth by a whole chorus of
“second selves,” but one feels that this is in part to compensate for the fact
that identity in the Keatsian sense has no place in Wordsworth’s concep-
tion of the afterlife. Think of Lucy, being “Rolled round in earth’s diurnal
course / With rocks and stones and trees.” Here lies Wordsworth’s most ele-
mentary understanding of the concept of Revolution.
Many of Wordsworth’s more memorable human figures seem almost to
have returned to the state of nature. Consider the much-discussed simile
in “Resolution and Independence,” where the Leech Gatherer melts first
into the rock and then the sea beast, to which he is compared: “Such
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seemed this Man, not all alive nor dead, / Nor all asleep” (71–72). Again
we are presented with what the Solitary in The Excursion calls “the universal
instinct of repose” (Excursion III.397), like Wordsworth’s longing in the
“Ode to Duty” for “a repose which ever is the same,” like Emily’s tale of
“female patience winning firm repose”—and also like Mortimer’s desire for
sleep. Note that in each of these cases, Wordsworth has no interest in the
standard romantic ideology of the dream as a space of freedom and imag-
ination. Rather, he is concerned with a form of self-containment, a self-
hood strangely divorced from the activity of life: “A slumber did my spirit
seal.” While Wordsworth calls the Leech Gatherer “more than human,” he
is so in part because he is less than human. He demonstrates what Lionel
Trilling has called “the morality of inertia,” the morality of the lesser
celandine, who withstands the storm not from “courage” nor from
“choice,” but by “Its necessity in being old.” As Trilling reminds us, “How
often the moral act is performed not because we are we but because we are
there! This is the morality of habit, or the morality of biology.”101
Wordsworth, though, would contest Trilling on one point: “because we are
we” and “because we are there” need not represent such separate motiva-
tions. It is possible to be most oneself by standing still on a spot, by root-
ing oneself to it, by simply being there.
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F2f
The Case of Clough: 
Amours de Voyage and the 
Crisis of Action in Victorian Verse
Trust in nothing but in Providence and your own efforts. Never sep-
arate the two.
—Charles Dickens, Bleak House
IN A LECTURE on Wordsworth’s poetry written in the early 1850s, the poet
Arthur Hugh Clough qualified his great admiration for his predecessor by
remarking on his conservative tendencies, singling out for particular
scrutiny his aversion to action. Quoting Wordsworth, Clough noted that
“The moving accident, as he says, was not his trade; of event and of action
his compositions are perfectly destitute.”1 Rather, according to Clough’s
Wordsworth, “Blue sky and white clouds, larks and linnets, daisies and
celandines—these . . . are ‘the proper subject of mankind’; not, as we used
to think, the wrath of Achilles, the guilt and remorse of Macbeth, the love
and despair of Othello.” Clough ended his review with a warning:
Nevertheless, we fear that the exclusive student of Wordsworth may go
away with the strange persuasion that it is his business to walk about this
world of life and action, and avoiding life and action, have his gentle
thoughts excited by flowers and running waters and shadows on moun-
tain-sides.
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This we conceive is a grievous inherent error in Wordsworth. (PPR I: 324,
325)
Clough’s comments are part of a larger debate in Victorian criticism con-
cerning the appropriate role for action in poetry. The discussion often took
the form of a comparison between subjective and objective poetry.
Subjective poetry, essentially Romantic in origin and psychological in
nature, is concerned with interior processes such as thought and emotion.
Objective poetry, in contrast, is classical and corresponds to a poetry of
action, action being defined by its external, bodily nature. The Victorian
debate most famously centered on Matthew Arnold’s programmatic
Preface to his Poems (1853).2 As much a manifesto for his times as was
Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Arnold’s essay was also written as
a response to Aristotle’s dictates in the Poetics concerning the proper roles
for action and character in drama. But the Preface to Poems came directly
out of Arnold’s conversations with his close friend Clough. The two poets
were responding to what they perceived to be the dangerously subjective
tenor of the age, in fact and in literature: its tendency to look inward rather
than outward, to explore thoughts rather than deeds.
And in the middle of the nineteenth century, the battle over action became
particularly visible in the generic tensions of narrative verse. Poets writing
at a period of decline for Romantic poetry—and trying to engage with the
subject matter of the increasingly popular Victorian novel—struggled with
action as a necessary result of their struggles over genre. The result was the
phenomenon of the long Victorian poem, frequently incorporating elements
from a variety of genres. The question of generic hybridity and its relationship
to the place of action and character in literature comes to the fore in one
such poem: Arthur Hugh Clough’s Amours de Voyage (written 1849, pub-
lished 1858). Clough referred to Amours as his “5 act epistolary tragi-com-
edy, or comi-tragedy.”3 Moreover, the work, written as a series of letters composed
in (mock) epic hexameters punctuated by lyrical elegiacs in a narrative voice,
is also in many respects novelistic. Victorian critics were quick to point out
this quality, largely on the basis of its presentation of character.4 Its strug-
gle with genre underlying an obvious concern with issues of action in its
subject matter, Amours de Voyage provides a particularly revealing lens through
which to explore the crisis in action in nineteenth-century thought and its
influence on the literature of the period.
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The Life
To see how Amours relates to the wider atmosphere of crisis, it helps first
to look at the story that developed around the life of its author. In doing
so I follow in the footsteps not only of contemporaries of Clough, but also
of modern critics, most of whom find it difficult to separate analysis of Clough’s
works from that of his life—for excellent reasons, as I hope will become clear.5
While the following biographical material is by now familiar to scholars of
Clough, I want to emphasize the degree to which “the myth of Clough’s
‘failure’” (as Michael Timko has referred to it) gained such a strong hold
on the Victorian critical imagination because of its relationship to what I
call the crisis of action.6
The popular version of Clough’s life, most famously represented (albeit
rather turgidly) by his friend Matthew Arnold in his elegy “Thyrsis”
(1866), is of a man whose overacute sensitivity and hyperactive conscious-
ness inhibited his ability to get things done:
What though the music of thy rustic flute
Kept not for long its happy, country tone;
Lost it too soon, and learnt a stormy note
Of men contention-tost, of men who groan,
Which task’d thy pipe too sore, and tired thy throat—
It fail’d, and thou wast mute!7
Although Clough produced three major poems (The Bothie of Tober-na-
Vuolich [1848],8 Amours de Voyage, and Dipsychus and the Spirit [written
1850, first published, in an edited version, in 1862]) as well as numerous
short works of great merit, his is a story of anticlimax. As G. H. Lewes
wrote when reviewing his posthumous Poems (1862), “he was one of the
prospectuses which never became works: one of that class whose unwrit-
ten poems, undemonstrated discoveries, or untested powers, are confi-
dently announced as certain to carry everything before them, when they
appear. Only they never do appear.”9 To a great extent, the myth is the
product, ironically, of a single defining act. In 1848, after a few years of
holding an Oriel Fellowship, Arthur Hugh Clough found himself unable
to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles and relinquished his post. This
decision prevented him from achieving the success both he and his con-
temporaries had expected. Clough’s deed and its consequences undoubt-
edly led to his great sensitivity to problems surrounding action in the
modern world, a sensitivity that his poetry dramatically reflects.
49The Case of Clough
Markovitz_CH2_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:25 PM  Page 49
The favorite student of Dr. Arnold at Rugby, Clough was marked out
to be the great man of his generation at a time when the mantle of great-
ness was handed down like a crown from generation to generation.10 He
was known by his friends at Oxford as “Citizen Clough” for his radical polit-
ical beliefs—in particular, for his arguments against laissez-faire policies (what
Carlyle tellingly translated as “Donothingism”11). On a more practical level,
he acted as a distributor of meal tickets and administrator of a hospital and
soup kitchen for the Oxford Mendicity Society. But when Clough was infected
with skepticism in Oxford’s heavy atmosphere of religious doubt, the dis-
ease crippled him. He wrote to his sister, “Until I know, I will wait: and if
I am not born with the power to discover, I will do what I can, with what
knowledge I have.”12
Yet just how much one can do without belief is at issue. Perhaps, until
we know, all we can do is wait. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out in
reference to Clough’s early poem, “Qui Laborat, Orat” (“he who labors, prays”),
this is “a beautiful thought concerning one who has never been taught to
pray, [but] a pernicious falsehood about one who has rejected the practice.
With such a one it will soon be Qui non orat, nec laborat!”13 Clough’s men-
tor Carlyle bewailed the crisis in faith by linking it to the passing of an age
of natural action:
Action, in those old days, was easy, was voluntary, for the divine worth of
human things lay acknowledged. . . . 
How changed in these new days! . . . Heroic Action is paralysed; for what
worth now remains unquestionable with [the youth of these times]? At the
fervid period when his whole nature cries aloud for Action, there is noth-
ing sacred under whose banner he can act; the course and kind and con-
ditions of free Action are all but undiscoverable. Doubt storms-in on him
through every avenue; inquiries of the deepest, painfulest sort must be
engaged with; and the invincible energy of young years wastes itself in
sceptical, suicidal cavillings; in passionate ‘questionings of Destiny’;
whereto no answer will be returned.14
Without belief in an end (what Carlyle called a “banner,” using a
metaphor that brings to mind the banner in The White Doe of Rylstone) to
give some kind of narrative intelligibility to effort, the idea of action
becomes meaningless. As Hazlitt put it in his Principles of Human Action
(1805), “without a power of willing a given end for itself, and of employ-
ing the means immediately necessary to the production of that end,
because they are perceived to be so, there could be neither volition, nor
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action, neither rational fear nor the pursuit of any object . . . : all would
be left to the accidental concurrence of some mechanical impulse with the
immediate desire to obtain some very simple object.”15 Why do any one
thing instead of another if you cannot know what is right, or even whether
such a thing as “the right” exists?
The problem is one that has long confronted intellectuals and continues
to do so to this day. Contemporary philosophers such as Alasdair
MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, responding to the current wave of skeptical
thought contained in the relativist discourse of multiculturalism, have addressed
the need in our society for goals that can impose structures of significance
onto a life’s narrative. Not incidentally, both these thinkers approach the
issue from the perspective of their Catholic backgrounds—the same per-
spective John Henry Newman turned to in an attempt to find meaning in
action. They argue that without an end that can give agents a sense of direc-
tion, life narratives lack a kind of plot coherence.16 With his loss of faith,
Clough seems to have lost his understanding of the trajectory of his life.
His religious doubt contributed to his failure to get the first expected of
him. Then in 1848, he made the crucial decision to give up his post; as he
told his provost, his “objection in limine to Subscription would be that it
is a painful restraint on speculation.”17
After leaving Oxford, Clough traveled to the Continent, visiting revo-
lutionary France in 1848 and Rome in 1849. But on returning home, he
found that many doors to employment had been closed to him by his act
of renunciation. Eventually, he departed for a sojourn in America, where
he tried to find literary work through the help of his friend Ralph Waldo
Emerson. As Clough wrote, “for a man to act—there are no places so hope-
less, so unnerving” as the European capitals; perhaps America would pro-
vide him with a blank slate of experience, untouched by the consequences
of his previous deeds.18
Nevertheless, he was to face a second (and oddly analogous) major deci-
sion that would eventually bring him home: whether to marry. A letter writ-
ten at the height of his post-Oxford depression (to Matthew Arnold’s brother
Tom in New Zealand, commenting on Tom’s recent marriage) shows how
the vocational and domestic choices that Clough made became conflated
in his mind in rather revealing ways. Clough announced: “I, like you, have
jumped over a ditch for the fun of the experiment and would not be dis-
inclined to be once again in a highway with my brethren and companions.”19
Yet the language makes unclear precisely to which pair of actions the “jump
over a ditch” refers: is it to Tom’s emigration coupled with his own deci-
sion to give up the Oriel Fellowship? Or is it to Tom’s marriage coupled
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with Clough’s relationship to Blanche Smith (his future wife), to whom he
was not yet officially engaged but with whom his ties were strengthening?
Such connections between questions of marriage and of broader action
recur throughout Clough’s writings. Given that there is “little opportunity
for elevated action” in marriage, he acknowledged in a letter to Blanche of
January 1852, the “single life . . . has some superiorities.” The limited scope
of domestic life “does look at times a little ignoble, or at any rate unchival-
rous” (PPR I: 172). Note how for Clough, this struggle with the shape that
he felt his life should take had generic implications: married life, while not
quite the “ignoble ease” feared by Virgil in the Georgics, precludes the pos-
sibility of epic deeds. Its usefulness struck Clough as being sadly self-
contained, not reaching outside the family circle, the realm of the novel.
But his decision to marry was also couched in terms of its ability to aid
him in action. Consider this remarkable statement to Blanche:
To a certain extent it seems to me that the whole world is apt to wear a
mere pictorial aspect, that it must be by an effort that I accept anything as
fact. This is the meaning of what I have often told you that I “believe in
you”—I do not think that I can say the same to anyone else, though I can
with less effort or with no effort talk and get on with old familiars . . . but
if I am to make a choice, to act . . . I cannot turn, I think, except to you.
There has never been in my whole life I may say any act of mine, sealing
either friendship or love, up to this time. It has seemed to me a great thing
(a thing that at times I doubt the truth of myself ) to have done this at all.20
Blanche, then, fills the void of absent (or at least tenuous) religious belief,
allowing Clough “to make a choice, to act.” She is his banner. Clough’s
faith in his wife became the point from which he could begin to draw other
lines of belief; she was proof against a demon deceiver and would let him
build out from the morass of the cogito into which he had sunk.21
Blanche herself related in the biographical note to her edition of his works
how Clough’s intellect was naturally subject to “a certain inertia, a certain
slowness of movement, [which] constantly made it hard for him to get over
the initial difficulties of self expression” (PPR I: 40). Yet, she added point-
edly, during their years of marriage, “his mind turned more and more to
action as its natural relief; and in his family circle his gentle wisdom and
patience and great tenderness of feeling caused him to be constantly
appealed to” (PPR I: 47). But the actions left open to him were markedly
opposed to the great deeds—poetic and otherwise—he had envisioned him-
self doing, as Blanche’s comment suggests.22 In fact, the poet’s life reads like
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that of a character in a George Eliot novel: we may think of him as a kind
of Lydgate, whose grand visions of career became tangled in a web of domes-
ticity; or more positively, as a Dorothea, who was able to temper her orig-
inal enthusiasm for plans and content herself with the “incalculably
diffusive” effects of her domestic actions.23
After returning from America to marry, Clough took a job in the
Education Office, allowing him to support his wife. In his spare time, he
worked laboriously on a translation of Plutarch’s Lives, a slow, steady
process in comparison with the more creative work of writing original poetry
(“It is odd how much better I like this Plutarch than I do anything which
requires distinct statement of opinion or the like”24). And while Clough may
have exercised his domestic virtues as a model husband and father—his wife
went to some pains to emphasize this25—duty to wife and family did not
suffice. He satisfied his social conscience with his dedicated service to Florence
Nightingale (Blanche’s cousin) and her cause, activity bitingly summarized
by Lytton Strachey:
Though the purpose of existence might be still uncertain and its nature
still unsavoury, here, at any rate, under the eye of this inspired woman,
was something real, something earnest: his only doubt was—could he be
of any use? Certainly he could. There were a great number of miscella-
neous little jobs which there was nobody handy to do. For instance, when
Miss Nightingale was travelling, there were the railway-tickets to be
taken; and there were proof-sheets to be corrected; and then there were
parcels to be done up in brown paper, and carried to the post.26
For all their sting, Strachey’s comments were not harsher than Clough’s
own in his more critical moments: his foil Dipsychus, the “hero” of his
unfinished Faustian dialogue Dipsychus and the Spirit, remarks that “We
ask Action, / And dream of arms and conflict; and string up / All self-devo-
tion’s muscles; and are set/ To fold up papers.”27 The “modern Hotspur,”
Dipsychus recognizes,
Shrills not his trumpet of To Horse, To Horse
But consults columns in a railway guide;
A demigod of figures; an Achilles
Of computation. . . . (3.2.108–11)
But the work of the modern Hotspur offers a limited kind of heroism: if (and
it is a big if ) the end were one’s own, “One’s choice and the correlative of the
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soul, / To drudge were then sweet service” (3.2.116–17). Presumably,
Clough sought such “sweet service” in folding papers and consulting timeta-
bles for Florence Nightingale. “This that I see is not all,” Strachey imagines
him as having comforted himself, “and this that I do is but little; neverthe-
less it is good, though there is better than it.”28
“All things become clear to me by work more than anything else,” Clough
wrote in March 1852 to his future wife. “Any kind of drudgery will help
one out of the most uncommon sentimental or speculative perplexity; the
attitude of work is the only one in which one can see things properly” (PPR
I: 174). The message also belonged to Carlyle: “Man is sent hither not to
question, but to work: ‘the end of man,’ it was long ago written, ‘is an Action,
not a Thought.’ In the perfect state, all Thought were but the picture and
inspiring symbol of Action.”29 Or again, “Hence, too, the folly of that impos-
sible Precept, Know thyself. Till it be translated into this partially possible
one, Know what thou canst work at.”30 Carlyle’s admonition was to act as
relief to burdened skeptics like Clough; setting oneself small, doable tasks
provided an escape from self-consciousness. “Solvitur ambulando,” reads one
of Clough’s mottoes for Amours de Voyage: “it is solved by walking.” Take
it one step at a time; or, as Carlyle put it, “‘Do the Duty which lies nearest
thee,’ which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second Duty will already have
become clearer.”31 Work then, with its mundane, rather inglorious conno-
tations, takes the place of grander action in a process we will see repeated
in George Eliot’s writings. It is this diminishment of the scope of activity
that allowed Clough to continue his letter to his wife: “One may be afraid
sometimes of destroying the beauty of one’s dreams by doing anything, los-
ing sight of what perhaps one will not be able to recover: it need not be so”
(PPR I: 174). That is, the clue need not be lost if the things we choose to
do are limited enough in their range. The latter years of Clough’s short life
passed uneventfully. He died in Florence, where he had gone to nurse his
failing health, in 1861.
Clough in Context
Clough’s life shows why a concern with action manifests itself so strongly
in the poetry (most of which stems from 1848–50, the years directly fol-
lowing the renunciation of his fellowship and preceding his marriage); as
Joseph Bristow argues, Clough’s work is so infused with an interest in
action that “the very word ‘action’ becomes a personification of sorts.”32 In
Adam and Eve, for example, which is written over the span of this period,
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Clough explores the original myth of the fall into sin as a fall into action.
The speculative Adam ponders at the start of the play over the “irretriev-
able act” that resulted in his expulsion from Eden (2.5). Adam’s son Cain
closely resembles the figure of Wordsworth’s Rivers (and, for that matter,
Milton’s Satan): he is the consummate actor, and both a sinner and a sym-
pathetic figure for being so. Like his antihero precursors, he is driven to
action by his desire to assert his identity:
a strange impulse struggling to the truth,
Urges me onward to put forth my strength,
No matter how—Wild curiosity
Possesses me moreover to essay
This world of Action round me so unknown
And to be able to do this or that
Seems cause enough, without a cause, for doing it—
Something I must do, individual
To vindicate my nature, to give proof
I also am, as Adam is, a man. (7.10–16, 22–24)
He shares in the Aristotelian conviction that deeds define the man. The
act Cain commits, though, is the murder of his brother, and after it, his
father reveals to him the most basic truth about action: “One step you
stirred, and lo! you stood entrapped” (12.14). It is a truth of which
Clough’s decision to give up his post must have made him heartbreaking-
ly aware.
Yet the focus on action becomes particularly apparent in Amours de Voyage,
not least because of its generic confusions. While tension arises from the
odd conjunction of the hexameters with the lyrical elegiacs that open and
close each canto of the poem, the same kind of tension manifests itself in
the hexameters themselves. The epic poem, Goethe and Schiller tell us, “rep-
resents man as an external agent.”33 In Amours, part of the satire comes from
Clough’s adoption of a traditionally active meter to tell the story of a failed
love affair between two British tourists during the French siege of Rome in
1849. Moreover, Clough’s “heroes”—the intellectual, somewhat priggish,
and highly speculative Claude, and Mary Trevellyn, the similarly sensitive
daughter of a well-to-do mercantile family—are markedly unheroic and even
ordinary, in the tradition of the realist novel. With his choice of subject,
Clough was responding to his sense (expressed a few years later in a review
entitled “Recent English Poetry”) that to be popular, modern poetry, like
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the novel, must learn to deal with “general want, ordinary feelings,” the stuff
of “every-day life.”34 So here, Clough novelistically reverses the standard epic
hierarchy by making the love story the major plotline of the work. The siege
(in marked contrast with that of Troy in the Iliad ) acts as counterpoint.
What is perhaps most notable about the plot of Amours is how the love
affair fails: anticlimax characterizes the poem as forcefully as it did the life
of its author. The punctilious Claude cannot be quite certain of his feel-
ings for Mary: “I am in love, you say; I do not think so exactly” (II.x.263).
So Claude chooses to stay in Rome (ostensibly to explore the Vatican mar-
bles) when Mary and her family leave. But after Mary’s departure, Claude
finds he has underestimated his emotions and decides to follow her.
Cantos IV and V relate the pursuit, showing how crossed communications,
missed opportunities, and lost letters confound the lovers. Claude and Mary’s
travels across Italy can be mapped out as a mental image of the real com-
plexity of action and plot, providing a kind of antidote to the neatly plot-
ted Victorian novel, where the hero and heroine find each other in the grand
finale. Amours sputters quite shockingly to its nonconclusion: Claude gives
up the pursuit and continues on alone eastward to Egypt; Mary regretfully
goes home to England with her family.35
While the most overt objection on record to this ending belongs to Emerson
(“I cannot forgive you for the baulking end or no end of the Amours de Voyage”36),
Matthew Arnold seems to have been similarly disappointed by his friend’s pro-
duction: “as to the Italian poem, if I forbore to comment it was that I had
nothing special to say—what is to be said when a thing does not suit you.”37
Entering into the century’s debate about the role of action in literature, Arnold
lamented the absence of “great human action” in the work of modern poets
in the Preface to Poems (1853).38 Implicit in this view was a critique of Clough,
whom he felt to be infected by a “morbid conscientiousness” that “spoil[ed]”
his “action”39—nowhere more so than in his construction of the plot of Amours.
The diagnosis was made around the period Arnold was drafting the Preface,
and it is probably fair to assume, as Lionel Trilling does, that the tension that
developed in the friendship of the poets came in part from Arnold’s fears of
catching the speculative infection.40 He believed he had already succumbed
to it in Empedocles on Etna, the poem now pointedly withheld from the new
volume. “You certainly do not seem to me sufficiently to desire and earnestly
strive toward—assured knowledge—activity—happiness,” Arnold wrote,
invoking the great Aristotelian telos. And he continued by implying a lack of
masculine fortitude in his friend: “You are too content to fluctuate—to be ever
learning, never coming to the knowledge of the truth. This is why, with you,
I feel it necessary to stiffen myself—and hold fast my rudder.”41 The tenor of
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these comments shows how close the prescriptions Arnold made to his friend
for a healthy life were to his prescriptions for a healthy literature in the Preface.
Part of what makes the Preface so interesting as a statement for its times
is the way in which Arnold sought to place it within a tradition of such state-
ments. As I have suggested, this tradition begins with Aristotle’s Poetics. The
belief in the primacy of action stands behind Aristotle’s description of the
relative importance of character and action in drama: “In a play accordingly
they do not act in order to portray the Characters; they include the
Characters for the sake of the action.”42 In his Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800),
Wordsworth, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, revised the claim
to favor feeling—that is, an internal quality affecting character—over
external action: “Another circumstance must be mentioned which distin-
guishes these Poems from the popular poetry of the day; it is this, that the
feeling therein developed gives importance to the action and situation, and
not the action and situation to the feeling.”43
Now Arnold strove to revert to the Aristotelian hierarchy. Under the influ-
ence of the Wordsworthian model, poets, including Arnold himself, had for-
gotten the healthy lessons of the ancients:
the calm, the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity have disappeared;
the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems
have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the dis-
couragement, of Hamlet and of Faust.44
The solution to this state was action, but not any action; rather, the deeds
aimed at were those of “great human action,” either modern or (more
probably, given the usual “smaller human action of today”) ancient. Such
actions would appeal to the “permanent passions,” to the “elementary feel-
ings,” to the “great primary human affections.”45 The language is almost
exactly that of Wordsworth’s Preface, although Wordsworth used those
same phrases (“elementary feelings,” “primary laws of our nature”) to sup-
port his decision to write of the “beautiful and permanent forms of nature”
in the “permanent” language of “humble and rustic life”46—that is, of what
Clough termed, in his lecture on Wordsworth, “blue skies and white
clouds, larks and linnets, daisies and celandines.” Arnold argued with
Wordsworth by using his own words against him.
In fact, though, as their mutual opposition to Wordsworth suggests, Clough
also accused Arnold of a dearth of epic energy. In his discussion of Arnold’s
work included in “Recent English Poetry” (also 1853), Clough singled out
Arnold’s poetry for some of those same criticisms he had himself received.
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Ironically, he did so by contrasting “A’s” work with that of the Glasgow mechanic
poet, Alexander Smith, whose volume A Life Drama (1853) would be labeled
“spasmodic” by the critic and poet William Edmonstoune Aytoun. Aytoun
coined the term in the early 1850s to refer to what he perceived to be the
dangerously subjectivist poetry—overly speculative and lacking in plot and
action—that was prevalent at the time. His worries closely resembled those
of Matthew Arnold in the Preface.47
Actually, Clough had to misread Smith’s poem drastically in order to
achieve the required contrast with Arnold. A Life Drama tells the tale, sin-
gularly lacking in drama, of a lovelorn, Werther-ish young man, who even-
tually overcomes the loss of his lady to pursue a career in poetry. Yet this
is Clough’s description of Walter, the rather milksoppish hero of Smith’s
poem:
Eager for action, incapable of action without some support, yet knowing
not on what arm to dare to lean; not untainted; hard-pressed; in some sort,
at times, overcome,—still we seem to see the young combatant, half com-
batant, half martyr, resolute to fight it out, and not to quit this for some
easier field of battle,—one way or other to make something of it. (PPR I:
363)
We can sense why Clough found the character sympathetic. It was, how-
ever, only by learning, with Walter, to prize what the poem calls “the quiet
lightning deed,” that Clough could find in Smith’s Drama a model for
active engagement, and the rhetoric he used to defend his hero is surely
inappropriate given the magnitude and type of that engagement (PPR I:
367; emphasis added). And when Clough turned his attention in the
review to Arnold’s volumes, he did so with the obvious intent of empha-
sizing precisely those qualities in his friend’s poetry that were singled out
by Arnold as flaws in his own character:
But now, we are fain to ask, where are we, and whither are we uncon-
sciously come? Were we not going forth to battle in the armor of a right-
eous purpose, with our first friend, with Alexander Smith? How is it we
find ourselves here, reflecting, pondering, hesitating, musing, complaining
with “A[rnold]?” (PPR I: 376)
Moreover, like Arnold in the Preface, Clough saw the problem as charac-
teristic of his times: “for the present age, the lessons of reflectiveness and
the maxims of caution do not appear to be more needful or more appro-
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priate than exhortations to steady courage and calls to action” (PPR I:
377).
The similarity between the friends runs deep. It is emphasized further
by the fact that critics have compared both Arnold and Clough to the “shilly-
shally” Claude (II.xv.335), the hero of Amours. Contemporaries insisted on
biographical readings of Amours, no doubt fueled by knowledge of the poet’s
experiences in Rome during the siege (Clough’s letters home actually repeat
Claude’s lines in his own voice), the popular version of Clough’s life as a
failure, and the handy alliteration between the poet’s and his protagonist’s
names.48 More recently, though, Eugene R. August has suggested—on the
basis of Park Honan’s evidence that “the real-life counterpart of Marguerite
[the lady in Arnold’s series of poems commemorating a failed love affair in
Switzerland] was a young woman named Mary Claude”—that Clough actu-
ally had Arnold in mind when composing Amours.49 Yet to anyone who has
read the materials surrounding Arnold’s Preface, this confusion should come
as no surprise. Rather, it demonstrates how much alike Clough and Arnold
were, at least as far as concerns the crisis in action in which both partici-
pated; Claude resembles both Arnold and Clough because they resembled
each other.
One can see this in the way the friends shared the use of certain
metaphors favored by writers of the period to describe their sense of aim-
lessness. In “Blank Misgivings of a Creature moving about in Worlds not
realized,” Clough expressed the need for something that could lead him like
Ariadne’s thread out of the labyrinth of action and change the wanderings
of a Cain or a Don Juan to the purposeful motion of a modern Ulysses or
Aeneas:
How often sit I, poring o’er
My strange distorted youth,
Seeking in vain, in all my store,
One feeling based on truth;
Amid the maze of petty life
A clue whereby to move,
A spot whereon in toil and strife
To dare to rest and love.50
Arnold turned to the same phrase in Culture and Anarchy: “our habitual
causes of action seem to be losing efficaciousness, credit, and control, both
with others and even with ourselves. Everywhere we see the beginnings of
confusion, and we want a clue to some sound order and authority.” His
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clue would be Hellenism, a “going back” to obtain a “sounder basis of
knowledge on which to act”;51 in contrast, Clough desired not to go back
but to go forward, however modestly—this difference was the source of the
debate between the friends. But the idea of a “clue” of life took hold of the
Victorian imagination. George Eliot, as we shall see, used the same
metaphor to describe her characters’ sense of confusion and purposeless-
ness, their need for some rule of action that would guide them.
More strikingly, both poets addressed the failure of epic in their works
via the trope of the “battle by night.” Taken from Thucydides’ account of
the Battle of Epipolie, where the Athenians, in the confusion of darkness,
mistakenly fought one another, the image vividly represents the difficulties
associated with action in the contemporary world. Clough used the
metaphor first, in The Bothie (1848), in a letter from Philip to his tutor and
mentor, Adam, who had recommended his pupil place his faith in the work-
ings of Providence. Philip’s reply shows his mistrust of the distinction between
Providence and Circumstance:
Where does Circumstance end, and Providence where begins it?
What are we to resist, and what are we to be friend with?
If there is battle, ’tis battle by night: I stand in the darkness,
Here in the mêlée of men, Ionian and Dorian on both sides,
Signal and password known; which is friend and which is foeman?52
He returned to it in “Say not the struggle naught availeth,” which was writ-
ten during the siege of Rome in 1849. In this instance Clough imagined
that the darkness could hide progress rather than confusion: “If hopes
were dupes, fears may be liars” (1.5). The third, most famous, use of the
battle by night, by Arnold in “Dover Beach” (probably written in 1851),
again took a depressing view of the picture, but Arnold notably countered
the public disarray with a vision of contrasting private consolation:
Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. (lines 29–37)
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That the two latter variations on the theme are from, respectively, by far
the most famous short poems produced by Clough and Arnold is not a
coincidence, as the image (like that of the lost clue of life) partakes of the
spirit of the age.
So what made the battle by night such a potent metaphor in the
Victorian period, and in particular such an important one for these two poets?
Isobel Armstrong has noted that “for both poets, action is figured as com-
bat or battle.”53 But battle no longer consists of the ordered string of events
we are familiar with from the Greek and Roman epics—lists of single com-
bat, with the outcomes monitored by (admittedly squabbling) gods and god-
desses. Neither is it the haphazard but still nicely consecutive sequences of
adventures undertaken by the heroes of romance as they progress toward
their goals. Rather, battles have been replaced by revolutions that disinte-
grated into Reigns of Terror. As Walter Bagehot (who had come under Clough’s
influence while completing a Master of Arts at University College London
in 1848) argued in an 1859 review of Tennyson’s poetry, Arnold’s prefer-
ence in his Preface for antique subjects reflected his sense of the illegibility
of modern action. After detailing the difference between ancient and mod-
ern warfare, Bagehot concluded that “the events of the chivalric legend are
better adapted to sustained and prolonged poetry than the events of recent
times and of the present day . . . because they . . . present human actions
in a more intelligible shape [and] give us a sort of large-hand copy of life
which is comparatively easy to understand and imitate.”54 The Battle of Epipolie,
while it belonged to the world of “great human actions” for which Arnold
felt such nostalgia, was in fact the first “modern” war: it anticipated the impen-
etrability of deeds in the contemporary world, the way in which motives
and consequences ricochet and are redirected under a cloud of confusion.
Hence the prevalence of the motif.
The battle by night also figured in a sermon preached by John Henry
Newman at Oxford on 6 January 1839 (and published in 1843), with which
both Clough and Arnold were likely to be familiar:
Controversy, at least in this age, does not lie between the hosts of heaven,
Michael and his Angels on the one side, and the powers of evil on the
other; but it is a sort of night battle, where each fights for himself, and
friend and foe stand together.55
Armstrong has seen in this passage (“where each fights for himself ”) a ref-
erence to “the aggressive language of economics and competitive laissez-
faire individualism,” used here to describe a “spiritual individualism” more
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and more threatened by association with the economic society of contem-
porary England.56 In other words, the Battle of Epipolie could also stand
for the laissez-faire marketplace in which an invisible hand was the only
vestige of government control. (Matthew Arnold’s anarchy, or “doing as
one likes,” is a related concept.) In contrast to the political engagements of
poets of the previous generation, such as Wordsworth and Byron, who had
firsthand experience of revolution, Clough’s early political involvement
took the form of a series of writings against laissez-faire policies. The lega-
cy of the Reign of Terror had frightened off the activists. In Amours, when
Claude thinks he witnesses the murder of a priest who had been seen frat-
ernizing, he echoes Wordsworth in The Prelude57: “I began to bethink me
of Paris Septembers, / Thought I could fancy the look of the old ’Ninety-
two” (II.vii.203–4). So instead of fighting, as he wrote to his friend J. P.
Gell in July of 1844, Clough intended “to set to work at Political
Economy,” “to see if I cannot prove ‘the Apostle of Anti-laissez-faire.’”58 He
knew that his was a debased revolutionary age, where real change occurred
on the Exchange.
Not only did the Revolution of 1789 loom as a specter, but the less grand
failure of 1848 also stood as a recent reminder of the uncertainties of rev-
olutionary action. Clough’s attitude toward revolution took on a pronouncedly
dilettantish aspect, as his letters from France in 1848 show:
I do little else than potter about under the Tuileries Chestnuts and here
and there about bridges and streets, pour savourer la republique. I con-
template with infinite thankfulness the blue blouses, garnished with red,
of the garde mobile.
Ichabod, Ichabod, the glory is departed. Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity, driven back by shopkeeping bayonet, hides her red cap in
dingiest St. Antoine. Well-to-do-ism shakes her Egyptian scourge to the
tune of Ye are idle, ye are idle.59
“Well-to-do-ism” had taken the place of doing in this atmosphere of
Donothingism. In a letter to Tom Arnold, Clough quoted his friend’s
brother Matthew: “I think we rash young men may learn from the failure
and discomfiture of our friends in the new Republic. The millennium, as
Matt says, won’t come this bout.”60 From Rome, he repeated the lament
over a past glorious age of revolutionary possibility: “It is funny to see how
like any other city a besieged city looks. Unto this has come our grand
Liberty-Equality-and-Fraternity Revolution.”61 And in the battle by night
passage from The Bothie I referred to above, Philip arrives at the same con-
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clusion; given the apparent “infinite jumble and mess and dislocation,”
“Let us get on as we can, and do the thing we are fit for; / Every one for
himself, and the common success for us all” (IX.64, 67–68). The passage
neatly demonstrates the nexus of overlapping metaphors: the battle by
night, the glancing allusion to laissez-faire (“Let us get on as we can”), and
the tantalizing preview of Darwinism (“fit”).
But I would wish to shift the emphasis from what Armstrong describes
as a “crisis in individualism”—the idea that “self-culture” had become tainted
by its relationship to a culture of the pursuit of private gain—to what I call
a crisis in action. Clearly, Adam Smith’s vision of the market radically changed
our understanding of useful activity. On the one hand, Smith’s market econ-
omy is a tremendously empowering construct for the average person; it sug-
gests that the labors of the farmer in the field and the shopman in his shop
are what keep the country going.62 On the other hand, all such activity not
only lacks the heroic scope, but also it occurs under the banner of self-profit.
“Let me sing the song of the shopman,” Claude ironically declares in a can-
celed paragraph of Amours echoing the opening line of the Aeneid, where
the song is one of “arms and the man.”63 Industrialization obviously added
to the problem of knowing what to make of the new form of action by turn-
ing workers into “hands” severed from their thinking minds (not to men-
tion the rest of their laboring bodies) or cogs in a machine. Even the epic
action of warfare had been mechanized; as Carlyle lamented, “Battles, in
these ages, are transacted by mechanism; with the slightest possible devel-
opment of human individuality or spontaneity.”64 Clough’s concern over the
mechanization of labor appears in Dipsychus and the Spirit:
The earth moves slowly, if it move at all
And by the general, not the single force.
At the [huge] members of the vast machine
In all those crowded rooms of industry
No individual soul has loftier leave
Than fiddling with a piston or a valve. (2.3.118–23)
So the emphasis on collective force took away from individuals those very
powers that it had seemed so generously to bestow upon them; the broad
range of individual acts that were heroicized by the new system could
prove significant only when bound into group activity. As Bagehot
remarked, “For this is the odd peculiarity of commercial civilization. The
life, the welfare, the existence of thousands depend on their being paid for
doing what seems nothing when done.”65 As a result of this paradox, the
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rhetoric of agency in the Victorian period can often strike one as rather
convoluted. Writers were forced to juggle with various understandings of
words like freedom and action; their meanings could be crucially altered
depending on whether they were viewed from the perspective of the indi-
vidual or the collective.
John Stuart Mill’s reflections on the modern status of action demonstrate
his awareness of the need for specificity, for qualifications. Of what
Armstrong calls the “crisis in individualism,” he declared: “One of the effects
of a high state of civilization upon character, is a relaxation of individual
energy: or rather, the concentration of it within the narrow sphere of the
individual’s money-getting pursuits.”66 Yet the first formulation of Mill’s state-
ment would have been as troubling to Clough as the latter. I say this because
it seems to me that the real focus in Clough’s poetry is not so much on the
eighteenth-century problem of benevolence we associate with Mandeville’s
Fable of the Bees (1714), but rather on the question of whether it is really
feasible to do anything meaningful at all, given how obscured the ground
of action is. Clough’s characters are not selfish in the money-grubbing mar-
ket sense; but even though they would like to do good, they cannot seem
to figure out how to do it. So they end up doing little or nothing. The epic
intent is still there—hence the hexameters—but the reality of modern life
is that the epic must be a mockery and that hexameters can be read only
through the filter of a lyrical narrative consciousness.
Obscurity lies at the heart of the problem of modern action, which is why
the battle by night became such a potent image. The Invisible Hand had replaced
the Hand of God in the grand scheme of things: Elspie, Philip’s beloved in
The Bothie, dreams of a “great invisible hand” that will drop the keystone into
the bridge being built between her and Philip (7.68); in Amours, Claude depends
on the strength of “invisible arms” to hold him up over the chasm of his uncer-
tainty (I.xii.243). But given the close relationship between “seeing” and “believ-
ing” in a culture built at least in part upon empiricist values, invisibility turns
out to create trouble. (The Catholic Church has long suspected as much, and
the very visibility of God in Catholicism was surely a large part of its attrac-
tion to nineteenth-century intellectuals.) Hence the overwhelming prevalence
of darkness as a metaphor, as here in Carlyle:
For young Valour and thirst of Action no ideal Chivalry invites to hero-
ism, prescribes what is heroic: the old ideal of Manhood has grown obso-
lete, and the new is still invisible to us, and we grope after it in darkness,
one clutching this phantom, another that; Werterism, Byronism, even
Brummelism, each has its day.67
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Carlyle’s list incorporates various postures that the modern protagonist
could adopt in lieu of the traditional heroic stance: the suicidal cavilings
of Werther, the outcast wanderings of the Byronic hero, and the dilettan-
tish dandyism of Beau Brummel. Clough and his heroes flirted with these
attitudes but ultimately found them dissatisfying. Middle-class masculin-
ity could discover little foothold on such uncertain ground. With the
domestication of heroism, in fact, the most comfortable heroes seem to
have been the heroines. Clough’s admiration for Florence Nightingale
reflected his recognition that her activity (including her struggle against
constraints placed on her by gender) was more glorious than that of the
soldiers for whom she cared. Moreover, as we shall see with George Eliot’s
work, women had at least an arena in which their conventionally more
restricted battles could be naturally depicted: the novel.
In “The Ethical Current,” the final essay of The Gay Science (1866), E.
S. Dallas, one of the pioneers of psychological criticism, made precisely this
point while considering the fate of the hero and the literary consequences
of contemporary market and social structures: noting both the preeminence
of biography as a genre and the fact that “a novel is but a fictitious biogra-
phy,” he asserted that “now all the more important characters seem to be
women.”68 Not incidentally, Dallas touched in this essay on many of the
issues I have raised and will raise, including, for example, “the question of
Hamlet.”69 He also expressed his admiration for Plutarch’s Lives, the very
work Clough spent the last years of his life translating. Dallas described how
the contemporary vogue for biography indicated the Victorian interest in
a history that revealed “the inner life as well as the outer”—that is to say, a
novelistic history.70 Clough’s introduction to his translation shows just how
novelistic his attitude to the Lives was: “In reading Plutarch, the following
points should be remembered. He is a moralist rather than a historian. His
interest is less for politics and the changes of empires, and much more for
personal character and individual actions and motives to action.”71 As Dallas
quoted Plutarch remarking, “the most glorious exploits are not always the
most characteristic.”72 Such a distinction between great actions and a sense
of individual character is at the heart of what the writers I am looking at
are exploring.
Dallas recognized all these tendencies as resulting from transformations
in the perceptions of action that accompanied the shift in its quality and
scope. The following passage, written in the context of an argument about
the preponderance of ordinary men and women serving as the heroes and
heroines of biographies, shows his awareness of how difficult it is to chart
the course of individual acts through history:
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Just as philosophers tell us that every word we utter, every breath we
inhale, has, through a million of intermediate links in the chain of cause
and effect, a definite influence on the dancing of the leaves in an
American forest or on the course of a hurricane in the Indian seas, so we
recognise the fact that the action of every unit of a nation or party tells
upon the total result of human achievement, and we insist on tracing that
action, no matter how infinitesimal, throughout all its ramifications.73
But rather than interesting himself in the ramifications of the spreading of
consequences (like, we shall see, novelists such as George Eliot did), Dallas
emphasized the effect of an awareness of causal structures on the idea of
the heroic. A newly scientific age was unwilling to give up the concept of
achievement, but, pace Carlyle, the most effective action need not be that
done by the great men of history. Who could tell what mode of life actu-
ally did the most good? And given how impossible it was to track conse-
quences, what was the point of trying to do the great deeds? Might not the
small ones have as vast impact in the end?
What I find most notable in Dallas’s account, though, is his great mis-
trust of the process of writing such histories. The passage continues:
We have nothing to do with the question whether this be right or
wrong—whether to trace the influence of every little emmet on society
may not be as worthless a task as would be an attempt to calculate the
effect of the blast of a trumpet on the weather of to-morrow. Right or
wrong, there is the fact that we do seek to estimate the influence on soci-
ety of every petty individual whom we happen to like. A Dissenting gro-
cer, who makes money and extends his operations till he is regarded as a
marvel by the country-side, has his life written by a very able man in a
very ornate style as the pattern of a British and Christian merchant; a sick-
ly undergraduate who never does anything, but makes up for his noth-
ingness by writing in his diary all his good intentions, is paraded before
the world as a favourable specimen of the earnest and evangelical stu-
dent.74
Perhaps the “Dissenting grocer” and the “sickly undergraduate” (who
could be Clough, in the less sympathetic versions of his life story) were
actually helping the nation. But history of this sort cannot be written out
as a sequence of intentions followed by events. For all his democratic val-
ues (he was an advocate of the ability of art to provide pleasure to the mass-
es), Dallas did not seem quite to believe in the usefulness of “infinitesimal”
66 Chapter Two
Markovitz_CH2_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:25 PM  Page 66
deeds, because the path of cause and effect is too complicated to trace. The
invisible hand writes in an invisible—or at least indecipherable—script.
Clough’s erstwhile disciple Walter Bagehot, in his evolutionary model of
government in Physics and Politics (1872), was also interested in the change
in the idea of heroism: how the “fighting age” had passed, to be taken over
by an “age of discussion,” led ideally by a government characterized by what
he called (somewhat paradoxically but rather wonderfully) “animated
moderation.”75 Offering a typically pragmatic salve to the popular percep-
tion of abdication on the part of the rulers, Bagehot alluded in The English
Constitution (1867) to the same problem of legibility found in Dallas. In
his description of the advantages of monarchy, he wrote: “The nature of a
constitution, the action of an assembly, the play of parties, the unseen for-
mation of a guiding opinion, are complex facts, difficult to know and easy
to mistake. But the action of a single will, the fiat of a single mind, are easy
ideas.” Hence his conclusion: “royalty is a government in which the atten-
tion of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions.
A republic is a government in which that attention is divided between many,
who are all doing uninteresting actions.”76 The close resemblance of this argu-
ment to the one that Bagehot made in the review of Tennyson’s poetry (con-
cerning the intelligibility of antique versus modern actions as poetic
subjects) demonstrates the connections between literary and political
modes of action. It is as though Bagehot were arguing here that monarchies
make for more compelling plot lines: by allowing for popular comprehen-
sion, they keep the masses appeased. Legibility is necessary to safety.
But Clough was looking for a ruler more substantive than Bagehot’s fig-
urehead of a monarch. In a discussion of laissez-faire policy in his “Sixth Letter
to Parapedimus” (to the editor of The Balance, 20 March 1846), he argued
that while the system of the free market may be the best we have, and may
indeed work in nine cases out of ten, it is “an instrument demanding perpet-
ual superintendence; a sort of ruthless inanimate steam-engine, which must
have its driver always with it to keep it from doing mischief untold.”77 We hear
the longing for genuine leadership. Carlyle had earlier expressed the same doubt
as Clough, in almost the same language (note the frequent recurrence to indus-
trial metaphors): “What sound mind among the French, for example, now fan-
cies that men can be governed by ‘Constitutions’; by the never so cunning Mechanising
of Self-interests, and all conceivable adjustments of checking and balancing;
in a word, by the best possible solution of this quite insoluble and impossible
problem, Given a world of Knaves, to produce an Honesty from their united action?”78
It may be good engineering, but it does sound rather like alchemy; again, the
obscurity of the process renders it suspect.
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FSo we can think of the failure of plot in Amours de Voyage as a gesture
toward realism: in a laissez-faire world, one ruled by countless individuals,
heroes are hard to find, and the courses of actions are to a great degree
impossible to read. When the action of plot fails we are left with the sub-
ject of Claude’s letters: his reflections on the problem of action in the mod-
ern world. It is precisely through Claude’s inaction (in the sense of both
impeded external action and heightened internal action) that we come to
know his character so well. As Henry Sidgwick noted, Clough’s presenta-
tion of character was admirable: “To say that Clough’s dramatic faculty was
strong might convey a wrong impression, as we imagine that he was quite
devoid of the power of representing a scene of vivid action; but the power
of forming distinct conceptions of character, and expressing them with the
few touches that poetry allows, is one of the gifts for displaying which we
may regret that he had not ampler scope.”79
Sidgwick’s comments should be located within the context of what Isobel
Armstrong has recognized as a midcentury debate concerning the proper
definition of the dramatic.80 Following in the wake of Romantic poetry’s con-
cern for feelings, critics began to lay down hints for a new understanding
of drama that placed greater emphasis on character and less on action—an
understanding (Armstrong argues) derived from the idea of romantic pro-
jection, or sympathy, found in Keats’s letters. The important action thus becomes
a mental rather than a physical one, a process of identification that seems
central to both the experience of reading lyric poetry and that of reading
novels.
We can see this turn away from Aristotelian action toward something closer
to novelistic, or at least lyric, character in William Caldwell Roscoe’s tin-
kering with the meaning of the term drama. In an 1854 review, he wrote
in response to Arnold’s Preface:
Without venturing to contradict Aristotle, we may certainly say that the
poetic art is not limited to the representation of human actions, in how-
ever wide a sense we may employ the term. We have poems to the Lesser
Celandine, to a Mouse, to the Skylark— . . . And an action is not only
not the sole, it is not the highest, subject of the poetic art. Man is higher
than his actions, and it is in the representation of the whole man that the
romantic drama soars far beyond its classical rival.81
68 Chapter Two
Markovitz_CH2_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:25 PM  Page 68
Roscoe seems to have been suggesting a link, via inaction, between what
he called “romantic” dramas and the Romantic lyric, as the reference to
poems by Wordsworth, Burns, and Shelley (and the resemblance of his
argument to that of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads) indicates. Such use of
the word drama and its cognates was quite common in the reviews of the
period. In The Eclectic, C. Edmunds wrote of Browning’s genius as “essen-
tially dramatic, but not in the sense which the word vulgarly bears. Mr.
Browning’s is mostly the drama of character, not of incident, or scenic
effect.”82 Browning’s dramatic monologues, like the monologues (or letters)
that make up Clough’s “five-act epistolary tragi-comedy, or comi-tragedy,”
typify the shift in interest from incident to the revelation of character
through the description of states of mind; as Richard Simpson described
Browning in his review of The Ring and the Book (1868–69), the mono-
logues “are eminently lyric, because their chief interest is reflective, lying
not in the deed or narrative itself, but in the psychological states of the
speakers.”83 It is as though drama were being filtered through lyric in order
to cleanse it of action, so leaving a pure residue of character.
According to Isobel Armstrong, by the 1860s critics’ interest in psychology
had taken over from their nostalgia for great actions.84 W. J. Fox’s ground-
breaking review of Tennyson’s Poems, Chiefly Lyrical (1830) already showed
the beginnings of this trend—and demonstrated its links to the romantic
project, especially as represented by Wordsworth. Fox pointed to “our ever-
growing acquaintance with the philosophy of mind and of man, and the
increasing facility with which that philosophy is applied”:
This is the essence of poetic power, and he who possesses it never need
furbish up ancient armour, or go to the East Kehama-hunting or bulbul-
catching. Poetry, like charity, begins at home. . . . The most important
department in which metaphysical science has been a pioneer for poetry
is in the analysis of particular states of mind. . . . [It has provided a] new
world for him [the poet] to conquer. The poets of antiquity rarely did more
than incidentally touch this class of topics; the external world had not yet
lost its freshness; situations, and the outward expression of the thoughts,
feelings and passions generated by those situations, were a province so
much nearer at hand.85
The review predates the publication of The Prelude, but that poem’s inte-
rior epic seems to be what Fox was calling for.
The new psychological poetry often focused on depictions of character.
Fox argued in his review of Tennyson that works of literature were enjoyed
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for the characters portrayed in them: “What is the vitality of the Iliad? Character;
nothing else. All the rest is only read either out of antiquarianism or of affec-
tation.”86 Critics frequently compared poets to portraitists when praising
them for their ability to create characters. Fox had noted in particular Tennyson’s
talents at drawing women: “Mr. Tennyson sketches females as well as ever
did Sir Thomas Lawrence. His portraits are delicate, his likenesses . . . per-
fect, and they have life, character, and individuality.”87 He implied that because
of the circumscribed nature of their activity, women were especially suit-
able subjects for the new psychological school of writing: they would sit still
more naturally while they were painted. In his review of The Princess (1847)
in the Christian Remembrancer, Charles Peter Chretien alluded to early pho-
tographic methods: “The Daguerreotype process gives the whole of a land-
scape faithfully, except figures in quick motion, or the leaves of a tree which
are trembling visibly in the wind. Like it, Mr. Tennyson requires all but a
dead calm to display his powers to advantage.”88 Chretien was in fact crit-
ical of Tennyson’s unwillingness to take full advantage of his chosen
medium’s ability to describe objects in motion. But perhaps activity and the
accurate rendition of a consciousness are incommensurable.
As the century progressed, praise for the psychological emphasis became
commonplace. An anonymous reviewer in The Eclectic demonstrated how
the changing attitudes toward the role of action in poetry reflected aware-
ness of the changing needs of the age. Again, the argument was posed in
opposition to Arnold’s tenets in the Preface:
The sweetest songs ever sung do not necessarily relate an action, they
chronicle a thought, or a sentiment. . . . how shall we deal with this won-
drous living age of ours, so transitionary, so full of hopes and fears; its fet-
tered energies, its phases of faith, its mental revolutions, if we are to have
actions alone represented? For our own part we believe there is a world of
unuttered thought yet to be uttered subjectively, and that it affords as
great and glorious a field for the poet as all the great actions of the past.89
Those “mental revolutions,” like Claude’s in Amours, replaced the external
revolutions of epic poetry. They are essentially Romantic ground; again,
The Prelude seems to provide the model. Indeed, in many of these discus-
sions the epic appears to have dropped off the literary map altogether. Still,
we can see in the arena of Victorian poetry—and specifically in the con-
text of the debate concerning the appropriate role for action in poetry that
I have been looking at here—how “inward revolution,” as George Eliot and
Henry James would term it, gained legitimacy as a subject matter for lit-
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erary work.90 As a reviewer in the Dublin University Magazine argued in
1854: “The present age is a metaphysical and a psychological one, and
poetry, as the reflex of the age, must, to be popular, exhibit the inner life
of man—mental action, feelings, passions, spiritualities.”91
Amours de Voyage
We can register the shift toward the inner workings of the mind in the way
that inaction becomes both subject and method of Clough’s poem. As we
have seen, concerns about action and about marriage were intimately relat-
ed for Clough. The link between them also manifests itself in the plotting
of Amours, where the hero’s early unwillingness and later inability to com-
mit to marriage stand for his unwillingness and inability to act: the “I do”
of marriage seems impossible to him. And a letter to Blanche written in
December 1851 (one can only wonder how she felt upon reading it) again
demonstrates the connection:
Fortified by bread and cheese I return and rise to the sublime . . . here in
this dim deceitful misty moonshiny night-time of existence we grope
about and run up against each other, and peer blindly but enquiringly into
strange faces, and sooner or later (for comfort’s sake for the night is cold
you see and dreary) clasp hands and make vows and choose to keep
together and withdraw again sometimes and wrench away hands and seize
others and do we know not what.92
Here is another Epipolie: the same confusions, the same blindness, the
same longing for a lost plan. The situation resembles that described in
Arnold’s “Dover Beach,” only now, rather than providing a sanctuary from
the surrounding night-battle, love participates in it. “Il doutait de tout,
même de l’amour,” states the second epigraph to Amours de Voyage. Like
Clough, Claude worries that acts of love are no more genuine than—or, in
the language of Amours, are as “factitious” as (II.xi.271)—any other kinds
of action; they are as much as everything else the result of circumstance
and demonstrate neither real choice nor Providential planning. So Arnold’s
plea, “Ah, love, let us be true / To one another!” represents merely anoth-
er prayer to a false god.93
Amours de Voyage, as its title suggests, plays itself out primarily on the
field of Venus rather than Mars, but the great chase across Italy represents
a version of the battle by night. So when Clough transfers the language of
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laissez-faire from the political realm to that of the novelistic courtship plot,
it is actually fitting. Thinking of his “conquest” of the Trevellyns—and of
Mary in particular—Claude reflects on the mechanics of social life:
I am glad to be liked, and like in return very kindly.
So it proceeds; Laissez faire, laissez aller,—such is the watchword.
Well, I know there are thousands as pretty and hundreds as pleasant,
Girls by the dozen as good, and girls in abundance with polish
Higher and manners more perfect than Susan or Mary Trevellyn.
Well, I know after all, it is only juxtaposition,—
Juxtaposition, in short; and what is juxtaposition? (I.xi.220–26)
The tone of this passage is interrogative, but Claude’s question leads him
in circles; the at first drawling and then almost desperate repetitiveness of
these lines, emphasized by their frequent central caesuras, parallels the
endless and meaningless repetitions of the social—and the economic—
cycle. Such questions and repetitions are common features of Clough’s
verse, and they lend to it the quality of immediacy that makes it so attrac-
tive, the sense of our overhearing a man’s thoughts, as they lead one into
the next. And the hexameters give Clough room to mimic the somewhat
halting flexibility of ordinary speech, with its interjections, hesitations,
and qualifications; they provide an example of Clough’s tendency toward
what I have called generic hybridity, incorporating the skeleton of the
epic, the immediacy and inwardness of the lyric, and the colloquialism of
the novel. But because of these features, Clough’s epic hexameters rarely
invigorate; rather, their constant rise and fall focuses attention on the dif-
ficulties of escape from metrical—and, by association, from social—con-
ventions. The action of the meter is improgressive, anticlimactic, and
self-reflexive—again, an inaction.
Clough’s emphasis in this passage on the concept of juxtaposition seems
to represent a grab for some notion that will lead him out of the maze of his
own verse, but the concept proves to be so ungrounded in any kind of pos-
itive knowledge that it only bewilders him further, as the move from a state-
ment of cause (“it is only”) to one of question (“and what is”) indicates. Why,
Claude wonders, should he fall for Mary rather than some other girl who
would be equally suitable and equally attractive? Is love just the chance col-
lision of two people who are, as the saying goes, in the right place at the right
time—a kind of lucky hit in the dark? “Juxtaposition,” within the frame-
work of Amours, fits into two sets of metaphors. The first of these is chem-
ical and has to do with the concept of elective affinities: the idea that elements
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have varying inherent tendencies to form combinations and that they will
combine and recombine according to these tendencies when placed in solu-
tion with each other. Goethe had explored the social and sexual implications
of the concept in his novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (1809), a work that
obviously influenced Clough’s reflections on the subject in Amours.94
Goethe’s novel is really more of a thought experiment about Enlightenment
than anything else. In it, a hyperrational couple invite into their home a pair
of outsiders, only to discover that the foreign elements bring with them dan-
gerous forces of elective affinity. The four main characters find themselves
reshuffling their relations according to these affinities, and the results are dev-
astating.
The point that Goethe made—and that Clough worries about—is that
there is nothing genuinely elective about elective affinities: we have no choice
in these matters, other than the choice to oppose our inherent passions. This
restriction proves to be severe. In the jottings of his “1849 (Roma)
Notebook” Clough describes how “Mechanical Ethics” (“training of bod-
ies of men”) is taught by Aristotelian habituation: “You get soldiers into the
way of marching to music—boys and girls of dancing—schoolboys of tak-
ing places—learning off by heart.” But such ethics must be distinguished
from what he calls a “Spiritual Ethics,” which is taught not by action but
by inaction: “its virtue is negative; to check or suppress inferior vital effluxes—
and coalescences—combinations / to withdraw oneself / to decline solici-
tations.” We can see by the context that the term “Spiritual Ethics” refers
specifically to control of sensual attractions; his examples are sexual and gus-
tatory. Clough seems to want to argue that while we can teach a boy to recite
his lines by making him say them over a hundred times, we cannot teach
a man to love a woman by what we call “going through the motions” of
lovemaking: this is not true love (nor true action—again, the connection)
but rather something else, “to sham-to-act.”95 So “doing” in the sexual sense
poses a threat to action.
Unfortunately, we have a greater “affinity” for “lower kinds of juxtapo-
sition” (that is, the sexual kind) than for the higher, spiritual ones. Such attrac-
tion must be resisted if we ever wish to engage in genuine acts of love. In
“Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne,” a Browningesque dramatic monologue
composed during the same period as Amours, Clough imagines the French
king Louis XV’s horror of action, and of sexual action in particular, as so
great that he considers castration: “With one short act, decisive for all time
/ By sharp excision sever the seed of ill.”96 Clough hardly condones the king’s
attitude—in fact, it comes across as pathological—but he seems also to feel
some sympathy for his protagonist’s position: “Poor Kings, must forth to
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action, as you say; / Action, that slaves us, drives us, fretted, worn, / To plea-
sure, which anon enslaves us too” (lines 42–44). And Clough’s notebooks
show that he shared in the king’s sense that routine inaction provides the
only solution to the problem:
If ought there be for sinful souls below
To do, ’tis rather to forbear to do;
If ought there be of action that contains
The sense of sweet identity with God,
It is, methinks, it is inaction only. (lines 59–63)
In part, “Sa Majesté” must be read as a critique of Christian quietism, a
revelation of its morbidity, and another push forward in Clough’s campaign
for action. And yet the disease, as we can see with Claude, has spread to
the secular limbs of the nineteenth century.
Clough located his only hope of genuine acts of love in his belief that
the lower, sexual affinities, though strong, were also temporary. Any mix-
tures formed on the basis of the lower attractions would prove themselves
unstable and would, like oil and water, rapidly dissolve into their compo-
nent elements.97 Claude uses the language of elective affinity to describe the
distinction between genuine love (that which forms a stable molecule from
its elements) and mere sexual attraction (a short-lived emulsion):
There are two different kinds, I believe, of human attraction;
One which simply disturbs, unsettles, and makes you uneasy,
And another that poises, retains, and fixes, and holds you. (II.xi.264–66)
But how then do we know that what we are feeling is love rather than mere
sexual attraction? The difficulty of distinguishing between the two kinds
of attraction leads Claude to follow upon this distinction with the reflec-
tion that “action / is a most dangerous thing” (II.xi.270–71). “To act com-
mits us,” as Clough declares in the Roma notebook,98 and Claude
expresses the same worry:
Action will furnish belief,—but will that belief be the true one?
This is the point, you know. However, it doesn’t much matter.
What one wants, I suppose, is to predetermine the action,
So as to make it entail, not a chance-belief, but the true one. 
(V.ii.20–23; original emphasis)
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Clough, like Aristotle, thought that we are habituated to the good by doing
good deeds. Our society trains us in virtue by teaching us to do—at first by
rote or under duress, with neither understanding nor belief—what it deems
to be right. Eventually we learn to believe in what we are doing; only at this
stage can our deeds be said to be truly virtuous. Aristotle’s faith in his sys-
tem of ethics was predicated on a faith in his society’s system of beliefs.
Claude, though, has lost such faith: how do we know that those conventions
we are raised with uphold the “true” beliefs? And what kind of action is con-
ventional action, anyway? As Florence Nightingale remarked: “What is con-
ventional life? Passivity when we want to be active.”99
The concept of convention, the link between costume and custom, and
the parallel double meaning of “habit” (both a costume and a customary
act) all show the blurring of the distinction between action and acting, as
in these canceled lines from Amours, I.v.83–86:
Curious work, meantime, this re-entering society: how one
Sits and perceiving no meaning, consents to converse without meaning
Suffers the gesture and speech to adopt the costume of convention.
Then of a sudden one loses the limit; true Nature immingles,
Lives in the false; the hard seed develops and grows in convention.
Make-belief changes to fact; and acting converts into action.100
Again note the repetition in the verse, here heightened by Clough’s adroit
use of alliteration and assonance. The slurring of words through repeated
syllables, like the slurring of a dandy’s voice, suggests the deep connection
between matters of form and of content, and even, perhaps, the subsum-
ing of the content into the form. Each step along the way seems so
insignificant: from consenting to converse, we suddenly find ourselves cos-
tumed in convention. Each “act” is rendered impure by the slip of a letter
or the addition of a suffix that follows quite naturally and almost neces-
sarily from the lost root: from fact (and its corresponding vocabulary of the
“factitious”) to acting to action. With so little to separate the words, how
can there be much to separate the concepts? The regularity of the dactyls
in the second and third lines quoted pulls the reader along in the process
of conversion. The two spondaic phrases, “true Nature” and “hard seed,”
present a temporary break in the flow of the meter, testifying to an almost
elegiac longing for an innate core of self that could swim against the river
of costume, custom, conversation, and convention down which Claude is
being dragged. But the dactyls pick up again in the final line, as the course
of conventionalization is completed.
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One can see here how deep the Aristotelian tendency of Clough’s thought
ran: “acting converts into action” is as succinct and accurate a description
of Aristotelian habituation as one is likely to find. But because of his lack
of faith in conventional action, Clough’s description of Aristotle’s lesson
comes across as a nightmarish reflection on the impossibility of genuine
action—or genuine love. “I am in love, you say; I do not think so exactly,”
Claude remarks. And the sad thing is that he really cannot be sure; all he
can do is let things progress as they will—laissez faire, laissez aller. Actively
to pursue any course is to implicate himself in a possible falsehood; only
by abrogating responsibility can Claude maintain his sense of integrity. (Mary
seems to understand Claude’s worries: this is precisely what he likes in her.
As her sister says—again reflecting the language of laissez-faire—she “Lets
him go on as he likes, and neither will help nor dismiss him” [II.viii.234]).
Again, Carlyle highlights how Clough’s dilemma is representative of his
age; with skepticism, “Genuine Acting ceases in all departments of the world’s
work; dexterous Similitude of Acting begins. . . . Heroes have gone-out;
quacks have come-in.”101 Action threatens to become acting in its dramatic
sense, tainted by falsehood; as Clough’s hero Claude puts it in another can-
celed passage of Amours de Voyage, “What is all Action and Life but a series
of affectations? / Parts we assume; tinsel drapes we wear and are fain to
act up to?”102
The alternative to acting, as Clough had noted, is abstinence, willed inac-
tion, and for a while Claude attempts this: he avoids any declaration of his
intentions; he does not leave Rome with the Trevellyns. “I do not like being
moved,” Claude declares,
for the will is excited; and action
Is a most dangerous thing; I tremble for something factitious,
Some malpractice of heart and illegitimate process. (II.xi.270–72)
The dilemma is one Claude, who shares his author’s uncompromising
honesty and his capacity for self-scrutiny, will repeatedly confront in the
Amours under the name of the “factitious.” Claude hesitates acknowledg-
ing his feelings because he distrusts the relationship between emotion and
motion. The former leads to the latter, but any falseness in feeling will cor-
rupt the action it generates, so rendering the entire process false and lead-
ing to an unforeseeable and uncontrollable chain of events, all subject to
the taint of the original act. Yet no matter how much he dislikes it, Claude
finds himself moving:
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But I am in for it now,—laissez faire, of a truth, laissez aller.
Yes, I am going,—I feel it, I feel and cannot recall it,—
Fusing with this thing and that, entering into all sorts of relations,
Tying I know not what ties, which, whatever they are, I know one thing,
Will, and must, woe is me, be one day painfully broken,—
Broken with painful remorses, with shrinkings of soul, and relentings,
Foolish delays, more foolish evasions, most foolish renewals.
(I.xii.231–37)
Again the verse progresses relentlessly: repeated words and sounds cause
phrase to follow phrase with the appearance of inevitability. Claude’s
description of love presages Clough’s nightmarish letter to Blanche of 31
December 1851. And Claude’s vision of the affair turns out to be prophet-
ic of the voyage of love upon which he is about to embark.
That voyage provides the second metaphoric framework in Amours for
the concept of juxtaposition. Indeed, a version of the travel theme extends
through all three of Clough’s major works: The Bothie is an escapist “vaca-
tion pastoral” located in the Scottish Highlands, the voyage of Amours con-
stitutes a leg of the Grand Tour, and Dipsychus is set in the tourist’s Venice.
Clough’s characters’ status as tourists reflects their sense of homelessness in
the world, their alienation from society, and also their restlessness. His trav-
elers are the descendants of the Romantic wanderers: the Cains, the
Ancient Mariners, the Don Juans. As the title of the work indicates,
Amours de Voyage is as much a rumination on the love of—or perhaps, more
accurately, the need for—travel, as on the romance that develops between
the hero and heroine. In fact, it suggests that these two forms of love actu-
ally reflect the same underlying search: a quest for authenticity, a desire to
escape the “factitious” elements of modern life. But the move from
Romantic traveler to Victorian tourist should be noted. As James Buzard
has shown in The Beaten Track, the claim “that ‘the tourist’ is one of the
best models available for ‘modern-man-in-general’ derives from . . . an image
of the tourist as a figure estranged from the authentic.”103
Amours de Voyage begins with a reflection on travel as a search for authen-
ticity: “Come, let us go,—to a land wherein gods of the old time wandered,
/ Where every breath even now changes to ether divine” (I, opening ele-
giacs, lines 3–4). But from the very first, Claude expresses a sense of alien-
ation from his cultural past that renders the quest itself suspect: “’Tis but
to prove limitation, and measure a cord, that we travel”; “’Tis but to change
idle fancies for memories willfully falser” (I, opening elegiacs, lines 7, 9).104
The tourism of Amours acts as a metaphor for broader cultural alienation.
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Where the epic hero once stood, the tourist now gawks. In fact, Clough’s
heroes sightsee at Revolution, as though it were one more of the cultural
attractions to take in. Clough himself recorded with irony how on the trip
to Rome that formed the basis for Amours, he found it necessary to disturb
the revolutionary hero Mazzini from his political pursuits in order to get a
letter of permission to study some rare collections of sculpture (presumably,
those very sculptures Claude uses as an excuse for staying behind in
Rome).105 War becomes something that can be appreciated only from the
tourist’s perspective. In one remarkable scene in Amours, Claude stands amidst
a group of fellow tourists atop the Pincian Hill and looks down upon the
battle, enjoying the view and pointing out its peculiarities:
Twelve o’clock, on the Pincian Hill, with lots of English,
Germans, Americans, French,—the Frenchmen, too, are protected,—
So we stand in the sun, but afraid of a probable shower;
So we stand and stare, and see, to the left of St. Peter’s,
Smoke, from the cannon, white,—but that is at intervals only,—
Black, from a burning house, we suppose, by the Cavalleggieri.
(II.v.113–18)
Recall Clough’s letters home during his stay in Paris in 1848, where he
talked of “potter[ing] about under the Tuileries’ chestnuts, and here and
there about bridges and streets, pour savourer la république.”
Claude describes how he gets his first “sign of the battle” one morning
when he is sitting in a café, “Murray, as usual, in hand”—sensing a change
in the weather, “but thinking mostly of Murray”—when the waiter tells him
that there is no milk (II.v.101, 96, 98). The passage perfectly describes the
tourist’s strange dialectic of nearness to and distance from the visited cul-
ture: even as Claude considers the cultural artifacts of the city, he demon-
strates his ignorance of its current political truths. In another shocking scene
in Amours, already mentioned, Claude writes home about seeing a priest
attacked by a mob. On the way back from St. Peter’s, “Murray, as usual, /
Under [his] arm,” he notices a disturbance. As he tells his friend, “So I have
seen a man killed! An experience that, among others! / Yes, I suppose I have;
although I can hardly be certain” (II.vii.167–68, 162–63).106 Witnessing a
murder is not so different from looking at St. Peter’s, and Murray serves as
a guidebook to both “experiences.” After all, everything Claude sees comes
to him at the tourist’s distance, through gaps in the crowd, in a language
he can’t quite comprehend: “History, Rumour of Rumours,” he continues,
quoting Carlyle.
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The search for authenticity also occurs on the literary level. The move-
ments of Mary and Claude over the crossed and scarred soil of the Italy of
the Amours seem to reflect the palimpsest-like cultural markings of the ter-
rain on which History and Culture have left so many confusing traces. As
Buzard would put it, they are on a “beaten track.” But the traces of ancient
greatness appear to Claude as the waste products of a dead civilization:
Rome disappoints me much; I hardly as yet understand, but
Rubbishy seems the word that most exactly would suit it.
All the foolish destructions, and all the sillier savings,
All the incongruous things of past incomprehensible ages,
Seem to be treasured up here to make fools of present and future.
(I.i.19–23)
The form of waste, though, most evident in the poem is not that of the
actual crumbling structures with which Claude is surrounded (although
the opening canto in particular includes several descriptions of the local
sights, relayed in a rather jaded guidebook manner). Rather, the cultural
detritus that most pervades the poem is that of previous writers who have
engaged with Rome.
Clough creates in Amours a web of allusions that replicates Rome’s infa-
mous architectural jumble (the same “stupendous fragmentariness” that would
so disturb George Eliot’s Dorothea during her honeymoon there107). He often
does this by quotation. A characteristic example of the process is his revi-
sion of Brutus’s declaration, “There is a tide in the affairs of men, / Which,
taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.”108 Claude’s take on the lines of the
famous Roman (as written by the most famous of Englishmen) adds only
a few words but produces a dramatic shift in meaning: “There is a tide, at
least in the love affairs of mortals, / Which, when taken at flood, leads on
to the happiest fortune” (IV.iii.33–34). The alteration typifies the paradigm
shift in Amours from a primary concern for the fortunes of war to the for-
tunes of the heart. But as modern buildings in the Eternal City stand on
Renaissance foundations covering Roman ruins, so the layering here con-
tains many levels: the allusion is also a direct one to the interim text of Byron’s
Don Juan, a poem that like Amours can be thought of as a “novel-in-verse,”
a quest-romance travelogue led by a famously passive (although bodily active)
hero, who refuses to end his tale with a wedding. (Byron’s narrator quips:
“There is a tide in the affairs of women / ‘Which taken at the flood leads’—
God knows where.”109) “Should I incarnadine ever this inky pacifical fin-
ger [?]” (II.iv.72), Claude wonders. But Clough’s sense of loss is as much
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about literature as about heroism, about the authenticity of the inky finger
as that of the bloody one, about the ability to say something in a modern
voice rather than through the words of the dead.
From France, Clough had alluded to Wordsworth’s Intimations Ode to
describe his own sense of revolutionary disappointment; comparing the Paris
he walked through to that of ’89, he noted that “the glory and the fresh-
ness of the dream is departed.”110 Claude also expresses his sense of
Romantic belatedness by invoking the famous Ode, the iconic poem of a
lost golden age, and it is telling that for him the golden age is one of nat-
ural action. He explains why he must discontinue his pursuit of Mary:
There was a time, methought it was but lately departed,
When, if a thing was denied me, I felt I was bound to attempt it; . . . 
It is over, all that! I am a coward and know it.
Courage in me could be only factitious, unnatural, useless.
(V.v.77–78, 84–85)
Clough’s quest for a poetic voice through which to express himself authen-
tically has become inextricably tied to the genuine revolutionary experi-
ences of the poets of the past. Wordsworth’s France and Byron’s Italy peep
through the cracks of Clough’s Rome. But the connection to these places
has altered dramatically: absent “genuine” experience, the only kind of
poetry that seems possible is the poetry of tourism.
So travel allows Clough to express his hero’s sense of cultural alienation.
But Clough also makes travel represent the almost inevitable failure of plot-
ting in a complicated world. No matter how carefully plans are laid, no mat-
ter how often timetables are poured over, something always disrupts one’s
intended course. Amours makes particularly adroit use of the phenomenon
that the Victorian critic John Addington Symonds, himself a great traveler,
called “a natural accident of travelling”: “when once missed,” a sought-after
party (here the Trevellyns) “cannot be caught up again.”111 What results is
a parody of the Grand Tour. Take, for example, letter ii of canto IV:
Gone to Como, they said; and I have posted to Como.
There was a letter left, but the camariere had lost it.
Could it have been for me? They came, however, to Como,
And from Como went by boat,—perhaps to the Splügen,—
Or to the Stelvio, say, and the Tyrol; also it might be
By Porlezza across to Lugano, and so to the Simplon
Possibly, or the St Gothard,—or possibly, too, to Baveno,
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Orta, Turin, and elsewhere. Indeed, I am greatly bewildered. 
(IV.ii.19–26)
So is the reader.
Yet the uncertainty generated by travel functions in two directions: while
it is difficult when traveling to find someone we are searching for, we inevitably
meet random people. Dickens, a Victorian writer who unlike Clough pre-
served a firm faith in action, as his carefully plotted novels demonstrate,
took advantage of such random collisions, the famous “coincidences” that
propel his stories.112 In a statement to John Forster about the plan for Little
Dorrit (1857), he described his methods:
It struck me that it would be a new thing to show people coming togeth-
er, in a chance way, as fellow-travellers, and being in the same place, igno-
rant of one another, as happens in life; and to connect them afterwards,
and to make the waiting for that connection a part of the interest.113
Dickens may have made the original meetings seem accidental, but he
ensured (by “connect[ing]” his characters “afterwards”) that our sense of
providential planning would be preserved. Clough, though, never recon-
nects the dots. Claude calls such chance crossings of paths “juxtaposi-
tions,” and unlike Dickens, he is very much troubled by them:
Juxtaposition, in fine; and what is juxtaposition?
Look you, we travel along in the railway-carriage, or steamer,
And, pour passer le temps, till the tedious journey be ended,
Lay aside paper or book, to talk with the girl that is next one;
And, pour passer le temps, with the terminus all but in prospect,
Talk of eternal ties and marriages made in heaven. (III.vi.107–12)
Love, then, the idea that two people are “meant” for each other, is merely
an “illusion” (III.vi.113), and Claude, unlike most of us, cannot pretend
it is anything more. “Where does Circumstance end, and Providence
where begins it?” Philip asked in the battle-by-night passage from The
Bothie (IX.49). Both Claude and Clough find it impossible to hide from
this question; inevitably—especially once the idea of Providence is aban-
doned—the act of falling in love contains an element of chance. You get
married to a girl because she happened to be seated next to you on the
train.
Of course you can also think of such juxtaposition, more positively, as
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a matter of destiny. In his extraordinary poem “Natura Naturans”
(1846–47), Clough’s narrator imagines the entire process of evolution as he
stares across a railway carriage at a young woman sitting opposite him. The
poem is unusual in that in it Clough celebrates those same sexual
instincts—elective affinities, here figured as “elections”—that he fears else-
where:
Yet owned we, fused in one,
The Power which e’en in stones and earths
By blind elections felt, in forms
Organic breeds to myriad births. (lines 41–44)
The narrator continues by ascending a kind of biblically inflected evolu-
tionary ladder: from lichen to lily to cedar to bee to bird to gazelle, and
finally, to man and woman. The prime mover in this proto-Darwinian
process is the “primal prime embrace” (line 76). But as the poem makes
clear by its ending, the “genial heat” (line 77) of sexual energy can be pre-
served only in an atmosphere where “young Desire” is never “told the mys-
tic name of Love” (lines 87–88). The incident can represent evolutionary
destiny rather than random juxtaposition precisely because the encounter
in the train is between perfect strangers who never enter the realm of
social intercourse: they do not even speak to each other, much less begin
talking of “eternal ties and marriages made in heaven.” The man and
woman never become individuated; they remain male and female repre-
sentatives of the human species. Any imagined act between them bears no
mark of the individual will; it is essentially collective.
In contrast, Amours de Voyage is plotted like a courtship novel, so love
and marriage cannot be avoided. Moreover, individuation (that is, a sense
of characters rather than of mere types) stands at its center. This is appro-
priate to a love story. We like to believe, after all, that we fall in love with
people for their peculiarities, for the things that make them different from
everyone else we have met. We call the resultant distinct entities their essen-
tial selves. But evolutionarily, the essential self is the very opposite of such
individuality: it is what we all have in common, the human genome. What
can seem like destiny when you think in terms of an entire race appears
random when you bring things down to the level of the individual; acts that
are meaningful collectively—the workings of the market, the social con-
ventions—can lose their meaning viewed from the perspective of one pair
of eyes. Hence Claude’s crisis in action: from where he stands things just
don’t make much sense.
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As elsewhere in Amours, the marriage referred to in the “strangers on a
train” passage represents a larger commitment to action. A little later on in
the same letter, while musing on the fact of death, Claude comments that
“But for the steady fore-sense of a freer and larger existence, / Think you
that man could consent to be circumscribed here into action?”
(III.vi.123–24). Men can stand to marry, to do the deed that will tie them
to one person for the rest of their lives, only because they know there will
be an escape in death. Claude’s speech weirdly rewrites Hamlet’s famous
“To be, or not to be” soliloquy. Only here, marriage replaces suicide, and
the “something after death”—“The undiscover’d country,” so dreaded by
Hamlet, “from whose bourn / No traveller returns”—is positively
embraced by Claude, and instead of making him “lose the name of action”
would give him the courage to take it.114 But it is not enough. When Claude
gives up the search for Mary, he also forsakes any lingering impulse toward
a life of directed action. To believe in action is to look toward to a future
in which one’s deeds bear fruit; the move from Italy to Egypt takes Claude
into a yet-more-distant past.
Hamlet stands at the center of the debate about action and character in
nineteenth-century literature.115 Emerson wrote that the “speculative
genius” of the age was “a sort of living Hamlet.”116 I suggested in the pre-
vious chapter that The Borderers owed something to Shakespeare’s great
drama of inaction; one can see how both play and character also resonate
with my discussion of Clough and Amours de Voyage. A. S. McDowall indi-
cates the source of the connection in his belief that “no other English poet
has so anatomized the idea of duty, or the possibilities of acting truly, or
even (Hamlet always excepted) the possibility of acting at all [than
Clough].”117 Furthermore, the resonance was not lost on contemporary
critics, scarcely one of whom missed the chance of bringing it up, fre-
quently in the service of describing Claude as a spirit of his age. In his treat-
ment of Amours de Voyage in the Fortnightly Review, J. A. Symonds
(probably with Arnold’s Preface in mind118) compared Claude to both
Hamlet and Faust, those two “princes of metaphysical perplexity. However
exceptional, his skepticism is natural to himself, and to the temper of his
century.”119 W. Y. Sellars criticized the poem as a debased version of
Shakespeare’s play, featuring “a very modern Hamlet [who] is seen playing
a weak and common-place part in the very common-place drama of mod-
ern English society in Rome.”120 Today’s critics seem to prefer comparing
83The Case of Clough
Markovitz_CH2_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:25 PM  Page 83
Amours to “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” thus emphasizing its
modernity. But of course, this comes to much the same thing, as Prufrock
is itself a belated Victorian offspring of Hamlet, its hero a man who can-
not muster the grandeur of the Prince, but, in the form of “an attendant
lord,” shares his inability to act.
Claude himself seems to recognize the justice of the comparison. At one
point, he declares his Hamlet-like aversion to being “the observed of such
observers” (III.13.279).121 And when making his excuses for his abandon-
ment of politics in the midst of the revolutionary fervor that surrounds him,
he alludes to the Prince’s response to the speech of the Player King: “And
what’s the / Roman Republic to me, or I to the Roman Republic?”
(III.3.66–67).122 Moreover, Hamlet also stands at the center of the myth of
Clough’s life. Stopford A. Brook was by no means the first or last to com-
pare the poet to Hamlet, but he was unusually astute in his recognition of
the double-sidedness of the allusion: “Thus moving, like a Hamlet,
through the strifes of theology and religion, he resembles Hamlet in
another way. When the Prince is suddenly flung into the storm of action,
he takes momentarily a fierce part in it, and enjoys it, till overthinking again
seizes on him. Clough repeats this with his life and his poetry is touched
with it.”123
But as the Romantic predilection for conferring upon it the status of closet
drama suggests, Hamlet also featured in a generic argument of the period.
The work is Shakespeare’s greatest expression of the art of the monologue
(or soliloquy), and a correspondingly problematic example of the dramatic
form. Tennyson highlights this oddity by designating his own “little
Hamlet,” Maud, a “monodrama.”124 The debate in the period about the term
dramatic (discussed above) often seems to be a debate about the relative impor-
tance of action and character in Shakespeare’s plays in general and Hamlet
in particular. (As suggested in the previous chapter, Hamlet is particularly
relevant to the dispute over the importance of character and action in lit-
erature because of the degree to which the Prince’s superbly rendered con-
sciousness relates to his inaction.) Drawing on the Romantic tradition of
Shakespeare criticism exemplified by Hazlitt, Victorian critics took it for
granted that what made Shakespeare great was the realism of his charac-
ters.125 William Roscoe’s argument against Arnold’s Aristotelianism took pre-
cisely this tack: “In Sophocles, the action is predominant, and the
characters are interesting as they elucidate it. In Shakspere [sic], the char-
acters are predominant, and the events gain their main interest from the
insight which, by their aid, the poet contrives to give us into some human
heart.”126 So Shakespeare himself became a keyword indicating the impor-
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tance of character in literary works. Henry Sidgwick turned to Shakespeare
in his praise of the “individuality” of Clough’s “personages”: “It becomes as
impossible for us to attribute a remembered remark to the wrong person as
it would be in a play of Shakespeare.”127
But in Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre (1795–96), Goethe suggested how to
take the debate over genre one step farther. Wilhelm argues that Hamlet
actually bears a strong structural resemblance to the form of the novel:
The hero of a novel must be passive [leidend], or at least not active to a
high degree; from the hero of a play we demand effective action and
deeds. . . . [Hamlet] really only has sentiment, and it is only external
events that work on him, so that this play has something of the breadth
of a novel.128
And Sidgwick seems to have been following a similar train of thought
when he introduced his comments comparing Clough’s character presen-
tation to that of Shakespeare with a different comparison: “There is not
one of the personages [of The Bothie or Amours] whose individuality is not
as thoroughly impressed upon us as if they had been delineated in a three-
volume novel by Mr. Trollope.”129 So Claude’s Hamletism could also
reflect Clough’s more novelistic concerns in Amours.
Walter Bagehot advised the heads of constitutional monarchies to fol-
low a policy of “well-considered inaction”130—a phrase that reads like a plot
summary of Hamlet. He again reveals the connection between the politi-
cal and literary realms by having used the same word in his review of the
posthumous edition of Clough’s works to describe the plot of Amours de
Voyage. Bagehot remarked that while “Mr. Arnold teaches that a great poem
must be founded on a great action, . . . this one is founded on a long inac-
tion.” But, he added, “Art has many mansions.”131 And perhaps Claude’s
Hamlet-like propensity for inaction does make him more properly the hero
of a novel. Barbara Hardy has argued against the novelistic approach to Amours
de Voyage: “[Clough] is very unlike a novelist, and especially unlike a Victorian
novelist. His motion is very erratic, his fluidity and foreshortening and shut-
tling are all products of an essentially lyrical form, where history is cut down
so that feeling is prominent.”132 My point is of course that precisely this close
connection to the lyrical, this emphasis on feeling—that is, this following
of Wordsworth’s prescriptions in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads rather than
Aristotle’s in the Poetics—makes the poem like a certain kind of novel that
is very much Victorian: the novel of character, as distinguished from the
novel of plot.
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And as Sidgwick’s review suggests, Victorian critics registered the con-
nection (no doubt motivated in part by pressure from the increasing pre-
dominance of the novel in the literary marketplace). J. M. Robertson wrote
of The Bothie and Amours as “in essence works of narrative, analytical, psy-
chological fiction” and stressed “the relation that such works bear to the con-
temporary novel.”133 Rather conveniently for me, he drew explicit links between
Clough’s characters and those of George Eliot and Henry James, the very
writers to whom I now wish to turn.134 Such readers testify to the contem-
porary sense of the novel as a genre of character. They also testify to a broader
shift from the genre of the epic, with its concern for the great deeds of heroes,
to the novel, with its concern for consciousness and belief in the “incalcu-
lably diffusive” influence of “unhistoric acts,” as George Eliot would mem-
orably phrase it. Amours de Voyage stands on the edge of this shift, at the
place where the novel, the lyric, the drama, and the epic—and their dif-
ferent attitudes toward action—collide. The generic explosion it represents
manifests the disturbance to be found at fault lines.
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“That girl has some drama in her”:
George Eliot’s Problem with Action
If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? And if I am only for
myself, then what am I? And if not now, when?
—Rabbi Hillel, Pirkei Avot
THE DEBATE CONCERNING the proper role for action in poetry also mani-
fests itself in the Victorian novel, where it is transformed into the division
between novels of plot and novels of character. Etymologically, prose
means sequence, and plot, the sequence of events out of which a story is
constructed, would seem to be an inherent element of prose narrative. As
Wilkie Collins, one of the fathers of that most pure form of the novel of
plot, the detective story, noted in his Preface to the 1861 edition of The
Woman in White (1860), “I have always held to the old-fashioned opinion
that the primary object of a work of fiction should be to tell a story; and
I have never believed that the novelist who properly performed this first
condition of his art, was in danger, on that account, of neglecting the
delineation of character.”1 Nevertheless, with The Moonstone (1868), he
also succumbed to the trend for reversing the Aristotelian priority of plot
over character: “In some of my former novels the object proposed has been
to trace the influence of circumstances upon character. In the present story
I have reversed the process. The attempt made here is to trace the influ-
ence of character on circumstances.”2
The pressures on Collins to focus on character were strong. In 1863, a
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reviewer in Blackwood’s was driven to protest the increasing tendency to say
“the plot is nothing, the character is all.”3 But in general, psychologically
driven novels garnered critical approval more readily than the contempo-
rary poetry discussed in the previous chapter. In part, the cultural stakes
were lower for the relatively arriviste genre, and comparisons to classical texts
could be more easily avoided. In fact, reviewers looked at the novel with
increasing seriousness in the light of its ability to delve into the depths of
characters’ minds. This new approach made the novel a form of art worthy
of adult contemplation, while a corresponding impulse relegated the more
plot-driven branch of the genre to a lower rung on the ladder of culture.
As a critic in Fraser’s put it in 1851: “Few men feel interest in plot after
nineteen. . . . [F]rom that time forward, they look only to the development
of character”; although some action may be necessary to display the psy-
chologies of the characters involved, the burden of interest should fall squarely
on character.4 Plot-driven novels were dismissed as boys’ adventure tales or,
even worse, sensation fiction.
The approval of the tendency to focus on character was not universal,
and some critics looked upon it with almost Arnoldian foreboding, as the
manifestation of hidden cultural disease. R. H. Hutton’s disparaging
remarks in 1855 on the modern trend toward devaluing plot hint at an under-
lying cause of the shift in focus from plot to character:
The best modern writers of fiction seem to be falling into the error of
neglecting the tale in delineating the characters. You feel constantly
inclined to say of them, as the grateful layman said of the long-winded
divine, “it is very good of him to stop at all; for there was no reason why
he should.” . . . It is getting quite unusual to conclude with the wedding.
. . . The reason is, that the strict experience school of fiction is on the
increase, and is carrying out its realism to a faulty extreme. . . . The con-
sequence has been the springing up of a sort of accidental school of fic-
tion.5
Hutton suggested that realism and plot are incompatible in the real world,
where action commonly takes the form of accident and where the story
rarely concludes with the wedding.6 His formula fits perfectly the course
of Amours de Voyage, as we saw. But for a deeper understanding of the
threat to action posed by realism, we must turn to the greatest realist nov-
elist of the Victorian period: George Eliot. In his analysis of Eliot’s trou-
bled relationship to plot, Robert Caserio argues that “in Eliot there is an
arbitrary relation between what is done and narrative reasoning about
88 Chapter Three
Markovitz_CH3_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:26 PM  Page 88
what is done that always threatens to return action to the form of accident.
And this constant threat to the significance of action . . . is also offered by
Eliot as most plausibly representing ‘the real.’” 7 In what follows, I wish to
explore Caserio’s statement in light of the fact that for Eliot (as Caserio
seems to be hinting), accident was not an “arbitrary” category: rather, it car-
ried all those negative connotations with which the word has been invest-
ed by common usage. If action “threatens” to return to accident, then it
should come as no surprise that George Eliot’s attitude toward it tended to
risk aversion.
One way to avoid risk was to internalize the action. D. H. Lawrence remarked
that of the novelists, “it was [George Eliot] who started putting all the action
inside.”8 So, for example, in Felix Holt (“The Radical,”1866), she shifts the
focus from the political revolution implied by the title of the novel to Esther
Lyon’s “inward revolution.”9 When Eliot “puts things inside,” willing,
judging, desiring, and feeling gain the same ontological status as acting. And
yet properly speaking, as I have been arguing, action is set apart by its exter-
nality: it is by our actions, by our words and deeds, that we insert ourselves
into the world. Community is as much the condition of action as of lan-
guage; this is why the end of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics—his treatment
of individual action—launches directly into his Politics.10 Moreover, it is only
by doing, Aristotle tells us, that we become just or unjust. Eliot knew Aristotle’s
writings well, especially the Poetics. In a journal entry of May 1873, she wrote
of “finishing again Aristotle’s Poetics, which I first read in 1856.”11 And she
acknowledged the Aristotelian connection between action and ethics: as the
narrator of Daniel Deronda (1876) insists, “the fuller nature desires to be
an agent, to create, and not merely to look on.”12 In fact, Eliot’s shifting
inward of action created for her a series of ethical problems with which she
wrestled increasingly in her novels. The struggle culminated in Daniel Deronda,
in which the nature and potential of action become the dominant subject,
and it is to this work that I will eventually turn. But first I want to explore
some of the causes that lay behind George Eliot’s problem with action.
The Problem with Action
Ironically, given (as we shall see in chapter 4) that he is an author fre-
quently accused of writing novels in which nothing occurs, Henry James
had a speaker (Pulcheria) complain in his conversational review of Daniel
Deronda: “I never read a story with less current. It is not a river; it is a series
of lakes.”13 But it is not enough to note that relatively little happens in most
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of Eliot’s stories, where even the “murders” are usually and conspicuously
(in a manner that recalls the central crime in The Borderers) crimes of inac-
tion: Hetty’s abandoning her child, Bulstrode’s not telling his housekeep-
er to refrain from administering the liquor, Gwendolen’s hesitating to
throw Grandcourt the rope. Eliot, as Caserio has deftly shown, is very dif-
ferent from an author like Dickens to whom narrative activity—the exter-
nal working of plot—functions as a kind of meaningful agency.14 Yet, pace
Lawrence, Jane Austen resolutely pulled her plots inside without encoun-
tering the problems Eliot faced. For while Austen is primarily a novelist
interested in epistemology, Eliot’s first concern is always with the ethical.
V. S. Pritchett has brilliantly recognized that Eliot has a mind “that has
grown by making judgments,”15 but these judgments are rarely allowed to
find outward expression in positive action. Her optimism, her sense of
progress, seems to have been much more about the human potential to will
the right things than about the human potential to do the right things.
Even Aristotle appreciated that both goodwill and good deed are essen-
tial to virtue.16 But Eliot seems more troubled than Aristotle by the gap between
internally driven will and externally conditioned action. As the narrator of
Felix Holt notes, we must learn to discern between will and destiny (FH
11): because our ability to act is hindered in part by forces outside our con-
trol, by the actions of others as well as ourselves, morality involves an ele-
ment of what could be called luck. Sorrow can be inherited, we are told in
Eliot’s Introduction to Felix Holt; this is the great lesson Harold Transome
comes to recognize: “It was the most serious moment in Harold Transome’s
life: for the first time the iron had entered into his soul, and he felt the hard
pressure of our common lot, the yoke of that mighty resistless destiny laid
upon us by the acts of other men as well as our own” (FH 385). The yoke
of resistless destiny forms a leitmotiv throughout Eliot’s writing. In the first
motto she ever originated for a chapter, one gentleman declares to another,
“Our deeds are fetters that we forge ourselves,” only to be reminded, “Ay,
truly: but I think it is the world that brings the iron.”17 In her favorite metaphor
for this scenario, free will is constrained in the web of human interaction.
Hannah Arendt, Aristotle’s greatest modern interpreter and disciple, uses
the same figure to describe, in terms remarkably close to Eliot’s, the role of
action in linking character to community:
The disclosure of the “who” through speech, and the setting of a new
beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where
their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new
process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcom-
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er, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he comes into
contact. It is because of this already existing web of human relationships,
with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost
never achieves its purpose; but it is also because of this medium, in which
action alone is real, that it “produces” stories.18
In fact, what Arendt describes is the narrative of an Eliot novel. The pos-
itive aspect of this scenario is the creation of community; as both Arendt
and Eliot recognize, the acknowledgment of our essential interrelatedness
that allows for the working of sympathy depends on the web woven of our
collective deeds. Yet because of the web, individual action (especially
action conceived on a grand scale; as we shall see, this distinction was
important to Eliot) rarely achieves its purpose. Think of the way in which
Felix’s desire to stop the riot is constrained by the “tangled business” of the
“small selfish ends” of the other rioters (FH 266), or the way in which the
deed that is Casaubon’s will actually works to bring about the very event
(Dorothea’s marriage to Ladislaw) it was written to hinder.
So Eliot’s trouble with action rested partly in her sense of the impossi-
bility of controlling consequences in the world. Through the voice of Felix,
she warns each person to take care how his “tugging will act on the fine
widespread network of society in which he is fast meshed.”19 Eliot’s stories
are produced by the ricochet of a few cue deeds on a table where the other
balls are already moving in a determined fashion. Or, to use her own metaphor
in Felix Holt, her characters are trying to play chess with pieces that have
passions and intellects of their own (FH 236). Of course Eliot herself has
control, but she is the only real author. This distinction points to the cru-
cial difference between the production of art and the living of life. Arendt
interestingly continues the passage quoted above by disparaging the con-
ceit of being the author of one’s own life: “although everybody started his
life by inserting himself into the human world through action and speech,
nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words, the
stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is
not author or producer.”20 Autobiography can happen only after the fact.
But the problem Eliot wrestled with is twofold: not only are we constrained
by the deeds of others, our own past acts also limit present and future choices.
Mrs. Transome, who “felt the fatal threads about her” (FH 94), has learned
the hard way that activity can entangle the struggler in the meshes of her
own deeds. In Adam Bede (1859), the narrator comments of Arthur
Donnithorne, “Our deeds determine us, as much as we determine our deeds.
. . . There is a terrible coercion in our deeds which may first turn the 
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honest man into a deceiver, and then reconcile him to the change; for this
reason—that the second wrong presents itself to him as the only practica-
ble right.”21 Again and again, Eliot reminds us of this lesson: Tito Melema’s
decision to sell Baldassarre’s ring occasions the narrator’s comment that “he
had chosen his color in the game, and had given an inevitable bent to his
wishes.”22 And Eliot’s fear was compounded by her awareness of the irre-
versibility of acts, the worst kind of “woeful progeny” (FH 11). There is a
“dreadful vitality of deeds”—“children may be strangled, but deeds never”
(R 156). One can sense her terror in this analogy. Eliot would have been
fascinated by chaos theory’s butterfly effect. In her novels, the smallest actions
can bring about vast and unimaginable consequences. So when Eliot
declared that we are “struggling, erring human creatures,”23 she wished to
imply a connection between sin and activity that is only partly within the
control of the agent. Her awareness of the incredible power of action lies
behind that search for safe forms of action by which her novels are driven.
Yet while she was troubled by the force of destiny, her sense of the “inex-
orable law of consequences,” Eliot also believed firmly in free will.24 Her posi-
tion resembles that which John Stuart Mill explored in his Autobiography (1873):
I perceived, that the word Necessity, as a name for the doctrine of Cause
and Effect applied to human action, carried with it a misleading associa-
tion; and that this association was the operative force in the depressing and
paralyzing influence which I had experienced. I saw that though our char-
acter is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape
those circumstances; and that what is really enspiriting and ennobling in
the doctrine of free will, is the conviction that we have real power over the
formation of our character; that our will, by influencing some of our cir-
cumstances, can modify our future habits or capabilities of willing.25
Like Eliot, Mill was disturbed by the degree to which circumstances can
limit one’s ability to act. But what is particularly interesting in his descrip-
tion of free will is the way in which after the difficulty is defined as one of
human action, action itself drops out of the account, to be replaced by
character, will, and habit. Such substitution typifies how Eliot treated
action. She wanted to preserve a sphere for action, in which the will could
find free outward expression, but the only sphere she could envision, given
her determinism, was tremendously limited. As Eliot declared in a letter
to her friend Mrs. Ponsonby, “I shall not be satisfied with your philosophy
till you have reconciled necessitarianism—I hate the ugly word—with the
practice of willing strongly, willing to will strongly, and so on, that being
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what you certainly can do and have done about a great many things in
life.”26 Yet no matter on how many levels the activity of the will can
recur—and Eliot seems to have attributed some magical force to that “and
so on”—it will never break through into a real “doing,” an action.
When it comes to forming habits, though, the repetitions of “and so on”
can attain an almost magical force. Eliot was obsessed with habits. Because
of its incremental force, habit allows for a greater element of control over
action; habitual deeds are less subject to chance than other, more radical
forms of activity. Habit also provides protection against self-interested behav-
ior, which might otherwise dominate in a moment of crisis; if one has been
habituated to do the good, then the virtuous deed is simultaneously the instinc-
tive deed. In a fascinating earlier letter to the same friend, Eliot attempted
to respond to determinism’s tendency to lead to the loss of “all sense of qual-
ity in actions” by distinguishing between it and “hideous fatalism.” Her proof
of effective action rested in Mrs. Ponsonby’s habits of cleanliness: “And if
they [i.e., necessary combinations of cause and effect] don’t hinder you from
taking measures for a bath, without which you know you cannot secure the
delicate cleanliness which is your second nature, why should they hinder
you from a line of resolve in a higher strain of duty to your ideal . . . ?”27
Happiness, which to Aristotle was activity, was to Eliot a kind of habit: “there
is naught less capable of magical production than a mortal’s happiness, which
is mainly a complex of habitual relations and dispositions” (FH 311). Eliot’s
safety-seeking tendencies are perfectly captured in this rather extraordinary
claim. To be sure of happiness, she wished to take away from it that ele-
ment of chance under which she felt we all labor. Yet while habit may act
as a kind of harness on action, a harness can strangle as well as control. Habits
can be good or bad, as Eliot recognized. In its negative manifestation, she
called habit “the purgatory in which we suffer for our past sins.”28 As Carlyle
put it, “Habit is the deepest law of human nature. It is our supreme strength;
if also, in certain circumstances, our miserablest weakness.”29 In Romola,
Romola’s virtue and Tito’s evil are both emphatically the product of habit-
uation.
Nevertheless, the force of habit is essentially conservative, as Burke under-
stood. In fact, Romola stresses the very Burkean (or Wordsworthian) concept
of moral tradition: “Our lives make a moral tradition for our individual selves,
as the life of mankind at large makes a moral tradition for the race; and to
have once acted nobly seems a reason why we should always be noble” (R
331). Habit is its own reason for action: when Romola comes upon the ail-
ing Baldassarre, “Her hands trembled, but their habit of soothing helpful-
ness would have served to guide them without the direction of her thought”
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(R 353). J. S. Mill actually went as far as to define purpose as “a habit of will-
ing.”30 Given that all voluntary action must have an end toward which it can
be directed, we see another reason why habit was so important to Eliot. Her
stake in it can be related to the famous comment to Frederic Myers concerning
the relative natures of “God, Immortality, Duty.”31 Something must fill the
void left by the death of God, and duty does not really mean much in the
abstract. But duty can become purpose when defined by a habitual inclina-
tion (whereas a lack of “sufficient ducts of habit” can turn our nature, as it
does Grandcourt’s, into “mere ooze and mud” [DD 132], taking us back to
the primordial slime out of which we have evolved). The relationship
between habit and a secular concept of duty that can stand in for Christian
charity helps explain the remarkable transition between the end of chapter
68 and the beginning of chapter 69 of Romola. The shift is one from a nos-
talgia for belief—“Many legends were afterwards told in that valley about the
blessed Lady who came over the sea”—to a description of the strange habit-
ual nature of Romola’s activity in the valley: “she had not even reflected, as
she used to do in Florence, that she was glad to live because she could lighten
sorrow—she had simply lived with so energetic an impulse to share the life
around her, to answer the call of need and do the work which cried aloud to
be done, that the reasons for living, enduring, laboring, never took the form
of argument” (R 527). Habit has become its own purpose.
Yet habitual action is in some sense a contradiction in terms, precisely
because habit acts as a substitute for will. If our habits are good, we need
no longer choose what we do: our wills can sit back and relax, so to speak.
“Habit is activity without opposition,” Hegel wrote,32 but the laws of dynam-
ics teach that each action is defined by its reaction. William Godwin described
how habits form:
In proportion as our experience enlarges, the subjects of voluntary action
become more numerous. In this state of the human being, he soon comes
to perceive a considerable similarity between situation and situation. In
consequence he feels inclined to abridge the process of deliberation, and
to act today conformably to the determination of yesterday. Thus the
understanding fixes for itself resting places.33
That search for the similarity between situation and situation resembles
closely Eliot’s narrative technique, her forced exercise of our “power[s] of
comparison” (M 164). Yet Eliot would never wish to “abridge the process
of deliberation.” So habit works both ways; it curtails some of the dangers
of action, but it also hampers some freedom of thought.
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The emphasis on habit also vastly limits the possibilities for progress. Aristotle,
the supreme political thinker, believed that one is habituated into a state
of virtue: virtue provides the backbone needed to do great deeds. But whereas
good habits can clearly go far in establishing cleanliness, are they to be our
only potential source of effective action? Moreover, can we really expect polit-
ical reform to spring from the near impossible universal reform of individ-
ual habits? This seems to have been the starting point of Eliot’s political
agenda. George Levine has stated her position as logical necessity: “Since
real change can only come about through the slow increment of myriad causes
working through history, revolution is doomed to failure.”34 But I wish to
stress that as much fear as logic motivated Eliot’s beliefs: the risks accom-
panying any action were tremendous; those of political revolution
unthinkable. In an 1856 review of Antigone, Eliot noted that “we shall never
be able to attain a great right without doing a wrong. Reformers, martyrs,
revolutionists, are never fighting against evil only; they are also placing them-
selves in opposition to a good.”35 When Felix involves himself in the riot,
he kills a man. Revolution requires wrongdoing, and since any wrongdo-
ing breeds “woeful progeny,” Eliot favored caution. In a letter to John Blackwood,
written while she was working on Felix Holt, Eliot mentioned “one passage
of prophecy which I longed to quote, but I thought it wiser to abstain. ‘Now,
the beauty of the Reform Bill is, that under its mature operation, the peo-
ple must and will become free agents’—a prophecy which I hope is true,
only the maturity of the operation has not arrived yet.”36 The letter cap-
tures perfectly both Eliot’s longing for and fear of such “free-agency.”
Eliot’s sensitivity to the force of consequences must have come in part
from the fact that her life’s story, like those of both Wordsworth and Clough,
was crucially determined by a few dramatic acts: her crisis of religious doubt
as a young woman, marked by a refusal to attend church with her father
in 1842, her entrance into a nonlegalized marriage with G. H. Lewes in
1854, and her legal marriage to John Cross in 1880. Most of us live lives
where our decisions are so many and so slight in and of themselves, their
effect so generally cumulative rather than independent, that it would be hard
to see how we ended up where we are. But Eliot’s three major acts stood at
visible crossroads on the map of her existence, making her particularly self-
conscious of their influence on her life.
They also effected a dramatic breach between Eliot’s sense of external
action and her sense of will or internal choice. As Rosemarie Bodenheimer
has shown, her three crucial deeds caused Eliot to think of a “woman’s life
as a rich and strenuous process of choice, invisible to a world in which she
is defined by requirements about conduct.” Bodenheimer demonstrates that
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“George Eliot’s representation of choice is about the essence of her experi-
ence, about how it was internally structured and how it was externally read
and misread by others.”37 The most objective descriptions of her acts—not
going to church, a sexual relationship with a married man, marriage
(shortly after his death) to another, one much younger than herself—could
reveal little on their own about Eliot’s moral qualities. So her acts and their
aftereffects forced her to relocate the moment of heroism from its usual exter-
nal manifestation in action to the internal process of decision that precedes
action. Such internalized heroism can occur as easily on the domestic front
as on the battlefront, as can be seen in her use of the term “holy war” to
designate what amounted on the surface to a domestic conflict between a
father and his daughter about her conduct. As she told a friend: “Oh, if I
could transport myself to your dining-room, where I guess you and Mr. Pears
are sitting in anticipation of tea, carrying on no ‘Holy War,’ but at peace
with the world and its opinions.”38 While the term is used somewhat iron-
ically, it anticipates the domestication and internalization of heroism that
we see so frequently in Eliot’s writings.
From an early age, Eliot took the idea of consequences very seriously. Her
conduct toward her father during the Holy War was something she would
later live to regret, in spite of her assurance to Dr. Allbutt of the careful
consideration she had given the subject: “the bent of my mind is conserv-
ative rather than destructive, and that denial has been wrought from me
by hard experience—not pleasant rebellion.”39 Rebellion almost never fig-
ures positively in her lexicon. So Eliot transformed what could be thought
of anachronistically as a moment of “teenage rebellion” (and the unbridled
activity we associate with the term) into something very different; instead,
her fall into adult consciousness was marked by what she later would call
“the labour of choice.”40 It is an interesting construction, one that asserts a
parallel between strenuous bodily work and a mental effort characteristic
of Eliot. Eliot’s religious doubt was actually described by a contemporary
as “modern atheistic pietism”41—a phrase that nicely captures the sacred atten-
tion she gives to her own uncertainty. Profound deliberation also marked
what John Cross, and virtually every other commentator on the subject, called
“the most important event in George Eliot’s life—her union with Mr. George
Henry Lewes.”42 As Eliot told Mrs. Bray in 1855, “If there is any one action
or relation of my life which is and always has been profoundly serious, it
is my relation to Mr. Lewes.”43 Seriousness—and the intense internal
scrutiny it entails—can help to legitimate otherwise rash-seeming action.
As Henry James noted, “The union Miss Evans formed with [Lewes] was
a deliberate step, of which she accepted all the consequences.”44
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One of those consequences was an effect on her writing, a tendency to
treat action with a seriousness that dramatically retards its progress. James’s
observation continues: “The fault of most of her work is in the absence of
spontaneity, the excess of reflection; and by her action in 1854 (which seemed,
superficially, to be the sort usually termed reckless) she committed herself
to being nothing if not reflective, to cultivating a kind of compensatory earnest-
ness.”45 While she never regretted it, Eliot maintained a painfully vivid aware-
ness of what could be called the ethical cost-benefit analysis of her choice.
Soon after her elopement with Lewes, she wrote to John Chapman, “I have
counted the cost of the step that I have taken and am prepared to bear, with-
out irritation or bitterness, renunciation by all my friends.”46 But almost three
years later, she was still making calculations: “If I live five years longer, the
positive result of my existence will outweigh the small negative good that
would have consisted in my not doing anything to shock others, and I can
conceive no consequences that will make me repent the past. Do not mis-
understand me, and suppose that I think myself heroic or great in any way.”47
One senses her racing against the clock in an effort to make up her moral
balance.
What will allow her to get into the black is the social good that will accrue
from her work as a novelist, to which she has come only as a result of her
union with Lewes. Lewes frequently appears in her letters as high priest to
the religion of her novel writing. Eliot seems to have greeted her vocational
“annunciation”—the discovery of her talent for writing fiction over which
he presided—with relief as well as joy: “I have at last found my true voca-
tion, after which my nature had always been feeling and striving uneasily
without finding it,” she wrote to her friend D’Albert Durade.48 Moments
of vocation are essential to Eliot’s conception of a successful life, as her nov-
els demonstrate.49 In fact, such moments frequently represent the greatest
“event” of her heroes’ and heroines’ lives, as we shall see. Perhaps
Middlemarch provides Eliot’s most extensive analysis of the concept.
Almost every character in the novel can be looked at in terms of vocation:
from Dorothea, who is always searching after one, to Lydgate, who has found
his but must forsake it, to Farebrother, whose job and vocation (clergyman
and entomologist) are distinct in troubling ways, to Fred Vincy, whom Mary
wants to preserve from Farebrother’s fate. Eliot’s fondness for using the term
vocation in a secular context shows her desire to reinvest work with the potency
that had been lost with the demise of the providential order. It also repre-
sents an attempt to seek out a new realm for heroism, for all her denial of
a “heroic” element to her work. All action that occurs under the auspices
of vocation is sanctified. So authorship-as-vocation became, like habit, a form
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of safe action for Eliot, one that could stand in the place of riskier endeav-
ors such as rebellions.
But even the less elevated form of vocation, work (itself a form of habit-
ual action), garners Eliot’s attention in her quest for safe substitutes for large-
scale action. In fact, she implies that any distinction between a job and a
vocation lies exclusively in the attitude of the worker. Adam Bede’s carpentry
provides a clear example of how Eliot constructs her argument of the heroic
worker. The opening two chapters of Adam Bede are titled “The
Workshop” and “The Preaching,” but before we hear Dinah, we listen to
Adam expound his “gospel” of work:
And there’s such a thing as being over-speritial; we must have something
beside Gospel i’ this world. Look at the canals, an’ th’ aqueducs, an’ th’
coal-pit engines, and Arkwright’s mills there at Cromford; a man must
learn sommut beside Gospel to make them things, I reckon. But t’hear
some o’ them preachers, you’d think as man must be doing nothing all his
life but shutting’s eyes and looking what’s a-going on inside him. . . .
[W]hat does the bible say? Why, it says as God put his sperrit into the
workman as built the tabernacle. (AB 11)
Walter E. Houghton has noted that “Except for ‘God,’ the most popular
word in the Victorian vocabulary must have been ‘work.’”50 But as we saw
in the case of Clough, when one does “except” God, work becomes even
more important. As Adam declares, “there’s nothing but what’s bearable as
long as a man can work” (AB 115).
Carlyle discussed the nobility of work in relation to his observation that
sorrow (which he linked to Jesus’ suffering) and not happiness (as Aristotle
believed) is the end of man: “All work, even cotton spinning, is noble; work
alone is noble.”For him, the modern epic was not of arms and the man but
of “Tools and the Man.”51 Arendt, though, limits nobility to the sphere of action,
which she defines as “the only activity that goes on between men. . . . [It] cor-
responds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man,
live on the earth. . . . [T]his plurality is the specifically the condition of polit-
ical life.” Work, on the other hand, has a limited range: “Within its borders
each individual life is housed.”Arendt argues that “to have a definite begin-
ning and a definite, predictable end is the mark of [work]. . . . This great reli-
ability of work is reflected in that the fabrication process, unlike action, is not
irreversible; everything produced by human hands can be destroyed by them.”52
One can see why such limitation would be attractive to the risk-averse Eliot,
with her sense that “children may be strangled, but deeds never” (R 156).
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As Carlyle’s beliefs about work and sorrow anticipate, Eliot’s emphasis
on habitual forms of action also connects to a corresponding emphasis on
passive endurance and on suffering as a form of activity. In the letter to Mrs.
Ponsonby in which she tried to persuade her friend of the possibility for
action, Eliot followed her allusion to habit by recommending “that stoical
resignation which is often a hidden heroism.”53 In the same manner, Felix
suggests the model of those who “have endured much with patient hero-
ism” to his working men.54 The passage from Romola quoted above, about
Romola’s activity in the valley, concludes with her recognition that “if the
glory of the cross is an illusion, the sorrow is only the truer” (R 527). Eliot
is sounding an old note here: Romola’s “new baptism” (R 527) through suf-
fering looks back to Adam Bede’s “deep, unspeakable suffering [that] may
well be called a baptism” (AB 425). Adam’s baptism comes about precisely
because “this brave, active man, who would have hastened towards any dan-
ger or toil to rescue Hetty” (AB 425) is unable to act. “Doubtless a great
anguish may do the work of years,” the narrator tells us (AB 426).
When Arendt describes the frustration inherent in action, she also links
it to suffering: “All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from
the realm of human affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity
for freedom, which, by producing the web of human relationships, seems
to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the
victim and sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done.” “To do
and to suffer,” she writes elsewhere, “are like opposite sides of the same coin.”55
The radical Felix Holt, whose “excess” used to lie in “being too practical”
(FH 308), has turned passive after his misbegotten attempt at action in the
riot. He now advises his listeners that “it is constantly the task of practical
wisdom not to say, ‘This is good, and I will have it,’ but to say, ‘This is the
less of two unavoidable evils, and I will bear it,’” although he tries to dig-
nify such behavior by calling it “activity.”56 “I am a man of this generation,”
Felix declares (FH 223), and the present is not the proper time for action.
As Eliot told her friend Mrs. Congreve, “Mr. Congreve’s suffering during
the journey and your suffering in watching him saddens me as I think of
it. For a long while to come I suppose human energy will be greatly taken
up with resignation rather than action.”57
The correlative of suffering is of course sympathy, and the work of sym-
pathy occupies the very center of Eliot’s moral and artistic program. Eliot’s
ability to make us realize the effort that stands behind a successful opera-
tion of sympathy is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of her ethical vigor.
“If Art does not enlarge men’s sympathies,” she wrote to Charles Bray, “it
does nothing morally.” Eliot considered her vocation to be the expansion
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of human sympathies through her writing: the “only effect I ardently long
to produce in my writings, is that those who read them should be better
able to imagine and to feel the pains and joys of those who differ from them-
selves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling erring human
creatures.”58 In other words, the only effect is an internal effect. This makes
it relatively safe—her works will not lead the masses to revolt—but it also
dramatically reduces the sphere of her influence. “I wish my feelings for you
could travel by some helpful vibrations good for pains,” she added to Mrs.
Congreve. But they can’t; sympathy has its limits.
Eliot’s focus on sympathy as a form of work links her writing to that of
the Romantic poets, for whom the work of poetry was the work of sympa-
thy. Her connection to Wordsworth is especially strong.59 Both writers devel-
oped their interests in consciousness (and in particular, the consciousness
of suffering) and habit as alternatives to action in response to fears surrounding
revolutionary forms of activity. As I hope will become clear, though, I believe
that Wordsworth achieved by the end of the composition of The White Doe
of Rylstone a far more secure resolution to his commitment to inaction than
Eliot ever managed. In part, the complacency with which he seems to have
regarded his attempt to elevate the moral status of consciousness may well
have owed something to the fact that his position was arrived at in a much
less self-conscious fashion than Eliot’s.
Eliot’s Romanticism comes from her sense of the power of feeling, and also
of the intimate connection between feeling and other forms of knowledge. Poetry,
as Wordsworth defined it, is “the first and last of all knowledge,” but it appears
in the form of “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”60 Or as Eliot
herself puts it, through the voice of Adam Bede, “It isn’t notions sets people
doing the right thing, it’s feelings” (AB 181), but “feeling’s a sort o’ knowl-
edge” (AB 510). “The great secret of morals is Love,” Shelley declared, there-
with pronouncing the poets legislators of the world.61 As Eliot remarked in 1857,
“My own experience and development deepen every day my conviction that
our moral progress may be measured by the degree in which we sympathize
with individual suffering and individual Joy.”62 Keats described the “camelion”
poet’s capacity to sympathize—to be “continually in for— and filling some
other Body.” This capacity allowed him to assume any character on which he
focused his attentions: “It has as much delight in conceiving an Imogen as an
Iago.”63 Similarly, Eliot would attempt, by conceiving Casaubon’s feelings with
as much sensitivity as Dorothea’s, to exercise her readers’ sympathetic imagi-
nations. Given her fear of the consequences of action, Romanticism allowed
Eliot to envision an alternative form of morality in which the essential activ-
ity could be mental rather than physical, internal rather than external.
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Eliot’s focus on sympathy also corresponded to increasing the attention
paid to character at the expense of plot. This led some contemporary crit-
ics to question the generic status of her works: “Her materials for excite-
ment and interest are not the excitements of adventure, with their varieties
of surface incident; her materials for tragedy are not murders or escapes from
murder, with the maneuvers of criminals and detectives: but they are the
inner spiritual events that take place beneath the surface. . . . Her works
partake thus of the quality that separates the poetry of a great drama from
the prose of a great novel. The essential difference, for instance, between
‘Hamlet’ and ‘Pendennis.’”64 Yet sympathy works via a process of identifi-
cation with the other, a process that stands as much at the heart of the nov-
elist’s enterprise as of the dramatist’s. E. S. Dallas noted that while Eliot
had not attained “ease of story telling,” “the secret of her power is to be
found in the depth and range of her sympathies. She gets to the heart of
her characters, and makes us feel with them, care for them, like to know
about them. . . . When we come to care for people . . . it really does not
matter what their story is: it fixes our attention.”65 Eliot herself complained
about Dickens that his lack of interest in depicting round characters lim-
ited the moral effects of his writing: “We have a great novelist who is gifted
with the utmost power of rendering the external traits of our town popu-
lation; and if he could give us their psychological character . . . his books
would be the greatest contribution art has ever made to the awakening of
social sympathies.”66 Her own work cannot be charged with the same flaw.
So Eliot believed that as a writer she could act in a safe and secure fash-
ion, without undue risk of accident and with widespread positive effect. As
she wrote encouragingly to a fellow author, “Whether the circulation of a
book be large or small there is always this supreme satisfaction about solid
honest work, that as far as it goes its effects must be good, and as all effects
spread immeasurably what we have to care for is kind and not quantity.”67
Of course, a writer loses some control as soon as she sends her book out
into the world; as Eliot ponders in Middlemarch, “Who shall tell what may
be the effect of writing?” (M 406). But in general, she seems to have felt
that the level of control available to the author exceeded that of other forms
of agency.
Curiously, Dorothea’s “unhistoric acts” at the conclusion of
Middlemarch provide a parallel to Eliot’s work of authorship. Eliot’s mod-
ern-day Saint Theresa may indeed be a “foundress of nothing,” but
although they clearly do not center “in some long-recognizable deed,” “her
loving heart-beats and sobs after an unattained goodness” are not “dispersed
among hindrances” (M 4). Rather, they form the centerpiece of a “home-
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epic” (M 815) and are, Eliot insists, “incalculably diffusive” in their effects
(M 822)—as she hopes her own “home-epics” will be. Both novel writing
and domestic activity allow for private deeds to have public benefits. In fact,
Eliot frequently emphasizes such connections between public and private
life: in Romola, “the fortunes of Tito and Romola were dependent on cer-
tain grand political and social conditions which made an epoch in the his-
tory of Italy” (R 195); and in Felix Holt, “there is no private life which has
not been determined by a wider public life” (FH 43). But it is notable that
Eliot almost always puts the equation thus, in terms of the effects of the
political world on domestic life; it is much harder to prove the converse.
Even Eliot’s comments concerning the diffusive nature of Dorothea’s activ-
ity are made only at the end of the novel, when they need no longer be detailed.
Nevertheless, within the scope of her works, public acts generally prove inef-
fective in comparison with private activity: Romola serves as the minister-
ing angel to both the poor citizens of Florence and the people in the plague-stricken
village, while Savonarola burns at the stake; in Felix Holt, as Rosemarie
Bodenheimer notes, “Public business makes nothing happen except for unan-
ticipated airings of private secrets,”68 and the most effective “action” (FH
373) in the novel turns out to be Esther’s testimony of love in the court-
room.
Eliot’s focus on domestic action suits the genre through which she has
chosen to express her beliefs. The novel is the literary manifestation of the
private realm. As we have seen, E. S. Dallas attributed the rise of the novel,
which he considered to be “gossip etherialized, family talk generalized,” to
the general decline of heroes—the fact that in a society driven by commerce,
while “great deeds are achieved as yore . . . they are not to be accredited to
one man so much as they used to be.” As a result, “the little men and the
private men and all the little incidents of privacy” came “into repute.”69 Yet
more often than not, these “little men” turned out to be little women: “Now
all the more important characters seem to be women,” Dallas noted,
though this was “all the more natural, seeing that most of our novelists just
now seem to belong to the fair sex.” And especially “natural” since “woman
peculiarly represents the private life of the race. Her ascendancy in litera-
ture must mean the ascendancy of domestic ideas, and the assertion of the
individual, not as a hero, but as a family man—not as a heroine, but as an
angel in the house.”70
The focus on women had particular consequences in the battle between
plot and character that was being fought in the journals. Women had tra-
ditionally been defined by what they were rather than what they did: recall
Wordsworth’s use of this distinction in creating Emily’s character in The White
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Doe of Rylstone. As Eliot puts it in the motto to chapter 45 of Daniel Deronda,
a woman’s “arduous function” was “solely ‘to be there’” (DD 475); who she
was could not be determined on the basis of any outward deeds. So, Dallas
recognized, the female focus of Victorian literature tended to privilege char-
acter over action, being over doing:
The first object of the novelist is to get personages in whom we can be
interested; the next is to put them in action. But when women are the chief
characters, how are you to set them in motion? The life of women cannot
well be described as a life of action. When women are thus put forward to
lead the action of a plot, they must be urged into a false position. . . . This
is what is called sensation. It is not wrong to make a sensation; but if the
novelist depends for his sensation upon the action of a woman, the
chances are that he will attain his end by unnatural means.71
As a realist (that is, not a sensation novelist), Eliot stressed the limits
placed on female activity throughout her writing. The Victorian under-
standing of female accomplishments—music, painting, languages, needle-
work—demonstrates beautifully the accepted range of feminine activity.
The irony of the term would not have been lost on Eliot. Dorothea’s
attempt to help those around her through her wealth are hampered by her
subjection to men: “Since I can do no good because a woman, / Reach con-
stantly at something that is near it,” states the epigraph to chapter 1 of
Middlemarch. And Eliot’s unusually isolated social position, her status as a
woman living out of wedlock with a man she considered to be her “hus-
band,” would have made her particularly sensitive to women’s limited
sphere of action. In The Mill on the Floss, she openly acknowledges the con-
nection between gender and action, and also, implicitly, genre:
While Maggie’s life-struggles had lain almost entirely within her own soul,
one shadowy army fighting another, and the slain shadows for ever rising
again, Tom was engaged in a dustier, noisier warfare, grappling with more
substantial obstacles, and gaining more definite conquests. So it has been
since the days of Hecuba, and of Hector, Tamer of horses: inside the gates,
the women with streaming hair and uplifted hands offering prayers,
watching the world’s combat from afar, filling their long, empty days with
memories and fears: outside, the men, in fierce struggle with things divine
and human, quenching memory in the stronger light of purpose, losing
the sight of dread and even of wounds in the hurrying ardor of action. (MF
309)
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Eliot tried to sympathize equally with her Hecuba-Maggie and her
Hector-Tom. Her attempt highlights her ambivalence with regard to
action, her combined desire for and fear of it. But most readers sense that
Eliot’s instinctive feelings tended toward the suffering girl rather than the
struggling boy.72 Hecuba, after all, is the proper heroine of a home-epic, or
novel.
So when Eliot championed the moral effectiveness of private forms of
action—both internal and small scale—she was simultaneously making an
argument about women’s ability to effect positive moral change. Eliot’s ten-
dency to link domestic action with public benefits is typical of conserva-
tive discourses about the role of women in Victorian society. For example,
in The Women of England, their Social Duties, and Domestic Habits (1839),
Sarah Stickney Ellis argued “how intimate is the connexion which exists between
the women of England, and the moral character maintained by their coun-
try in the scale of nations.” But Ellis based her assertion on her belief that
“so entirely do human actions derive their dignity or their meanness from
the motives by which they are prompted, that it is no violation to say, the
most servile drudgery may be ennobled by the self-sacrifice, the patience,
the cheerful submission to duty, with which it is performed.”73 Sound famil-
iar? For Eliot, “as a fact of mere zoological evolution,” woman had “the worse
share in existence.” But, she insisted, “for that very reason I would the more
contend that in the moral evolution we have ‘an art which does mend nature.’
It is the function of love in the largest sense, to mitigate the harshness of
all fatalities”—those fatalities being the external strictures placed on
women’s condition and action.74 In A Woman’s Thoughts about Women (1858),
Dinah Craik described the “natural” difference between “man’s vocation and
woman’s”: “one is abroad, the other at home: one external, the other inter-
nal: one active, the other passive.”75 Eliot often seems to prefer the female
form of vocation, even for the male. Because of her preference for unhis-
toric acts, the limitation to the domestic sphere, once accepted, could really
be appreciated as a form of liberation. Women may have been cut off from
grand-scale heroism, but they were surrounded with opportunities for the
commission of incalculably diffusive smaller deeds. In The Mill on the Floss,
Eliot repeats the famous observation that the happiest women, like the hap-
piest nations, have no history (MF 385)—that is, that their biographies are
devoid of recognizable acts, of deeds done on the epic scale. But one senses
that she might wish to extend this remark to men, as well. After all, grander
masculine activity hardly fares well in her works: Tom dies along with Maggie,
and Lydgate’s great ambitions are strangled in the bonds of his marriage to
Rosamond.
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Yet some late reflections in Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1879) indi-
cate that Eliot must have felt a degree of ambivalence about her champi-
oning of domestic action:
Seeing that Morality and Morals under their alias of Ethics are the sub-
ject of voluminous discussion and their true basis a pressing matter of dis-
pute—seeing that the most famous book ever written on Ethics [i.e.,
Aristotle’s], and forming a chief study in our colleges, allies ethical with
political science or that which treats of the constitution and prosperity of
states, one might expect that educated men would find reason to avoid a
perversion of language which lends itself to no wider view of life than that
of our own village gossips. . . . [W]hen a man whose business hours, the
solid part of every day, are spent in an unscrupulous course of public or
private action which has every calculable chance of causing wide-spread
injury and misery, can be called moral because he comes home to dine
with his wife and children and cherishes the happiness of his own hearth,
the augury is not good for the use of high ethical and theological dispu-
tation.76
While Eliot notes the connection between ethics and the political, she
seems nervous of the divisions between public and private spheres that can
open up when morality becomes a category of purely domestic behavior.
She wishes Morality (a term that carries with it connotations of the domes-
tic and social realms) to be considered a synonym for Ethics (a term that
cannot be divorced from Aristotle’s political conception of virtue, as Eliot’s
reference to his great treatise indicates): to be a man of “pure moral char-
acter,” she insists, one must be as publicly virtuous as one is domestically
so.77 That is, to be moral, one must be ethical; Eliot seems to wish to rein-
vigorate the more political, Aristotelian category.
And while Eliot’s women tend to showcase her conception of heroism,
bringing out its peculiarities, her least heroic character, Rosamond Vincy,
demonstrates again that she may well have felt uncomfortable with some
of her own conclusions. Rosamond is arguably the most effective agent—
almost daemonically so—in all Eliot’s writing. Her passive-aggressive pur-
posiveness represents a nightmarish realization of the kind of novelistic activity
Eliot appears to be advocating: it is habitual and petit bourgeois in the extreme.
In a single paragraph, Eliot actually compares her efficacy to both the unstop-
pable force of nature and also, implicitly, the force of the people in a lais-
sez-faire state:
105George Eliot’s Problem with Action
Markovitz_CH3_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:26 PM  Page 105
Mrs. Vincy’s belief that Rosamond could manage her papa was well
founded. Apart from his dinners and his coursing, Mr. Vincy, blustering
as he was, had as little of his own way as if he had been a prime minister:
the force of circumstances was easily too much for him. . . . [A]nd the cir-
cumstance called Rosamond was particularly forcible by means of that
mild persistence which, as we know, enables a white soft living substance
to make its way in opposing rock. (M 341)78
Perhaps Rosamond Vincy’s successful co-opting of the very forces of
modernity that had so constrained notions of the heroic helps explain the
intensity of Eliot’s hatred of her. Eliot’s sympathies, otherwise so diffusive,
discovered their limits; Cross remarked that “Of all the characters she had
attempted she found Rosamond’s the most difficult to sustain with [a]
sense of ‘possession.’”79
R. H. Hutton used Eliot’s “dead set” against Rosamond to describe the
impression of roundness Eliot generates with her characters: “Her charac-
ters are so real that they have a life and body of their own quite distinct
from her criticisms of them; and one is conscious at times of taking part
with her characters against the author.”80 Of course Rosamond’s selfishness
is the antithesis of Dorothea’s benevolence, but it also anticipates
Gwendolen Harleth’s selfish willfulness at the start of Daniel Deronda.81 Eliot
seems to have created Gwendolen partially in an attempt to remedy her fail-
ure of sympathy with regard to Rosamond, although it is interesting that
in order to allow her sympathetic identification with Gwendolen to pro-
ceed, she had to make Gwendolen fail in precisely those ways Rosamond
had succeeded. It is as though the act of sympathy depends in some mea-
sure on the frustration of action inherent in suffering. Yet Gwendolen’s posi-
tion with regard to action is far more complex than Rosamond’s had been,
as I shall show. Of all Eliot’s characters, she finds it hardest to accept restric-
tions on her activity, and her struggle must in part be seen to represent Eliot’s
struggle with the conclusions of her own beliefs. This is one of the forces
behind Gwendolen’s own, even more striking, roundness of character, which
will be the subject of the final section of this chapter.
Eliot’s “revision” of Rosamond in Gwendolen suggests her tendency to
refine from novel to novel her position with regard to action. This tendency
appears in a subtle shift that takes place in her approach to habit and to
the related categories—all substitutes for traditional, epic, forms of
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action—of work, suffering, and sympathy. The shift occurs around the
point Eliot wrote Romola, and in fact, one can think of the entire “second
half ” of Eliot’s oeuvre—from Romola on out—as consisting of “political”
novels.82 Romola questions Romola’s right to “rebellion” (R 442) during a
period of civil rebellion in republican Florence, just as Felix Holt sets
Esther’s “revolution” against the backdrop of a potentially revolutionary
England at the time of the First Reform Bill; in both novels, as we saw,
Eliot emphasizes the connection between public and private life.
Middlemarch continues the political trend with its similar backdrop of the
Reform Bill and with Ladislaw’s (and Mr. Brooke’s) political ambitions.
Finally, in Daniel Deronda, the politics of Daniel’s mission come into the
foreground. Eliot’s increasing concern for the political arena must be seen
as a reflection of the ambivalence she felt toward her own risk aversion with
regard to action, toward her tendency to internalize and restrict it.
Moreover, it is important to register a gradual change in the novels from
an emphasis on suffering toward one on habit and to see this as a result of
developing interest in the political sphere; although Eliot’s interest in habit
is present from the outset of her literary career—habitual is ever a favorite
word—the sharp focus on habit as a substitute for action sets in with Romola.
In the earlier works, it seems that to know sorrow is to know virtue: Adam
Bede’s narrator tells us, “Let us . . . be thankful that our sorrow lives in us
as an indestructible force, only changing its form, as forces do, and passing
from pain into sympathy” (AB 487). The indestructible force of sorrow serves
as a substitute for the indelible consequences of action. Eliot even suggests
in these novels that our capacity to suffer is the defining quality of human-
ity—“that superior power of misery which distinguishes the human being,
and places him at a proud distance from the most melancholy chimpanzee”
(MF 46–47). Adam Bede and The Mill on the Floss are both infused with a
somewhat sentimentalized version of Wordsworth’s pastoral atmosphere, and
they clearly share in the belief examined in chapter 1 that literature should
emphasize feelings, not action, that “a common tale / By moving accident
uncharactered / A tale of silent suffering” is the most interesting kind of
story.83 Part of their Wordsworthian emphasis has to do with a glorification
of the past via the exercise of memory; in these works, the past creates the
sole law. Maggie Tulliver’s “final rescue” comes only after she accepts this:
“If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie?” (MF 475). Memory is
her “clue of life” (MF 471), her Ariadne’s thread that will lead her through
the labyrinthine confusions of the web of action.84
Through the introduction of habit as a bridge from endurance to action,
Romola marks a change. When Romola turns back to Florence for the first
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time, she declares her intention “to thread life by a fresh clue” (R 348); rather
than Maggie’s backward glance of memory, the cautious force of habit will
lead her forward. But why write a political novel as a historical novel? Why
put the action so far back? The book is still conservative, and political activ-
ity ends in disaster: Tito slips irredeemably into sin; the impressive
Savonarola, in many respects a precursor to Mordecai (another man for whom
political vision and religious vision are one and the same) succumbs to the
need for a “doubleness” (R 539) that seems perilously close to falseness; and
the virtuous Bernardo is executed as a traitor. Ultimately Romola, like Maggie,
must return to her past. Yet the very presence of her second flight, the dif-
ference between it and the first, aborted attempt at escape, from which Romola
is sent back by Savonarola as one who has forgotten both wifely and civic
duty, indicates a new willingness in Eliot at least to toy with the idea of a
“sacred” rebellion (R 442). In Felix Holt, Eliot again scrutinizes the con-
cept of revolution, and the results lead her to try for the limited efficacy of
action in Dorothea’s “unhistoric acts” in Middlemarch.85 And although these
novels, set in the period of the First Reform Bill, still look backward in time,
they also look, Janus faced, to the present times of the Second Reform Bill.
Finally, in Daniel Deronda, George Eliot attempts to gaze into the future.
Daniel Deronda: Gwendolen Harleth
Daniel Deronda’s virtual contemporaneity marks its willingness to look
forward, to try activity.86 Hannah Arendt defines action as “the capacity of
beginning something anew”;87 the finale of Middlemarch had declared
every limit to be “a beginning as well as an ending” (M 815). But George
Eliot opens her final novel with the wise observation that “men can do
nothing without the make-believe of a beginning” (DD 3). Still, although
Daniel Deronda firmly asserts the connection between doing and begin-
ning, its author depends upon an element of make-believe to get the nar-
rative dough to rise. I wish to suggest that the heroine and hero of the story
actually represent not only two kinds of plot—those of realism and
romance88—but also two kinds of activity. When Henry James’s Theodora
wonders what Daniel accomplished in the East, Pulcheria’s response—
they had tea parties, Daniel talked, and Mirah sang a little—indicates her
refusal to leave Gwendolen’s realistic mode.89 Eliot sacrifices any potential
for realistic progress when she scapegoats Gwendolen, leaving her behind
to suffer in an outdated England while Deronda departs for Palestine and
the future. But Pulcheria is unable to consider seriously the possibilities of
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romantic political idealism, of make-believe as a leaven for doing.
Ultimately, one’s feelings about the success of the novel as an instrument
for progress will depend in part on one’s willingness to see beyond realism.
Politics cannot be divorced from plotting.
Eliot had tried out the plot of Daniel Deronda in an earlier work in a
different mode: The Spanish Gypsy (published in 1868 but originating in
1864, roughly the same period as Felix Holt). Like Deronda, Fedalma (the
heroine of The Spanish Gypsy) is a foundling who has been raised by nobil-
ity. On the eve of what Eliot calls “the great event” of her life as a woman—
her marriage to Don Silva, the duke of Bedmar—Fedalma experiences a moment
of vocation.90 The moment corresponds, as in Daniel Deronda, with a dis-
covery of her birth (and membership in a hated and scorned tribe): she is
the daughter of the imprisoned Zarca, chief of the Zincali. And as in the
novel, the discovery of birth affects marriage choices. So instead of marry-
ing Don Silva and becoming an angel in the house, Fedalma accepts her
lot: “To be the angel of a homeless tribe.”91 But first she must free her father:
“A work as pregnant as the act of men / Who set their ships aflame and
spring to land, / A fatal deed” (SG 112).
While the escape is successful, Zarca’s plans to get his people a home-
land run afoul when Don Silva refuses to accept his lot with that “grand
submission” that, Eliot tells us in her “Notes” to the poem, characterizes
Fedalma’s response to fate.92 Instead, he exhibits what Eliot calls “the tragedy
of entire rebellion”: “I will elect my deeds, and be the liege / Not of my
birth, but of that good alone / I have discerned and chosen” (SG 213). Don
Silva, his “nature over-endowed with opposites” (SG 151), resembles a Byronic
hero: his mixed essence renders him unsuited to life in the world. He fol-
lows Fedalma to the Gypsies’ camp and pledges his support for their cause
in order to stay with her. “I’ll face the progeny of all my deeds,” he blus-
ters ominously (SG 155); we recall that for Eliot, deeds themselves repre-
sent “woeful progeny” (FH 11). When Zarca leads an attack against
Bedmar, though, Silva finds that his divided loyalties (which resemble both
Francis’s in The White Doe of Rylstone and Daniel Deronda’s) prove too much
for him: he kills Zarca to revenge the Zincali’s slaughter of his people. The
conclusion of the drama lacks the hope of the ending of Daniel Deronda.
Fedalma leads her people to their promised land in northern Africa, but
the prognosis is poor without her father’s presence: “His image gone, there
were no wholeness left / To make a world of for the Zincali’s thought” (SG
247). “She saw the end begun” (SG 255), Eliot remarks, and we have no
sense here that the ending will also prove to be a new beginning.
Clearly, The Spanish Gypsy shares with Daniel Deronda a deep concern
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about the efficacy of political action. Zarca insists that “No great deed is
done / By falterers who ask for certainty”—a certainty Eliot had often seemed
to require before venturing forth into action. Yet the new approval of action
does not rely on a belief that deeds are necessarily efficacious, but rather on
the faith that
The greatest gift the hero leaves his race
Is to have been a hero. Say we fail!—
We feed the high tradition of the world
And leave our spirit in our children’s breasts. (SG 120)
That is, it relies on a sense of the force of character to prevail. And Zarca’s
optimism about the moral efficacy of heroic character seems strangely out
of step with the dismal conclusion to the poem. As Eliot’s “Notes” to the
poem tell, Zarca represents “the struggle for a great end, rendered vain by
the surrounding conditions of life.”93
Eliot obviously worried about the message she was delivering.
Curiously, in her “Notes” she used Clough’s poetry as a foil to her own enter-
prise. Eliot’s comments were aimed at what she saw as Clough’s dispiriting
notion of “duty,” a concept that she herself linked to “piety,” or an “Inward
impulse”—“i.e., loving, willing submission, and heroic Promethean efforts
toward high possibilities which may result from our individual life”—a con-
glomerate of those substitutes for external action discussed in the previous
section. (Eliot’s “piety” also marks a distinct shift from the pietas of Aeneas,
an inward feeling indivisible from its outward manifestation as the motive
behind the quest to found Rome.) Ostensibly, Eliot objected to Clough because
she viewed him as wishing to divorce, in the manner of Kant, the concept
of duty from any perceived ends we see as goods. This, she felt, was coun-
terproductive: “That favorite view, expressed so often in Clough’s poems,
of doing duty, in blindness as to the result, is likely to deepen the substi-
tution of egoistic yearnings for really moral impulses.”94
But the context of the reference to Clough makes clear that her real worry
was about the representation of action in art produced by a skeptical world
(that is, a world motivated by duty rather than by God), as the next para-
graph indicates:
The art which leaves the soul in despair is laming to the soul, and is
denounced by the healthy sentiment of an active community. The conso-
latory elements in “The Spanish Gypsy” are derived from two convictions
or sentiments which so conspicuously pervade it that they may be said to
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be its very warp on which the whole action is woven. These are—(1) The
importance of individual deeds; (2) The all-sufficiency of the soul’s pas-
sions in determining sympathetic action.95
Yet the very adamancy of the protest should raise the warning flags. Eliot’s
own poem seems, like most of her work, to depend on her second state-
ment to mitigate her failure to demonstrate the truth of her first claim.
Sympathetic action takes over from individual deeds. Indeed, the dispirit-
ing conclusion to her drama causes it to suffer from the same enervating
sins as Clough’s poetry. Not coincidentally, The Spanish Gypsy also shares
in the generic hybridity of Clough’s Amours de Voyage. Eliot’s “drama” con-
tains both narrative interludes and lyric songs (performed by a minstrel,
Juan—perhaps with subtle allusion to Byron’s hero of another generic
hybrid, the epic-novel-in-verse, Don Juan). Moreover, like the romantic
closet dramas, it is (according to Eliot) “eminently unsuited for an acting
play.”96 Again, we see the link between genre and attitudes toward action;
the epic intent (the founding of a new nation, as in the Aeneid) flounders
amidst the confusions of competing modes.
Daniel Deronda, in its combination of the realistic “Gwendolen-plot” with
the romance “Deronda-plot,” also presents something of a generic mix. Yet
the genre withheld from the blend is epic, and the trouble is that rightly
speaking, Gwendolen belongs in epic—or at least in an adventure story. From
the first sentence of novel, Eliot associates Gwendolen with activity; her glance,
we are told, has a “dynamic” quality (DD 3). Henry James’s Pulcheria is
not the only one to accuse Eliot of a want of tact in using so unfamiliar a
word—Eliot’s publisher, Blackwood, also objected—but the choice is
deliberate, and Eliot wants us to notice it.97 Comte, in his Introduction to
Positive Philosophy, divided the study of humanity into two categories, “the
static and the dynamic; that is, as fitted to act and as actually acting.”98 Again
and again, Eliot affiliates Gwendolen with the love of action; “she was never
fearful in action,” we learn early (DD 58). A modern-day Camilla, she thrives
on movement: she enjoys sports, both archery and riding. For Eliot gam-
bling usually represents a will-not-to-will, a relinquishment of the princi-
ple of choice, a “narrow monotony of action” (DD 5) the numbness of which
is the obverse of real action (although a little like habit; not a resemblance
Eliot would wish to stress). Of the Kursaal where Eliot had the well-docu-
mented encounter with Byron’s niece that formed the germ for the begin-
ning of her novel, Eliot complained that “there is very little dramatic ‘Stoff ’
to be picked up.”99 But Gwendolen, at least at first, goes to the roulette table
in search of passion rather than to escape it (DD 12). Being “bored to death,”
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her response is: “I must make something happen” (DD 9). Eliot notes the
general sense that it would have been “folly” to expect her to “wear a gown
as shabby as Griselda’s” (DD 30); patience is presumably not to be
expected of such a character. “I mean to do something” rings as her clar-
ion call (DD 200).
Although Gwendolen desires to be an effective agent, she fails. Her strength
of will may be remarkable (DD 18, 32, 43), but the events of the novel sys-
tematically crush it out of her, destroying her “belief in her own power of
dominating” (DD 363) and slowly transforming it into a Griselda-like self-
suppression, “an almost miraculous power of self control” (DD 503). Gwendolen
must be taught to submit. When her first plan, “to do what pleases me”
(DD 56), can no longer be carried out due to the financial losses of the
family (a typical blow of destiny), Gwendolen’s initial impulse is charac-
teristically “to do something” (DD 195): “I don’t resign myself. I shall do
what I can against it. What is the good of calling people’s wickedness Providence?
. . . [I]t was his improvidence with our money. . . . My uncle ought to take
measures” (DD 198). Her impotence, as Eliot describes it, owes much to
the vagueness of the “something” Gwendolen wishes to accomplish. She her-
self announces, “I would rather emigrate than be a governess,” therewith
suggesting her recognition of the limited number of paths open to her and
her desire to take the most adventurous one available (DD 199). But as a
young lady, she cannot escape so easily—unlike Deronda at the end of the
novel or any of the other figures we have encountered who have sought to
clear themselves of the entanglements of their past actions by emigration.100
So Gwendolen attempts, rather tellingly, to be an actress. But she is told
she lacks the talent for it—she does not have the vocation. Gwendolen’s flir-
tation with the stage shows how the theatrical theme in the novel connects
with the theme of action.101 Acting is acceptable to Eliot only when it takes
the form of vocation, as it does for the Princess, when it is “sincere acting”
(DD 539). Even then, it is dangerous. On the stage, actors deny responsi-
bility for their actions; people commit deeds of which their real characters
would be ashamed. Yet the ground between such acting and the truth is
slippery, as Laure’s “murder” of her husband by a “slip” of the foot shows
in Middlemarch (M 151). In Romola, Tito tries to “strip himself of the past,
as of rehearsal clothing, to robe himself for the real scene” (R 450). The
fact of a practical life, however, is that there is no “practice time”—what is
done cannot be undone. Notably, Mirah can act only “when it was not really
acting, but the part was one I could be myself in” (DD 185). Like Fanny
Price, the passive heroine of Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814), another novel
that exploits the connection between acting and action in a conservative cause,
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Mirah hates acting and desires only to be. She is inherently passive; think
of the crossed feet that Henry James registered as her characteristic pose.102
Her suicide attempt represents a supreme act of will: “And a new strength
came into me to will what I would do. You know what I did” (DD 190).
Yet though her will is strong, what Mirah does is renounce action completely
by “lying down to sleep” (DD 189) in a manner that recalls Mortimer’s fre-
quent yearnings after sleep in The Borderers.103 It is Mirah’s nature “to sub-
mit” (DD 190), Mrs. Meyrick tells Daniel: “The force of her nature had
long found its chief action in resolute endurance” (DD 626). Mirah’s mes-
sage is Eliot’s: “Acting is slow and poor to what we go through within” (DD
557; emphasis added).
After Gwendolen’s disappointment at her failure to become an actress,
she attempts to resign herself: “it makes no difference to anyone else what
we do. . . . Help me to be quiet” (DD 225). She wants to be more like her
rival, Mirah, to have her self-possession, and she sees that such composure
is incompatible with a thirst for activity. But her principle of action is too
strong; in her, resignation takes the form of “world nausea” (DD 231), a
“sick motivelessness,” a “numbness” (DD 232). “I can’t do anything bet-
ter,” she laments, feeling herself akin to a man whose profession is too nar-
row for his powers (DD 234). Yet her problem really belongs to her own
gender—and class—as Eliot’s friend Barbara Bodichon, the women’s rights
activist, recognized: “The want of stimulus to energetic action is much felt
by women of the higher classes. It is agreed that they ought not to be idle,
but what they ought to do is not so clear.”104 Eliot describes Gwendolen in
the same language that she had used for Maggie and Romola: “Surely a young
creature is pitiable who has the labyrinth of life before her and no clue” (DD
232). And although we can accept that her desire for pleasure was an inad-
equate vocation—she herself accepts this by the conclusion of the novel—
the only proffered substitute, sympathy toward those closest to her, leaves
little scope for her activity. As a woman, Gwendolen is expected (in the words
of the epigraph to chapter 51) to sit and spin like Erinna, “In insect-labor,
while the throng / Of gods and men wrought deeds that poets wrought in
song” (DD 535). Gwendolen realizes the truth in what she tells
Grandcourt: “We women can’t go in search of adventures—to find out the
North-West Passage or the source of the Nile, or to hunt tigers in the East.”
Grandcourt’s reply suggests the range of female doing: “But a woman can
be married” (DD 113).
Within the frame of Daniel Deronda, marriage can represent meaning-
ful activity. Catherine Arrowpoint’s “decisive effort” to wed Klesmer is com-
pared to “the leap of a woman from the deck into the lifeboat” (DD 208–9),
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a deed markedly opposed to the leap Gwendolen makes to follow her drown-
ing husband into the water.105 But it is worth noting that once Catherine
marries, her story is more or less over; she drops from sight in the narra-
tive. Gwendolen, unlike Catherine or Dorothea, both potential heroines of
the home-epic, does not see in marriage “the fulfillment of her ambition;
the dramas in which she imagined herself a heroine were not wrought up
to that close” (DD 30). In her resistance to the marriage plot, she resem-
bles the Florence Nightingale of Lytton Strachey’s Eminent Victorians:
“There was nothing in the world to prevent her from making a really bril-
liant match. But no! She would think of nothing but how to satisfy that
singular craving of hers to be doing something. As if there was not plenty
to do in any case, in the ordinary way, at home.”106 Nevertheless, while ini-
tially, like Nightingale, Gwendolen feels untempted by marriage, the
resemblance ends there. For in contrast to Nightingale’s purposeful pursuit
of her nursing career, “what [Gwendolen] was not clear upon was, how she
should set about leading any other [life], and what were the particular acts
which she would assert her freedom by doing” (DD 43). To Eliot, as I have
suggested, the idea of asserting freedom through action is necessarily trou-
bling. Gwendolen may think she will be able to regain her freedom after
the act of marriage (“she was going to do just as she liked” [DD 111]; “she
would know how to act” [DD 265]), but she soon discovers that marriage,
like all other forms of action, enslaves.
Of course, the most compelling courtship plot—that is, the possible romance
between Gwendolen and Deronda—remains what Gillian Beer has called
“a willful and conscious form of negation: its power comes from not telling
the stories we anticipate hearing.”107 By the time the novel opens, Deronda
has already met and rescued Mirah; the most he can ever say is, “I should
have loved her, if—” (DD 532). In fact, the disruption in Daniel Deronda
between chronological and narrative sequence (story and plot, to use the Russian
formalist terms), causes a general devaluation of the events as we encounter
them as readers; options that had seemed to be real possibilities are frequently
revealed to be dead ends because of the prior occurrence of events of which
we had no knowledge. So the “ifs” in Daniel Deronda remain curiously ster-
ile. Henry James complained of the same phenomenon that Beer describes
as “thickening, barely provisional counter-plots of possibility” when he lamented
in his review of Middlemarch the “wealth of dramatic possibility” given up
by not allowing more interaction between Dorothea and Lydgate. Such poten-
tially satisfying courtship plots haunt the two novels, casting ghostly shad-
ows of doubt over the very concept of purposeful action represented by the
“I do” of the marriage plot.
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Ironically, in Daniel Deronda both the proposal scene and the “murder”
are properly scenes of inaction rather than of action. Gwendolen never does
do anything other than suffer. The proposal scene is perhaps the greatest
example in all of Eliot’s writings, rife with such examples, of a slip into sin
that is unaccompanied by any real activity. Instead, Gwendolen’s act is char-
acterized by the same “hurry [that] would save her from deliberate choice”
with which she replies to Grandcourt’s note naming his intended visit (DD
248). Gwendolen never actually makes the choice to accept him; at each step
along the way, she relinquishes her will, for all her belief on going in to the
encounter that it will afford her the opportunity to “exercise her power” (DD
254). Her “drift[ing]” (DD 257) recalls Maggie’s voyage downstream with
Stephen in The Mill on the Floss, but the narrator, hinting at the degree to
which past acts determine present choices, reminds us that “the sails have
been set beforehand” (257). (Eliot thereby aligns the proposal scene with
Grandcourt’s death—at sea, so emphasizing the manner in which the mar-
riage not only resembles but also determines the “murder.”) All
Gwendolen’s evasions to Grandcourt’s questions lead her irrevocably into
that corner in which “Yes” seems the only possible response; although sug-
gestively, her crucial move toward agreement comes when she replies to
Grandcourt’s “Do you command me to go?” with a “No.” “[T]hat nega-
tive was a clutch,” Eliot informs us (DD 257).
Grandcourt’s method of proposal suits a man consistently represented
in the negative. The first thing we hear of him is that “whatever
Grandcourt had done, he had not ruined himself ” (DD 77). Gwendolen’s
attraction to him is defined by what he is not: “he is not ridiculous” (DD
92); he is “free from absurdities” (DD 115); there is “less to dislike” in him
than in other men (DD 117). Graham Handly describes how the “pauses
in his conversation with Gwendolen are proleptic of the long ‘do-nothing’
voids which are the words and punctuation of Gwendolen’s married life”
(DD xxi). Grandcourt’s nature is one of “refined negatives” (DD 574), of
“dreamy do-nothing absolutism” (DD 573), like the yachting that he enjoys.108
Eliot has created the worst possible husband for the active Gwendolen, and,
for a while, the “benumbing effect” of his torpedolike will (DD 363)—the
same force, incidentally, possessed by Rosamond Vincy, whose “torpedo-
contact” so stuns Lydgate (M 621)—seems to suck the life out of her.
Ironically, Gwendolen becomes a good actress only when she ceases to
be an actor: “I think I am making a very good Mrs. Grandcourt,” she remarks
(DD 473). But unlike her mother’s, Gwendolen’s unhappy marriage does
not lead her to succumb to a life of passive suffering. The real tragedy of
Gwendolen’s story lies in the replacement of a bold intention, “I mean to
115George Eliot’s Problem with Action
Markovitz_CH3_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:26 PM  Page 115
do something,” with a desperate plea to which no adequate reply is given:
“What should I do?” (DD 382). This is the question that, again and again,
Gwendolen asks of Deronda. Eliot’s heroines have asked it before:
Dorothea does repeatedly, both in a general sense, throughout
Middlemarch (M 27, 272), and specifically of Lydgate with regard to Casaubon’s
illness (M 286); Rosamond also asks it of Lydgate, but in a damningly dif-
ferent register (M 558). Yet by the end of the book, Dorothea’s question is
answered, apparently to the (realistically limited) satisfaction of all concerned.
Deronda never comes up with a reply that can satisfy the dynamic Gwendolen.
He tells her that her deed, the marriage to Grandcourt that deprived Mrs.
Glasher and her children of what should have been theirs, is “not to be amended
by doing one thing only—but many.” But when Gwendolen eagerly asks
“What?” Daniel responds by informing her that “there are many thoughts
and habits that may help us to bear inevitable sorrow” (DD 382). We have
heard this answer before from Eliot, yet by the time she came to write Daniel
Deronda, it must have been as unsatisfactory a description of doing to her
as it is to Gwendolen, who can only repeat her question. “I must get up in
the morning and do what everyone else does,” Gwendolen cries, “It is all
like a dance set beforehand” (DD 386). This was precisely Mrs. Ponsonby’s
worry, and it indicates that Gwendolen’s frustration is not specific; it is a
version of that inherent in human agency. Deronda tells her that “nothing
is feebler than the indolent rebellion of complaint; and to be roused into
self-judgment is comparative activity” (DD 388). “Self-judgment” repre-
sents just that form of inward contemplation of which Eliot was herself such
a great practitioner. But when Gwendolen informs Daniel of her intentions—
“I will try . . . I will think” (DD 388)—we know her well enough to sus-
pect that her struggles are not over. She is still looking for a way to do.
In fact, Eliot repeats such a scene between Deronda and Gwendolen, in which
Gwendolen makes a heart-wrenching appeal for some outlet in action, twice
more: once before and once after the “murder” (DD 521ff., 657ff.).
Unfortunately, Gwendolen can now, like her author, imagine action only as
something awful, something to be avoided: “The vision of her past wrong-doing,
and what it had brought on her, came with a pale ghastly illumination over
every imagined deed that was a rash effort at freedom, such as she had made
in her marriage” (DD 576). Bereft of all faith in action, she is left to dwell on
“the benignity of accident” (DD 576). Eliot, we may recall, is the proponent
of what Hutton called an “accidental school of fiction”—that is, she is a real-
ist. But for realists, accident is rarely a “benign” force; at best, it is neutral. To
depend upon it is to embrace a chaos over which we must relinquish all con-
trol. Of course, “the benignity of accident” hints forward to Grandcourt’s “acci-
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dent” or “murder” at sea (neither term adequately represents what happened).
The “accidental status” of this event is highly questionable, not only as regards
Gwendolen but also as regards her author. It is the product of a kind of quasi-
wishful thinking on both their parts, and it can correspondingly be thought
of as half-action and half-accident. It is also only “half-benign.” Through the
accident, Eliot lets Gwendolen escape her horrible marriage. But she does not
give her heroine to the hero of her dreams, and she ensures Gwendolen remains
burdened with an inescapable sense of guilt.
Insofar as it represents a desired event, the “murder” can be thought of
as a weird externalization of Gwendolen’s repressed active principle: “I only
know that I saw my wish outside me . . . and my heart said, ‘Die’—and he
sank; and I felt ‘It is done—. . . . That was what happened. That was what
I did” (DD 596). But because it was merely a matter of thought (and per-
haps a moment of hesitation), it cannot be seen as a real act. If her first
crime of inaction—the “I do” of her acceptance of Grandcourt, which was
unaccompanied by any real “I will”—locks her into the prison of her mar-
riage, her second crime of inaction, better seen as a will unaccompanied by
any doing, makes Gwendolen realize the inescapable prison of past
deeds.109 Curiously, Gwendolen echoes in her account of the event the detached
cadences of Mirah’s earlier description of her suicide attempt: “And a new
strength came into me to will what I would do. You know what I did. I was
going to die” (DD 190). But unlike Mirah’s, Gwendolen’s “half ” of Daniel
Deronda offers no opportunities for new beginnings, even in make-believe.
As the motto of chapter 22 declares, we may “please our fancy with ideal
webs / Of innovation, but our life meanwhile / Is in the loom” (DD 202).
Gwendolen is in fact stuck fast in a web, but it is a web of inaction rather
than of action. Although she struggles valiantly, she cannot free herself. After
Grandcourt’s death, Eliot compares Gwendolen to a “lost, weary, storm-beaten
white doe, unable to rise and pursue its unguided way” (DD 597). As Shifra
Hochberg has recognized, the allusion is to Wordsworth’s The White Doe of
Rylstone. Hochberg suggests that the reference to the doe indicates the
Wordsworthian element to Gwendolen’s moral education in sympathy. Yet
she notes a difference: “While in Wordsworth’s poem, the Doe becomes Emily’s
constant companion until the heroine’s death, in Daniel Deronda physical pres-
ence as overt symbol is ultimately replaced by the internalization of moral prin-
ciple after Daniel’s departure for the East.”110 I am arguing that the process
of internalization proves more costly to Gwendolen than Hochberg’s state-
ment intimates; Eliot’s struggle with action lacks Wordsworthian assurance.
Deronda asks Gwendolen, “What sort of earth or heaven would hold any spir-
itual wealth in it for souls pauperized by inaction?” (DD 387). But at the end
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of the novel, while Gwendolen may have learned sympathy, crucially, she does
“not yet see how” she can translate that knowledge into acts that better the
lives of others (DD 694). Daniel’s final advice to her, that a motive will be
formed from the repetition of small, inconsequential acts (DD 658), follows
Mill’s observation on the relationship between habit and purpose. Yet the strongest
sense of purpose Gwendolen possesses comes from her love for Daniel (DD
481, 653), and he deserts her. After hearing of Deronda’s plans to go to the
East, “Gwendolen had sat like a statue with her wrists lying over each other
and her eyes fixed—the intensity of her mental action arresting all other exci-
tation” (DD 689). The stance resembles Mirah’s characteristic crossed feet,
but the posture is neither natural nor comfortable for the energetic
Gwendolen.
Sir Hugo, on first seeing Gwendolen, makes the acute observation that
“that girl has some drama in her” (DD 137). The drama, though, for all
the melodrama of the “murder,” stays in, remains internalized. Early on,
Eliot stakes a novelist’s claim for the importance of such inner activity in
terms similar to those she used in Middlemarch:
Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in human history
than this consciousness of a girl . . . ?—in a time, too, when ideas were
with fresh vigor making armies of themselves . . . : when women on the
other side of the world would not mourn for the husbands and sons who
die bravely in a common cause. . . . 
What in the midst of that mighty drama are girls and their blind visions?
They are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and
fighting. (DD 102–3)
But by the end of the novel, although she has still not made clear what
Gwendolen is to do, Eliot uses the image of the American Civil War to
chastise her for the former narrowness of her vision: “Life looks out from
the scene of human struggle with the awful face of duty, and a religion
shows itself which is something else than a private consolation” (DD 689).
Nevertheless, “wide vision, narrow action” is an inherently frustrating
motto to live by, for both Gwendolen and her creator.
Daniel Deronda: Daniel Deronda
Daniel Deronda’s Judaism represents just the kind of religion Gwendolen
lacks, and Eliot wants to show how Daniel becomes, through the course
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of the novel, an effective agent of large-scale political change. Precisely
how this change will come about remains something of a mystery. Henry
James (as Constantius) put it thus: “There is something very fascinating in
the mission that Deronda takes upon himself. I don’t quite know what it
means, I don’t understand more than half of Mordecai’s rhapsodies, and I
don’t perceive exactly what practical steps could be taken.”111 But such dif-
ficulty has long been associated with idealism, as Eliot knows, and as the
conversation of the Philosophers at the Hand and Banner makes clear. The
very name of the pub demonstrates the conflict: can a banner bring about
change, or are active hands required?112 From our perspective, fifty years
after the foundation of the Jewish State, the problem seems less severe. But
when Eliot was writing her novel, the Zionist movement had not been
given the clarity even of a name, and Deronda’s mission as presented in the
text really is remarkably undefined; James was right to wonder about prac-
tical steps.113 Moreover, as Graham Martin has noted, even if one accepts
the force of ideas to occasion real political change, “The choice of Zionism
has the effect of removing the ideal aspirations associated with Deronda
from any effective engagement with the English scene.”114 The power of
make-believe can extend only so far; it is impossible for Eliot to imagine a
new beginning at home. Like Coleridge and Southey in their
“Pantisocratic” phase, she has to go to what is for her virgin territory—a
place where the web of past deeds has not yet formed to entangle new-
comers—to envision useful wide-scale activism.
We can compare Eliot’s novel to an earlier work in which an aristocratic
English hero sets out for the holy land on a “new crusade”: Disraeli’s Tancred
(1847), the concluding part of his Coningsby trilogy. In that novel
Tancred, the thoughtful only son of an ancient and magnificent family, embarks
on his travels to discover the true source of religion and so restore mean-
ing to an increasingly trivial world. “Ah! there is nothing like action,” one
character declares, voicing Disraeli’s own beliefs; and Tancred replies, “But
what action is there in this world? . . . The most energetic men in Europe
are mere busybodies. . . . [U]nless we bring man nearer to heaven, unless
government become again divine, the insignificance of the human scheme
must paralyse all effort.” Hence the need for a crusade. Yet although Disraeli’s
novel, unlike Eliot’s, concentrates on the hero’s adventures in the East, Tancred
himself admits that while “it is very easy now to get to Jerusalem,” the “great
difficulty . . . is to know what to do when you are there.”115 And for all Disraeli’s
desire to show that modern life, too, can be “full of adventure,” the terms
of that adventure have shifted: “There may be no longer fiery dragons, magic
rings, or fairy wands, to interfere in its course and to influence our career;
119George Eliot’s Problem with Action
Markovitz_CH3_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:26 PM  Page 119
but the relations of men are far more complicated and numerous than of
yore; and in the play of the passions, and in the devices of creative spirits,
that have thus a proportionally greater sphere for their action, there are spells
of social sorcery more potent than all the necromancy of Merlin or Friar
Bacon.”Again, note the move inward, into the arena of feelings and the social
passions. The conclusion of Disraeli’s story reflects this fact: even on holy
soil, Tancred discovers that he becomes “mixed up with intrigue, and pol-
itics, and management, and baffled schemes, and cunning arts of men.” The
East is not such a blank slate after all, and the intrigues Tancred becomes
ensnared by are as old as its soil and ruins. When Tancred declares his love
for Eva, the Jewish heroine of the tale, in the opaque and open-ended final
pages of the book, she laments, “You no longer believe in Arabia.” To which
Disraeli’s hero replies, “Why thou to me art Arabia.”116 As in Felix Holt, the
courtship plot has subsumed the political plot.
But while the success of Eliot’s visionary politics in Daniel Deronda depends
on her avoidance of a direct description of what happens in the East, I do
think it is a success—at least insofar as it concerns Daniel’s mission.117 We
believe Deronda when he tells us that “if we look back to the history of efforts
which have made great changes, it is astonishing how many of them seemed
hopeless to those who looked on in the beginning” (DD 457). Men can do
nothing without make-believe for a beginning, and the leap of faith Eliot
requires of us seems worth the effort. Her achievement owes something to
her use of Shelley and the Prometheus legend. When Mordecai and
Deronda enter the Hand and Banner, the idealistic Miller is reading from
Prometheus Unbound (DD 445). He has chosen the passage containing the
great simile of the avalanche:
Hark! The rushing show!
The sun-awakened avalanche! Whose mass,
Thrice sifted by the storm, had gathered there
Flake after flake, in heaven-defying minds
As thought by thought is piled, till some great truth
Is loosened, and the nations echo round
Shaken to their roots: as do the mountains now.118
Obviously, the simile represents the possibilities of a revolutionary ideal-
ism—of the changes to the world that can be brought on by incremental,
practically invisible (snow-flake-sized) shifts of thought in the minds of
individuals. These are just the kind of gradual shifts that the cautious Eliot
would advocate, although one might have expected the idea of an
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avalanche to put her off. But perhaps the most surprising—and character-
istic—thing about this simile is not what it describes, but the way in which
it describes. Shelley has reversed the ordinary relationship between tenor
and vehicle. Usually, metaphor is used to compare the insubstantial world
to the substantial, the less palpable to the external and everyday. So, for
example, we might say: “Her mind raced like a locomotive,” thereby offer-
ing an objective equivalent to a subjective experience. But here Asia sees
the avalanche and compares it to a revolution in thought in order to clar-
ify her experience. The implication is that the world of the mind is in some
sense more real than the physical world for Shelley—or at least should be
more real. The simile itself enacts one of those revolutions (literally, a turn-
ing around) of thought that he wishes to bring about via his drama.
Shelley is the supreme poet of what Miller calls “the transforming power
of ideas” (DD 447). Klesmer refers to his Defense of Poetry when he states
his claim for the political power of artists to the heavy, pedestrian Mr. Bult:
“We count ourselves on level benches with the legislators” (DD 206). Early
on, the narrator associates Daniel with “the author of Queen Mab” (DD
152), the political Shelley. Eliot’s new interest in the work of artists comes
from her desire to find a safe kind of political activity in Daniel Deronda.
The novel closely affiliates action with creativity (DD 407). In the work of
another novelist, say, Henry James, Daniel would have been a writer, or a
sculptor like Roderick Hudson. His less effective precursor Ladislaw (also
associated with Shelley, by Mr. Brooke [M 355]) actually toys with the arts
before turning to the more directly ethically useful activity of politics. Deronda
never becomes, or even wants to be, an artist. In fact, when Sir Hugo sug-
gests the profession of singer to him, he is mortified (DD 143), and he tells
his tutor he would rather like to be “a greater leader, like Pericles or Washington”
(DD 147). But the chapter in which he announces his vocation is headed
by an epigraph in which Heine declares that in spite of his aversion to art,
Moses was a great artist, the creator of Israel (DD 637).
“Genius,” states the narrator of Middlemarch, consists in “a power to make
or do, not anything in general, but something in particular” (M 82). Initially,
Daniel’s problem with action arises from his “many-sided [general] sym-
pathy, which threaten[s] to hinder any persistent [particular] course of action”
(DD 307). His negative capability is so great as to be a burden, bringing
on a “meditative numbness” oddly reminiscent of Grandcourt’s numbness
(DD 308). What he needs, according to Eliot, is “either some external event
or some inward light, that would urge him into a definite line of action,
and compress his wandering energy” (DD 308). Indeed, more troubling than
the vagueness of his idealism is the manner in which Deronda receives even
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his sense of a mission. As it turns out, his particular quest comes to him much
as Kant says genius comes to the poet, as a gift from the gods.119
In Daniel Deronda, revelation takes the place of revolution. To act safely
and effectively, one must experience a call. But vocations are not to be had
on demand, as Savonarola implies to Romola (R 343), and without the call,
Eliot cannot condone acting (the Princess suffers even with a vocation). Moreover,
while Daniel Deronda works to suppress Gwendolen’s activity, it argues for
Daniel’s passivity as an effective instrument of progress. Daniel does not
choose to do; he is Chosen. As Zarca tells Fedalma in The Spanish Gypsy,
“being of the blood you are—my blood— / You have no right to choose”
(SG 115). Daniel’s moment of “choice” has as little to do with genuine choice
as Gwendolen’s actions had to do with genuine activity, for all that it sup-
posedly will enable him to act purposefully:
His mother had compelled him to a decisive acknowledgment of his love,
as Joseph Kalonymos had compelled him to a definite expression of his
resolve. This new state of decision wrought on Deronda with a force which
surprised even himself . . .—his judgment no longer wandering in the
mazes of impartial sympathy, but choosing with that noble partiality which
is man’s best strength, the closer fellowship which makes sympathy prac-
tical. (DD 638; emphasis added)
Daniel Deronda can be thought of, like many of Eliot’s works, as an exer-
cise in how to make “sympathy practical.” But the solution Eliot offers here
would be difficult to replicate in the real world. “What my birth was does
not lie in my will,” Deronda had told Mordecai (DD 430). Happily for
the cause, it does lie in Eliot’s will. This is the providential plotting of
romance. Throughout the course of the novel, Deronda is the agent of
“rescue” (DD 655): of Hans, of Mirah, of Gwendolen, and finally of the
Jews. But he never really does anything. His characteristic gesture, as
James notes, is a clutching of the coat collar, as though to hold himself
back.120 Daniel appears to become the “new executive self ” (DD 435)
Mordecai—and Eliot—need him to be: “It seemed as if Mordecai were
hardly overrating his own power to determine the action of the friend
whom he had mysteriously chosen” (DD 435). Yet we always sense that
the force that occasions the rescues lies outside of Deronda; he is, to return
to Arendt’s terms, agent but not author.
The narrator may say that Deronda’s “entailed disadvantage” has not ren-
dered him an “Ishmaelite” (DD 148), but the novel makes his tendency to
wander very clear (DD 638). Yet for all his wandering, we are told that Daniel
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has “a wonderful power of standing perfectly still” (DD 381); as with Byron’s
Don Juan, wandering and stillness are manifestations of the same essentially
passive nature. In a particularly revealing allusion, Sir Hugo actually com-
pares Deronda to an English Don Juan figure: “You are always looking ten-
derly at women, and talking to them in a Jesuitical way. You are a
dangerous young fellow—a kind of Lovelace who will make the Clarissas
run after you instead of running after them” (DD 304). Richardson’s Clarissa,
considered by many to be the first novel of consciousness, carefully allies
action with its villain Lovelace’s “plotting genius,” just as it allies character
with Clarissa’s virtuous unwillingness to act.121 As Jay Clayton puts it, “her
virtue lies in the power that makes it so difficult for her to act at all, her
heightened sense of consciousness.”122 Clarissa’s passivity stands in stark con-
trast to Gwendolen’s desire for action, including her desire to run after Deronda.
But Gwendolen’s inability to act on this desire generates its own “height-
ened sense of consciousness,” as we shall see. Similarly, Sir Hugo’s comment
demonstrates how dangerous a force Deronda can be, in spite of a passiv-
ity that seems very different from Lovelace’s attitude in pursuit of Clarissa.
Deronda is rightly affiliated with the world of “romance” (DD 159). Sir
Hugo jokes about his “Quixotic enthusiasm” (DD 311), and Hans calls him
a “knight-errant” (DD 237). R. E. Francillon, in his 1876 review of the
novel as a romance, picks up on the same concept, referring to Deronda as
a “nineteenth century knight errant.”123 The knight-errant, notes Caserio
in relation to Eliot’s hero, is “perpetually rescuing others in distress” but “finds
his activity only the mask of an essential passivity, indeed of a suffering pas-
sion.”124 When Daniel comes upon Mirah, he is indulging himself in “that
solemn passivity . . . [when] what in other hours may have seemed argu-
ment takes the quality of passionate vision” (DD 160). Deronda exhibits
the Romantic conflation of thought and feeling that Wordsworth
described in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. When he later asks himself why
he should continue helping Mirah after the original rescue, Eliot informs
us that while “he gave himself several good reasons,” “whatever one does
with a strong unhesitating outflow of will has a store of motives that it would
be hard to put into words. Some deeds seem little more than interjections
which give vent to the long passion of a life” (DD 192). Again, the passion
(with its connotations of both passivity and feeling) gives meaning, the deed
serves merely as an escape valve for that meaning; and again, habit provides
the moral apparatus for action.
The epigraph with which Eliot heads the chapter in which she goes back
to narrate Deronda’s “exceptional” childhood declares the importance of “those
moments of intense suffering which take the quality of action—like the cry
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of Prometheus” (DD 139). We have returned to the world of Adam Bede,
where suffering can substitute for action. But the shift in model from Christ
to Prometheus, the iconic hero of revolutionary idealism, indicates Eliot’s
new political concerns: in 1862 she had written that “surely the acme of
poetry hitherto is the conception of the suffering Messiah and the final tri-
umph, ‘He shall reign for ever and ever.’ The Prometheus is a very imper-
fect foreshadowing of that symbol wrought out in the long history of the
Jewish and Christian ages.”125 Still, there is also something Christ-like about
Deronda and his passionate passivity. He appears for Mordecai like the long-
awaited Messiah.
Sir Hugo still believes in an Old England in which “Reform [is] not likely
to make any serious difference in English habits of feeling” (DD 680). In
Daniel Deronda, Eliot criticizes this traditional stance, one close to that which
she implicitly endorses in her earlier work. When Sir Hugo states his opin-
ion that “there is no action possible without a little acting” (DD 324), he
is expressing a truth that Eliot has acknowledged in the past and accepted
as good reason to doubt the beneficence of political action. And we can rec-
ognize in Daniel Deronda’s idealism and passivity a model for a kind of polit-
ical progress devoid of theatricality. Savonarola’s gradual decline into
“doubleness”—a version of acting—led to his death. Felix Holt slipped into
“acting” when he involved himself in the riot, and the results demonstrated
to him how dangerous and ultimately useless such action is. Daniel
Deronda attempts to show that there can be such a thing as pure political
action, but it achieves this goal only by sacrificing any more realistic forms
of action along with acting. Eliot wishes to allow Daniel agency without
forcing him “to draw strongly at any thread in the hopelessly-entangled scheme
of things” (DD 160)—that is, without ensnaring him in the web of action.
Of course, the attempt is futile: for all his efforts, when Deronda leaves England,
he makes Gwendolen “the victim of his happiness” (DD 690). Eliot is too
honest with herself to indulge fully in make-believe. Like Gwendolen’s, her
struggle with action does not end.
The Question of Consciousness
Reviewing Daniel Deronda, R. R. Bowker noted that “Tito Melema . . .
we know through his deeds, but neither Deronda nor Grandcourt do any-
thing.” Bowker recognized that we respond to Deronda’s inaction very dif-
ferently from the way we respond to Gwendolen’s anxiety and frustrations:
“The reader looks on him more as a force than as a person. On the other
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hand, the reader’s attention is concentrated upon Gwendolen, this throb-
bing, bleeding heart, torn by the circumstances we all know to our pain,
herself the product of circumstance and the battle-field of opposing char-
acter—because this is human and near to us.”126 We sympathize with
Gwendolen because she is caught between will and destiny—because she
is unable to do exactly as she likes. Gwendolen’s vast and “wonderfully
mixed consciousness” (DD 595), that awareness we have of “unmapped
country within” her (DD 235), owes its power of presence to the fact that
it is within, and must remain so. Dorrit Cohn has argued that “the most
real, the ‘roundest’ characters of fiction are those we know most intimate-
ly, precisely in ways we could never know people in real life.”127 But one
could also argue that the roundest characters, those who possess what
Bakhtin has called a “surplus of humanness,”128 are rather those we both
know and don’t know, precisely as we know and don’t know people in real
life. Such characters allow us room for speculation, as with the notorious
debate about Lady Macbeth’s children. They leave us with a sense of the
hidden that is felt as a presence, like the ghostly plots that hover over
Eliot’s novels, like the unmapped country of Gwendolen’s internal empire.
Eliot’s most-quoted remark on the nature of character hints at a com-
plicated dialectic between things hidden and things revealed: “Character 
. . . is a process and an unfolding,” the narrator of Middlemarch declares
(M 140). “Process” suggests the making of a self out of one’s acts, an effort
of will; “unfolding” implies the unveiling of an essential self, an effect of
destiny. Nevertheless, Henry James used Eliot’s word “process” to describe
Gwendolen’s specifically internal maturation: her mind was made to “ache
with the pain of the process.”129 A comment in Felix Holt shows that Eliot
firmly believes in a core of character, whether that character has been formed
over time or was there from the start: “A man can never do anything at vari-
ance with his own nature. He carries within him the germ of his most excep-
tional action” (AB 171). But while a man’s actions may represent a part of
his character, there will be many “germs” that never bear outer fruit. Eliot
actually attributes the “iridescence of [Gwendolen’s] character—the play of
various, nay, contrary tendencies” in her, to the degree to which her desires
are not allowed outward expression in deeds: “For Macbeth’s rhetoric about
the impossibility of being many opposite things in the same moment, referred
to the clumsy necessities of action and not the subtler possibilities of feel-
ing. We cannot speak a loyal word and be silent, we cannot kill and not
kill in the same moment; but a moment is room wide enough for the loyal
and mean desire, for the outward and murderous thought and the back-
ward stroke of repentance” (DD 33). “Action is transitory,” as Wordsworth
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wrote; it lacks the layers that mark feeling, and those layers are what pro-
vide the sense of depth necessary to make a character seem round. Yet the
strangely liminal nature of the “act” that is Gwendolen’s “murder” of
Grandcourt seems to be Eliot’s attempt to show what it would be to “kill
and not kill in the same moment.”
Eliot frequently attributes “consciousness” to Gwendolen, and the
growth of her “conscience,” her “struggle of mind attending a conscious error”
(DD 280), seems simultaneously to be the growth of her “consciousness”
(DD 262, 368). The process closely resembles that which I described in
relation to Wordsworth in chapter 1. For Hannah Arendt, the etymologi-
cal links between the two terms imply a deep connection between the kind
of thinking attributed to consciousness or self-knowledge (and vitally dis-
tinct from action) and the morality associated with conscience.130 Arendt
was of course driven to this conviction by the awareness the Holocaust left
her with of the terrible and coercive force of action. Eliot’s desperate search
for a secure form of action took her down a similar path.
Gwendolen’s roundness, however, comes not only from our active sense
of her consciousness, but also from the glimpses Eliot gives us into her “under-
consciousness” (DD 300). In particular, her complex relationship to action
functions on a number of levels: at times, Gwendolen appears to be aware
of her feelings; sometimes she seems to sense but wishes to avoid them. Some
of Gwendolen’s responses are obscure to her, and some are perhaps hidden
even from Eliot herself, and from the most discerning readers. Her strange
reaction to the panel painting of the dead face and fleeing figure—“How
dare you open things up which were meant to be shut up” (DD 20)—sug-
gests, for all Gwendolen’s love of action, her subconscious desire to keep
things locked up inside, self-suppressed. Curiously, the one “act” she
admits to when she makes her contorted “confession” to Deronda follow-
ing Grandcourt’s death is the stealing of a knife that she has also kept “locked
in the drawer” of her dressing case (DD 592–93). The accomplished deed
parallels the closeted act represented by her desire to kill her husband.
Gwendolen’s tendency to “lock away” her dread can in part be attrib-
uted to a more general trait: “I think I dislike what I don’t like more than
I like what I like,” she recognizes (DD 258). It is her own form of nega-
tivity, and lies behind her decision to marry the “negative” Grandcourt. Combine
Gwendolen’s remark with Eliot’s description of her greatest fear, in which
she recurs to the nightmarish panel: “her vision of what she had to dread
took more decidedly than ever the form of some fiercely impulsive deed,
committed as in a dream that she would instantaneously wake from to find
the effects real though the images had been false: . . .—a white dead face
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from which she was for ever trying to flee and forever held back” (DD 577).
Together, these statements of Gwendolen’s situation recall Wordsworth’s night-
mare interjection in “Tintern Abbey,” where he describes himself as “more
like a man / Fleeing from something that he dreads, than one / Who sought
the thing he loved.”131 Wordsworth’s dread is Gwendolen’s—and Eliot’s. This
is why “Tintern Abbey” makes its way with such frequency into Eliot’s writ-
ing in the context of attempts to ease a hazy sense of responsibility con-
cerning action. In Middlemarch, Eliot describes a more positive form of her
ghostly guilt: “The idea of some active good within [Dorothea’s] reach ‘haunted
her like a passion’” (M 749). For both Wordsworth and Eliot, crises of action
generated a concern for the diffusive influence of “unhistoric” or “little name-
less unremembered acts.” But these crises also lay behind a truly revolutionary
interest in portraying psychologies of depth, in which guilt can be felt but
not understood.
Yet what makes Eliot so remarkable, as I have tried to show, is the degree
to which she was self-conscious about her own struggle with action. She
seems to have recognized the immense moral cost of her aversion to risk—
the limitations it set on progress—and her novels were written to compensate
(at least in part) for both her inability and her unwillingness to participate
in or advocate larger revolutions. Her self-consciousness is responsible for
the continued, indeed the increasing, forcefulness of her work.
Wordsworth generated his most interesting poetry in the years in which he
was actively struggling with his beliefs. This struggle, rather than (as is so
often thought) the liberal or conservative bent of his work—its specific ide-
ological position—accounts for its power. The stand he takes on the ques-
tion of action in The Excursion is every bit as interesting philosophically as
that in his earlier works (and is, in fact, as close to Eliot’s position as he
comes), but to the degree to which he has achieved a stand, the poetry itself
has ceased to be groundbreaking. Because Eliot continued to explore the
consequences of her positions, because although she could not avoid them,
she was unable to rest with her conclusions, her work never ceases to be
compelling and, in its own way, revolutionary. In her last completed book,
Impressions of Theophrastus Such, she experimented further with our need
for action by removing plot altogether and replacing it with a series of essays
that, under the rubric of “character-studies,” attempted to characterize her
age.
And as an experiment, the character of Deronda is every bit as interest-
ing as anything Eliot ever did. That the greatest of the English realistic nov-
elists was able to envision him in all his idealism—and to envision him envisioning
a new nation—represents a feat of remarkable daring and shows Eliot to
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possess a courage in her moral vision that she may have lacked in regard to
action. But in portraying Gwendolen’s consciousness, she reached the apex
of her achievement. In February of 1857, Eliot informed Blackwood, “my
stories always grow out of my psychological conception of the dramatis per-
sonae.”132 According to James’s Constantius (and I must agree),
Gwendolen’s is the best portrait Eliot ever produced: “see how the girl is
known, inside out, how thoroughly she is felt and understood! It is the most
intelligent thing in all George Eliot’s writing, and that is saying much. It is
so deep, so true, so complete, it holds such a wealth of psychological detail,
it is more than masterly.”133 It also stands behind James’s conception of Isabel
Archer, the young lady at the heart of his own Portrait of a Lady.134 Like
Eliot, James began his novel with a psychological conception of his hero-
ine, but he then asked: “Well, what will she do?”135 As we shall see in the
next chapter, his answer to his own question would have further consequences
for the relationship between plot and character in the novel.
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F4f
Henry James’s Nefarious Plot:
Form and Freedom in the Hands of the Master
Since one was dealing with an Action one might borrow a scrap of the
Dramatist’s all-in-all, his intensity—which the novelist so often rue-
fully envies him as a fortune in itself.
—Henry James, Preface to Roderick Hudson
“What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but
the illustration of character?”1 Henry James’s most famous statement about
the interplay of action and character in literature is usually quoted out of
context. The passage continues,
What is either a picture or a novel that is not of character? What else do
we seek in it and find in it? It is an incident for a woman to stand up with
her hand resting on a table and look out at you in a certain way; or if it
be not an incident I think it will be hard to say what it is. At the same
time, it is an expression of character.
No doubt James was correct, but his choice of “incident” shows his colors:
character is not identified with the doing of great deeds; it may be revealed
by the smallest of gestures. In 1888, in a letter to Mrs. Humphry Ward
(Matthew Arnold’s niece) praising her religious novel, Robert Elsmere
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(1888), James stated his position even more boldly: “The interesting thing
to me in your book (& its great success) . . . is that you have seen a per-
sonal history in the richest and most interesting way—the way that yields
most fruit—seen the adventures of the real being, the intensely living
inner nature & seen them (rendering them too) so vividly that they
become exciting, thrilling, strongly attaching as a ‘story.’”2 Once again,
“story,” or plot, is internalized to the point of disappearance.
In the Preface to the New York edition of The Portrait of a Lady, Henry
James demonstrates his commitment to internalized action by acknowledging
his debt to two of the writers on whom I have concentrated. He first glances
at Wordsworth’s achievement in The Prelude by speculating that true vivid-
ness of character could best be reached “if one could do so subtle, if not so
monstrous, a thing as to write the history of the growth of one’s imagina-
tion.” Then he moves on to a more important precursor for him, George
Eliot. In Daniel Deronda, Eliot had defended her choice of centering on a
female consciousness during the upheavals of the American Civil War: “What
in the midst of that mighty drama are girls and their blind visions? They
are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and fighting.
In these delicate vessels is borne onward through the ages the treasure of
human affections.”3 James, who (as Leon Edel has argued) carried his own
burden of guilt about his inability to participate in the conflict that so dev-
astated the lives of two of his brothers, recalls Eliot’s defense in the context
of his own attempt to make his readers see how one can make an “ado” about
a subject so slight as the picture of “a certain young woman affronting her
destiny.”4
James’s use of “ado” in this context invokes the most famous instance of
the word in the language, in Shakespeare’s Much Ado about Nothing. “The
novel,” James insists, is in contrast “of its very nature an ‘ado,’ an ado about
something, and the larger the form it takes the greater of course the ado.”5
James definitely made his novel a “large” one. Almost all contemporary crit-
ics complained of the length of The Portrait of a Lady, and almost all related
this complaint to the want of external incident—or “doing”—in the story.
As the critic in the Nation put it (more sympathetically than many) in by-
now familiar terms, “his true distinction—that is to say, his strength and
weakness also—consists in his attempt to dispense with all the ordinary machin-
ery of the novelist except the study of subtle shades of character.” The result
is “the elaborate placidity of these 519 pages.”6 Yet perhaps the “ordinary
machinery” of the novelist does not consist of the kind of incident and action
implied by the Nation’s critic. When James takes “ado,” a word that carries
with it dramatic associations, and places it within the context of the novel,
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he suggests that in fact it is the strength of the genre to make “something”
out of what had been previously deemed “nothing.” And as the Nation’s
critic recognized, that something turns out to be a form of portraiture.
The “ado” I make over James’s use of the word strikes me as merited by
the degree to which forms of “doing” lie at the heart not only of the Preface
to The Portrait but also of the novel itself.7 James seems to be ringing the
changes of the verb, and in the process, he alters its meaning. What James
elsewhere referred to as “the whole question of the novelist’s ‘doing’”
becomes strangely implicated in the kinds of “doing” he can envision for
his characters.8 To say this is to argue that the way in which James is “really
‘doing’” Isabel Archer connects to his “primary” question in the Preface to
The Portrait of a Lady, “Well, what will she do?”—a question so central that
he asks it again a few pages later.9 The question seems to grow right out of
those repeated demands of “What should I do?” made by Eliot’s heroines,10
and James’s acknowledgment of Eliot in the Preface stems from his recog-
nition of how influential this question was for him. Of all the possible read-
ings one might give to Eliot’s works, James chose to read her as one who
was involved in the crisis of action. But there is a difference. When James
replaces Eliot’s “should” with his own “will,” he indicates that his ethical
concerns will be more about freedom than about duty. In addition, James’s
version of Eliot’s struggle with free agency takes place on a much more self-
consciously formal level than do Eliot’s ethical dilemmas. Together, these
shifts show the move from the Victorian to the modernist frame of mind.
James’s intention to make his characters “true agents”11 has been
summed up by Yvor Winters: “James displays in all his more serious works
an unmistakable desire to allow his characters unrestricted freedom of choice
and to develop his plots out of such choice and out of the consequent acts
of choice to which the initial acts may lead.”12 It was also recognized imme-
diately by critics as a revolutionary gesture, and one that was influenced by
the tendency away from action or plot and toward character. As William
Dean Howells wrote in the Century Magazine,
The new school [of fiction] derives from Hawthorne and George Eliot
rather than any others. . . . The moving accident is certainly not its trade,
and it prefers to avoid all manner of dire catastrophes. . . . Will the read-
er be content to accept a novel which is an analytic study rather than a
story, which is apt to leave him arbiter of the author’s creations? . . . 
[James] has finally made his public in his own way of story-telling—or
call it character-painting if you prefer.13
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An emphasis on readerly participation comes out of the emphasis on the
priority of character over plot. As the critic of the Quarterly Review noted
in response to Howells, “The novelist provides the characters, and every-
body is left free to dispose of them according to his own taste.”14 So the
freedom of the Jamesian reader parallels the freedom of the Jamesian char-
acter.
As a result of this conflation, though, James’s characters seem incapable
of escaping from a readerly—that is, an internalized and imaginative—con-
ception of action. In “The Dilemma of Determinism,” William James argued
that “our first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety
to be to affirm that we are free.”15 His brother Henry seems to have felt the
need to place the emphasis on the “inward” nature of this act.16 Isabel’s “adven-
tures” are to be “mild,” they are to be independent of “flood and field, of
the moving accident, of battle and murder and sudden death,” because as
James puts it, “Without her sense of them, her sense for them, as one may
say, they are next to nothing.”17 Isabel must read her own story. In other
words, for any adventure to be interesting, it must be translated in the mind
of its protagonist: “Place the center of the subject in the young woman’s
own consciousness,” James says to himself.18
Consciousness—the quality Eliot had attributed with such frequency to
Gwendolen Harleth—is a word James makes his own, and its distinction
from the more Aristotelian or deed-derived character speaks volumes about
James’s attitudes toward action. Writing of his favorite scene in the novel,
Isabel’s fireside vigil in chapter 42, James himself draws the connection between
the kind of activity he envisions as adapted to displaying consciousness and
the kind of activity we associate with the critical enterprise of reading. He
rings the final change on “doing” when he purports to “show what an ‘excit-
ing’ inward life may do for the person leading it.”19 An odd displacement
of agency happens here: as Isabel’s actions will be frustrated, some abstract
category termed the “inward life” will take over for her. “[R]educed to its
essence,” James announces of Isabel’s dark night of faith,
it is but the vigil of searching criticism; but it throws the action further
forward than twenty “incidents” might have done. . . . It is a representa-
tion simply of her motionlessly seeing, and an attempt withal to make the
mere still lucidity of her act as “interesting” as the surprise of a caravan or
the identification of a pirate.20
“Criticism,” the activity of the reader, replaces a more bodily form of action.
James’s description of an act as possessing “still lucidity” (the phrase is almost
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Wordsworthian) is particularly shocking in the context of a story that was to
have shown its heroine in all the glory and freedom of agency.
So what happens to bring about this unexpected change? To put it sim-
ply, for all James’s attempts to avoid it, plot happens. James’s refusal of plot
leads him to start with a central character, Isabel Archer. Instead of making
her act, he wishes to do justice to what he calls his “pious desire but to place
[his] treasure right.”21 In the process, he displaces responsibility for plotting
onto “the concrete terms of [his] ‘plot’”—his phrase for the characters with
whom he surrounds Isabel. He engages in such sophisticated sleights of hand
because of a desire to avoid what he terms the “nefarious name” of plot.22
Peter Brooks has argued that in modern literature the sense of plot as a secret
plan to accomplish an evil or unlawful purpose “nearly always attaches itself
to the other” sense—that is, the action of a story: “the organizing line of plot
is more often than not some scheme or machination, a concerted plan for
the accomplishment of some purpose which goes against the ostensible and
dominant legalities of the fictional world, the realization of a blocked and
resisted desire.”23 As we shall see, James’s distrust of action stemmed from
his inability to see it as anything other than either intrigue (“plot” as sinis-
ter “scheme”) or sacrifice.
But for James the problem took on a particular slant connected with his
aesthetic interests. We can register this in his replacement of the category
of action with that of situation: he will “place” Isabel, “his treasure,” right.
One is reminded of Gilbert Osmond’s treatment of Isabel, whom he
reduces to the most precious of his bibelots. Plot has a “nefarious name”
because James is unable to escape his sense that plotting is a “doing with”
rather than a pure doing and therefore a direct infringement of Kant’s cat-
egorical imperative, to treat agents as ends rather than means. I want to turn
first to The Portrait of a Lady to demonstrate James’s problem with plot-
ting. My focus, however, will be on the most obvious example of plot in
James’s fiction: the revolutionary plot at the center of The Princess
Casamassima. Finally, I will conclude by looking at the apotheosis of the
Jamesian plot, in “The Beast in the Jungle.” What should become clear along
the way is how, over the years, James became increasingly concerned about
his own techniques of handling action.
The Portrait of a Lady
Isabel Archer’s desire to be a Jamesian reader—to escape the nefarious
name of plot—entraps her within the confines of the narrative in which
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she finds herself.24 Isabel begins the novel every bit as entranced by the
sense of her own agency as was Gwendolen Harleth—a resemblance many
critics have noted.25 Both heroines exhibit a “love of movement” (330). If
Gwendolen liked archery, Isabel is an Archer. In an early scene reminiscent
of Eliot’s use of rowing as a symbol of agency, we hear that Isabel has just
been “handling the oars” (65). “If there’s a thing in the world I’m fond of,”
she declares to Caspar Goodwood, “it’s my personal independence” (142).
The aura of possibility surrounding Isabel makes her the subject of much
suspense, both for readers and for the characters in the text. In fact, the
characters surrounding Isabel seem, like readers, intent on finding out
what she will do. But in their curiosity they also resemble their own
author; James’s question in the Preface makes its first appearance in the
mouth of Ralph when he asks his mother: “What do you mean to do with
her?” (46). The question strikes Ralph as so pressing that he repeats it
shortly thereafter, only to be reprimanded by Mrs. Touchett: “Do with
her? You talk as if she were a yard of calico. I shall do absolutely nothing
with her, and she herself will do everything she chooses” (49). Already, the
distinction between “doing” and “doing with,” between subject (Isabel)
and object (the calico), has been introduced. But it is much harder to dis-
pense with than Mrs. Touchett’s quick retort suggests.
“A character like that,” Ralph remarks to himself, “a real little passion-
ate force to see at play is the finest thing in nature” (63). James would agree.
Ralph’s comment sounds like that of an author admiring his subject. But
while “play” connotes the freedom of Schiller’s Spieltrieb, it also carries a
suggestion of the chessboard deity, hovering over his pieces, determining
the next move. Both Ralph and James wish to avoid such manipulative plot-
ting. The freedom from plot that they envision is also a freedom from that
most conventional—and therefore restrictive—of female plots: the
courtship plot.26 When Ralph asks himself once again, “what was she going
to do with herself ?” (even here, with regard to Isabel herself, “doing” becomes
“doing with”), he recognizes that in Isabel’s case the realm of possible answers
far exceeds the usual: “This question was irregular, for with most women
one had no occasion to ask it. Most women did with themselves nothing
at all; they waited, in attitudes more or less gracefully passive, for a man to
come that way and furnish them with a destiny. Isabel’s originality was that
she gave one an impression of having intentions of her own” (64). It is also
James’s originality—as well as his primary goal in the construction of The
Portrait.
At first, Isabel seems likely to escape from the marriage plot. “I don’t want
to begin life by marrying,” she declares to Ralph, “There are other things
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a woman can do” (133). As I argued in relation to Daniel Deronda, the capac-
ity for new beginnings is central to a belief in action: when James’s novel
moves from America to England, to begin, as it were, again, Isabel’s stated
desire to “begin afresh” (39) bodes well for her story. We are told that she
had already experienced “beginning afresh a great many times” (39), and
the repeated refusals of would-be lovers with which the novel opens sug-
gests continued capacity in this regard. It also, though, calls into question
the very idea of starting anew by intimating that a story that is always begin-
ning is unlikely to go anywhere. Nevertheless, when Isabel sends away Caspar
Goodwood, she does so in part because his capacity for action limits hers:
in spite of his being “a man of high, bold action” (92), he seems “to deprive
her of the sense of freedom” (104–5). His activity would ensnare her as surely
as any nefarious plot. Her dismissal of Lord Warburton leaves Isabel with
the sense that “if she wouldn’t do such a thing” as marry such a man, “then
she must do great things, she must do something greater” (102).
Like Gwendolen, Isabel never seems sure what “greater” thing she will
do. Saying “no” to Caspar stands as her greatest “victory” thus far: “it appeared
to her she had done something; . . . she had done what was truest to her
plan” (145). But saying no comes closer to renunciation than to positive
action, and her “plan” remains remarkably indistinct. The vagueness hints
at a strange ambivalence in Isabel’s character: this most active of heroines
is also marked by a deep passivity. Henrietta Stackpole asks Isabel, “Do you
know where you’re drifting?” (146).27 Her question brings to mind Maggie
Tulliver’s drifting downriver into sin in The Mill on the Floss and also con-
trasts sharply with our earlier vision of Isabel holding the oars. “You’re drift-
ing to some great mistake,” Henrietta warns. Like George Eliot, Henry James
was possessed of what he himself called “the imagination of disaster.”28 His
heroine shares in it but insists on her agency nonetheless. Yet action brings
with it the possibility of catastrophe: this, in large measure, is the recogni-
tion lying behind Isabel’s often commented upon “certain fear” (78).
When Goodwood remarks, “One would think you were going to commit
some atrocity,” Isabel’s reply is telling: “Perhaps I am. I wish to be free even
to do that if the fancy takes me” (143).
Ralph negotiates his father’s bequest to Isabel precisely in order to stop
her drifting by putting “a little wind in her sails” (160). Isabel recognizes
that the virtue of wealth lies in its ability to aid action, but she soon sees,
like Dorothea, that the translation of money into acts is not easy: “the girl
presently made up her mind that to be rich was a virtue because it was to
be able to do, and that to do could only be sweet. . . . Just now, it is true,
there was not much to do—” (182; James’s emphasis). “The world lay all
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before her—she could do whatever she chose,” James tells us, setting up,
like Wordsworth, the inevitable comparison to Miltonic epic. But James’s
next sentence is typically deflating: “There was a deep thrill in it all, but
for the present her choice was tolerably discreet; she chose simply to walk
back from Euston Square to her hotel” (273). Any action to which her riches
leads occurs offstage in James’s novel. He happily skips over “several
months; an interval sufficiently replete with incident” (270) in order to return
Isabel to Osmond’s Florence. Travel affects her, but Isabel’s response to Rome
(which had so bewildered poor Dorothea on her honeymoon) is notably
nostalgic: “She had always been fond of history, and here was history in the
stones of the street and the atoms of the sunshine. She had an imagination
that kindled at the mention of great deeds, and wherever she turned some
great deed had been acted. These things strongly moved her, but moved
her all inwardly.”29 All the actions, all the great deeds of the past, are inter-
nalized. Like Ralph, she reacts to Rome so strongly because she sees it as
“confess[ing] to the psychological moment” (245). Isabel’s greatest “explor-
ing expedition” (235), her traveling adventure to the East with Madame
Merle as companion, occurs, like most of the overt action in the book, entirely
between the acts.30
The one great deed of Isabel’s life is her marriage to Gilbert Osmond,
which she will later think of as “the most serious act—the single sacred act—
of her life” (386). Appropriately, though, even the engagement scene hap-
pens outside of the narrative; we hear about Isabel’s decision only
afterward, in conversation. James had earlier related how Lily Ludlow was
perplexed by how little effect the Touchett legacy seemed to have had on
her sister. “But,” he tells us, “Lily knew nothing of these discriminations
[that is, Isabel’s various romantic opportunities and her decisions concern-
ing them] and could only pronounce her sister’s career a strange anti-
climax” (272). Her inability to penetrate Isabel’s consciousness brands Lily
as a poor Jamesian reader—one who could see little more than “strange anti-
climax” in such a novel as her sister inhabits. But Isabel marries Osmond
precisely because he represents everything that the discriminating Jamesian
reader should admire. Consider how Madame Merle tells Isabel that
Osmond has “no career, no name, no position, no fortune, no past, no future,
no anything” (172). Like Eliot’s Grandcourt, he is a man defined by the
“negative” (227). Gwendolen’s choice was determined by her need for money
and the belief that Grandcourt’s passivity would allow her greater license
to pursue her own ends. Isabel’s selection has far more to recommend it,
especially given James’s own literary positions.31
Gilbert admits to Isabel that his own plan has been “to be as quiet as
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possible. . . . Not to worry, not to strive nor struggle. To resign myself” (227).
He speaks of a “willful renunciation” in terms that bring to mind
Wordsworth’s “choice” of “submissiveness” in the “Ode to Duty.” In other
words, he seems to stand outside of the constraints of plotting, and this is
precisely what Isabel admires in him. As Madame Merle puts it to the Countess,
“What has he done? He has done nothing that has had to be undone. And
he has known how to wait” (233). Among the ambiguous and ominous sug-
gestions in her comment is a possible intimation that just such inaction defines
the successful life. When Osmond tells Isabel, “The events of my life have
been absolutely unperceived by anyone save myself ” (228), he is opening
the door for her to be the discriminating reader who can recognize, in James’s
words to Mrs. Ward, “the truth of view of the interesting novel, that it’s a
history of our moral life & not simply of our physical accidents.”32 Isabel,
James informs us, “was fond, ever, of the question of character and quality,
of sounding, as who should say, the deep personal mystery” (267), and Gilbert
Osmond strikes her as being every bit as interesting a subject as Isabel her-
self is for us. When Caspar Goodwood asks her, “What has [Osmond] ever
done,” Isabel’s response indicates how closely her reasoning follows that of
the ideal Jamesian reader: “That I should marry him? Nothing at all. . . .
If he had done great things would you forgive me any better? Give me up,
Mr. Goodwood; I’m marrying a perfect nonentity. Don’t try to take an inter-
est in him. You can’t.” But Goodwood’s reply proves that he understands
better than she thought: “I can’t appreciate him; that’s what you mean. And
you don’t mind in the least that he’s a perfect nonentity. You think he’s grand,
you think he’s great” (279). And so she does. What she sees in him is a form
of character free of the contamination of action. Again, choices serve as sub-
stitutes for deeds: when Isabel looks at Osmond’s home, “it spoke of the
kind of personal issue that touched her most nearly; of the choice between
objects, subjects, contacts—what might she call them?—of a thin and those
of a rich association” (237).
What, indeed, might she—or rather, might Osmond himself—call
them: objects, subjects, or contacts? Gilbert Osmond’s unwillingness to dis-
tinguish among these categories proves to be one major cause of Isabel’s tragedy.
Gilbert is defined by his things, by his ability to choose them, by what Madame
Merle calls his “adorable taste” (208), and this is a form of discrimination.
Troublingly, though, he wishes to acquire Isabel, whom he (also rightly) rec-
ognizes as a worthwhile possession, a portrait of a lady fine enough to “fig-
ure in his collection of choice objects” (258). The phrase “choice objects”
hints at how Gilbert Osmond directs his faculty of choice. It accords with
his belief, as he tells Isabel, that “a woman’s natural mission is to be where
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she is most appreciated” (226)—“to be” and not “to do.” Madame Merle
complains of Gilbert’s activities as a connoisseur, “But as the only thing you
do—well, it’s so little. I should have liked you to do so many other things”
(208). Nevertheless, Osmond’s inability to differentiate between Isabel as
an object and as a subject makes his seemingly passive role in her fate (which
he himself regards as an “altogether exceptional effort” [260]) morally equiv-
alent to Madame Merle’s active role. They are equally culpable.
Madame Merle serves as James’s scapegoat in The Portrait of a Lady: she
carries the very burden of plot with which James himself was so unwilling to
dirty his hands. James twice invokes the “nefarious name” of “plot” in
describing her manipulations of Isabel (453, 455). Appropriately, as with so
many other active heroines in novels, Madame Merle has something of the
stage actress about her (212, 275, 283). And explicitly, her form of “doing”
is a “doing with.” When Osmond asks Madame Merle, “What do you want
to do with [Miss Archer],” her reply shows the limits of action in James’s world:
“I don’t pretend to know what people are meant for. . . . I only know what I
can do with them” (207). At least she is honest. Gilbert Osmond’s inactive
stance hides his very potent abilities to do things with other people, as Isabel
soon learns. Moreover, James himself can be accused of a similar irresponsi-
bility for his inaction; in the end, it is his plot that leaves Isabel caged in her
marriage. Yet the deeper implication is that to focus on situation can be as
dangerous as to focus on action. Like James, Osmond merely “places”
Isabel,33 but such placement can be as nefarious as outright plotting, as the
events of the novel prove. On the other hand, Serena Merle’s “doing with”
significantly also represents a “doing for,” as the Countess explains: “She worked
for [Osmond], plotted for him, suffered for him” (455). It is a distinction worth
keeping in mind while constructing a moral calculus of the novel.
The great question raised by commentators on James’s novel concerns
the “anti-climax” of Isabel’s “career” (to use Lily’s earlier phrase): why does
Isabel return to her marriage at the end? Soon after she weds Osmond, Isabel
learns her mistake: “she had not read him right” (357). Like Dorothea after
her marriage to Casaubon, who felt “that the large vistas and wide fresh air
which she had dreamed of finding in her husband’s mind were replaced by
anterooms and winding passages which seemed to lead nowhither,” Isabel
sees the expanses of thought and experience that she had envisioned her mar-
riage would open before her instead close off: “She had taken all the first
steps in the purest confidence, and then she had suddenly found the infi-
nite vista of a multiplied life to be a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at
the end” (356).34 Like Gwendolen, though, Isabel learns from her mistaken
marriage to internalize her active principle; “she had more and more of the
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air of being able to wait” (310). Her belief that “unhappiness was a state of
disease—of suffering as opposed to doing,” and that “to ‘do’—it hardly mat-
tered what—would therefore be an escape, perhaps in some degree a rem-
edy” (348), slowly changes into a recognition of “suffering” as “an active
condition; it was not a chill, a stupor, a despair; it was a passion of thought,
of speculation, of response to every pressure” (356). Recall Ralph’s descrip-
tion of Isabel as “a real little passionate force to set at play” (63). If one stresses
the relationship between passion and passivity, then “passionate force” becomes
an almost oxymoronic concept that sheds real light on the paradox inher-
ent in Isabel. Isabel’s “passion” is indeed a suppressed force, an inaction rather
than an action, but no less strong for that.
Isabel asks the same question Eliot’s heroines asked in response to their
unhappy marriages: “what ought she to do?” (363; James’s emphasis). Yet
Isabel’s very commitment to action keeps her in the cage of her stifling mar-
riage. Staying with Osmond validates her deed: “almost anything seemed
preferable to repudiating the most serious act—the single sacred act—of
her life” (386). “One must accept one’s deeds,” she insists: “I married him
before all the world; I was perfectly free; it was impossible to do anything
more deliberate” (407). Of course she was not free, as James’s language makes
sure we recognize: “It was impossible to pretend that she had not acted with
her eyes open; if ever a girl was a free agent she had been. . . . [T]he sole
source of her mistake was in herself. There had been no plot, no snare; she
had looked and considered and chosen” (340). James lays the dramatic irony
on thickly. Isabel will learn that Madame Merle has been “a powerful agent
in her destiny.” Her “sense of accident” will be replaced by recognition of
Madame Merle’s nefarious plot (428).
Why then does this recognition not free her from the plot in which she
has been ensnared and allow her to resume her course of action, to con-
tinue on her adventures? In part, she is now aware, like so many of Eliot’s
heroines, of a sense of “duty” beyond herself. Pansy has become her “arti-
cle of religion,” the clue to lead her through the labyrinth of life (341). But
James goes a step beyond Eliot. After the plot has been revealed, Osmond
appropriates Isabel’s own argument: “I think we should accept the conse-
quences of our actions,” he announces to her (446). And not only does Isabel’s
respect for action keep her bound to Osmond, her newly experienced but
always appreciated awareness of the force of inaction—and its correlative,
internal action—also constrains her. Osmond’s statement stuns her: “Ten
minutes before she had felt all the joy of irreflective action—a joy to which
she had so long been a stranger; but action had been suddenly changed to
slow renunciation, transformed by the blight of Osmond’s touch” (446).
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We hear a resonance of Grandcourt’s “torpedo-like touch” in Daniel
Deronda. Yet James’s frightening suggestion is that Isabel may, on some level,
be glad of the opportunity “to live only to suffer” (466). She may see her
connection to Osmond not as numbing, but as liberating in a way that no
other marriage could be, as an “active condition” (356) that must be con-
trasted to “the joy of irreflective action.” After all, Isabel chose Osmond because
of his capacity for interior action. And the degree to which the active Caspar
Goodwood’s “touch,” his lightninglike kiss, represents an “act of possession”
clearly frightens Isabel; hence her relief “when darkness returned” and she
is again “free” (489). The only kinds of acts that remain clear of the taint
of “doing with” in this novel are acts of sacrifice and interior acts. Isabel is
left “free” to do both. Again, James seems to be hinting at the conclusion
of Paradise Lost: “She had not known where to turn; but she knew now.
There was a very straight path” (490). With the world all before her, what
she has “chosen” is precisely her “place of rest.”35 Having “wandered,” she
decides to take the “straight path” of inaction that now lies before her, a
welcome relief from the confusions of action.
Unsurprisingly, contemporary critics balked at James’s ending with a fer-
vor reminiscent of the response to the conclusion of Clough’s Amours de Voyage.
In spite of James’s reference to the “straight path,” R. H. Hutton complained
that Isabel was left “without compass and without clue,” and he added that
he was uncertain whether the novel could even be said to have an “ending.”36
His objection demonstrates the degree to which readers considered formal
issues on a moral level. Hutton’s outrage stemmed in part from his sense that
Henrietta Stackpole’s words to Caspar Goodwood at the conclusion of the
novel, “just you wait!” (490), accompanied by Goodwood’s upward (that is,
presumably hopeful) glance at Henrietta, indicated that James intended us
to believe Isabel’s “straight path” would lead through adultery or divorce to
Goodwood. Yet Henrietta’s phrase aptly lends itself to both optimistic and
pessimistic readings, ones that emphasize either possibility or resignation. As
the critic in the Athenaeum rightly complained, “this so-called ‘portrait of a
lady’ is left unfinished just at the point where some really decisive and enlight-
ening strokes begin to be possible.”37 It is a typically Jamesian tease, and it
must reflect on some level James’s desire to leave Isabel a free agent at the end
of his narrative; we cannot tell what choices she will eventually make.
In the process, James also, paradoxically, makes Isabel seem more alive.
Those critics who single her out as a successfully “round” character tend to
do so because, like Gwendolen, she is both known and not known. As one
early critic wrote: “It is claimed that the heroine is of all the characters the
one least clearly painted, least perfectly understood. But it would not be
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difficult to say that we know her and her motives as the author chooses for
us to know, and the interest of the novel comes in great part from the vague-
ness of our acquaintance with Miss Archer; and after all, when we lay down
the book, we cannot deny, if we are candid, that we know as much of the
motives which induced her . . . as we do of the impulses which lead our sis-
ters and cousins to similar results.”38 F. R. Leavis suggests that Isabel’s “pecu-
liar kind of impressiveness . . . is conditioned by her not being known inside
out”39—that is, much of her remains what could be called “inside in.” James,
by virtue of a kind of modest reticence, allows her a privacy that ensures
that whatever constraints she may face in the physical world, her interior
universe remains very much her own space.
But as I have been arguing, Isabel’s understanding of free agency has shifted.
Whereas at the beginning of the novel, her sense of action seems to domi-
nate in her, by its conclusion she has succumbed to lure of passionate suffer-
ing, of an outer passivity that conceals an “‘exciting’ inward life.” When he
revised The Portrait, James made the meaning of Henrietta’s advice to
Goodwood clearer, adding a final sentence: “She walked him away with her,
however, as if she had given him now the key to patience” (490). Is patience
to serve as the key to the novel? Consider Henry James’s letter to Edith Wharton,
written decades later in regard to her treatment at the hands of her own bru-
tal husband: “Only sit tight yourself and go through the movements of life. That
keeps up our connection with life—I mean of the immediate and apparent
life; behind which, all the while, the deeper and darker and the unapparent,
in which things really happen to us, learns, under that hygiene, to stay in its
place. . . . Live it all through, every inch of it—out of it something will come—
but live it ever so quietly; and—je maintiens mon dire—waitingly!”40 Again,
patience should rule—even in the face of marital abuse—because what “really
happens” happens internally. But the question still remains: are we to believe
that James sees Isabel’s return to the prison of her marriage as an act of moral
heroism (suggesting an internalized conception of the heroic) or as an act of
cowardice and conventionalism (suggesting a more externalized view of
courage)? I think that the very impossibility of fixing on a final reading for
James’s novel shows his complex awareness of the relationship of action and
consciousness to the moral life.
Revolutions in Plotting
Early on in her story, Isabel Archer declares, “I should delight in seeing a
revolution” (71). Her spirit for adventure makes her interest understandable.
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Her author, though, expressed a similar desire to his friend T. S. Perry: “If
I had nothing else to do I think I should run over to Ireland. . . . The rea-
son is that I should like to see a country in a state of revolution.”41 It seems
a strange wish, coming from one so apparently apolitical, and so averse to
turbulent action, as Henry James is often considered to be. In another let-
ter to Perry from the early 1880s, he expanded on his political observations:
“Nothing lives in England today but politics. They are all devouring, and
their mental uproar crowds everything out.” His comments suggest an
almost Wordsworthian objection to the stifling effects of the political fer-
vor: it leaves no mental space for other, perhaps quieter and more discrim-
inating, kinds of thought. Yet James was not wholeheartedly against the
invigorating atmosphere. He added that he should “hate it more if I didn’t
also find it interesting. The air is full of events, of changes, of movement
(some people would say of revolution, but I don’t think that).”42
Whatever he may have thought of the potential for revolution in
England, James responded to the current environment. In the latter half of
the 1880s he wrote the three novels that combine to form what can be thought
of as his “political period”: The Bostonians (1885–86) (which explores the
women’s movement of the years following the American Civil War), The
Princess Casamassima (also 1885–86) (which looks at revolutionary politics
in contemporary England), and The Tragic Muse (1890) (which forces its
protagonist to choose between political and artistic careers). The existence
of such a political period indicates James’s ongoing exploration of the role
of action in the moral life. It also coincides curiously with the era usually
thought of as James’s “middle phase,” following the great early successes and
preceding the astonishing formal revelations of the later novels. While all
three works display a complicated relationship to the political arena, none
so forcefully connects the formal issues of plot with politics as The Princess,
a novel that revolves around an anarchist plot. So it is to this work that I
wish to turn in order to explore how James’s stylistic developments relate
to his changing sense of action.
One common way of thinking of James’s interest in action is to look at
his use of melodrama.43 George Eliot’s Sir Hugo had declared to Daniel Deronda,
“At this stage of the world, if a man wants to be taken seriously he must
keep clear of melodrama”44—something James resolutely refused to do. Critics
have often remarked on what Leo Bersani calls James’s “inferior, corny plots.”45
Dorothea Krook has compared James to Wordsworth by noting that while
Wordsworth creates consciousness in his poems by stripping them of the
objective, James does so in his novels by overloading them with details of
the material world.46 James’s melodramatic flair—another kind of overloading
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of the objective—parallels this process: he brings the action back into his
work, but he changes the way in which his reader comprehends it. In many
of his works external melodramas are displaced by what Peter Brooks has
termed James’s “melodramas of consciousness”47—a phrase that describes
Isabel’s “adventures” in The Portrait. Commenting on The American
(1877), Brooks explains how “what differs [in James] is that the melodrama
of external action—the suspenseful menace, pursuit, and combat—are all
past by the time” the “ethical conflict” is resolved; “External melodrama has
been used to lead to the melodrama of ethical choice.”48
But James does not limit his melodrama to his characters’ consciousnesses.
Rather, he includes both versions: internal and external. So his tale “The
Story in It” (1903) presents us simultaneously with a “real” (that is, bod-
ily) love affair, between Mrs. Dyott and Colonel Voyt, and the “innocent”
love felt by Maud Blessingbourne for the Colonel.49 The characters argue
about the proper role for “drama” and “adventures” in literature—whether
they need be of guilty “relations,” or whether the inward drama of inno-
cence could also be called a “story.”50 Voyt finally admits that Maud’s “con-
sciousness” “was, in the last analysis, a kind of shy romance,” although (and
these are the final lines of the tale) “who but a duffer—he stuck to his con-
tention—would see the shadow of a ‘story’ in it?”51 James is of course the
duffer.52 His point, one he makes again the Preface to The Princess
Casamassima, is to note “the unreality of the sharp distinction, where the
interest of observation is at stake, between doing and feeling.”53
Nevertheless, the paradox presented by “The Story in It” is that James likes
to have it both ways. He leaves us to decide which is the more interesting
kind of adventure. James keeps titillating us with plot.
Still, he himself seems to have a preference. It appears in his strange inver-
sion of the moral process. As Brooks’s comments on The American suggest,
while we usually think of choice as preceding action, in James, the action
often precedes the choice. Because of this reversal, choice becomes the more
ethically invigorated category. Action, in contrast, just “happens,” as
though without prior consideration. Another way of considering this
inconsistency is to say that especially in James’s earlier works—although The
Ambassadors (1903) also stands as a great example—the actors are often not
the real agents of the drama: those characters who do the most tend not to
be the same as those who make the significant moral choices.
But we can identify a shift in James’s attitudes toward action over the
course of his career—one that suggests his growing awareness of its moral
complexities. Brooks has argued that one of the great attractions of melo-
drama in the nineteenth century was its ability to render conflict visible:
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“For melodrama has the distinct value of being about recognition and clar-
ification, about how to be clear what the stakes are and what their repre-
sentative signs mean, and how to face them.”54 James, though, as critics have
long recognized, prefers to avoid the obvious55; his use of both external and
internal melodrama reflects this fact by increasingly making things opaque
rather than clear. And while James’s position in The Portrait already exhib-
ited significant conflict with regard to the moral status of action, the later
novels make it much harder to align plot with evil. One can register the
change by comparing The Portrait’s love triangle of Isabel-Osmond-
Madame Merle to that of Milly Theale-Merton Densher-Kate Croy in The
Wings of the Dove (1902).56 Densher’s inaction (at least until after Milly’s
death) represents a far subtler version of complicity in crime than
Osmond’s (I actually find him a correspondingly more sinister character).
But the change in James’s sense of the morality of plotting is particularly
apparent in his revision of Madame Merle in the character of Kate Croy.
James seems to have recognized his unfair treatment of Madame Merle, so
he tries to make us sympathize with Kate—and with her desire to plot—
in a way he never allowed us to sympathize with his earlier villainess. We
begin the novel inside Kate’s consciousness, subjected to all the insults and
pettinesses that attend her daily life and make her wish to work her way
out of it; James lets us feel how hard it is to act with a pure will in such cir-
cumstances. And in general, the late novels make it harder to tell the heroes
from the victims, the good from the bad.57
But if moral judgment of characters can be difficult, in the later novels,
even the bare plot becomes the subject of mystery. James achieves this effect
not via the ordinary process of suspense (that is, by making us wonder what
will happen), but by his extraordinary methods of opacity (we often won-
der, like his characters, what is happening). He thus forces his readers to
contemplate plot with a conscious attention very similar to the inward action
that he portrays in his characters. As Arnold Kettle puts it, “With James
the question ‘What happened?’ carries the most subtle, the most exciting
ramifications. To no previous novelist had the answer to such a question
seemed so difficult, its implication so interminable.”58 Think about the role
of the ghost in The Turn of the Screw (1898); while we do not really know
what is going on in the tale, the center of interest rests squarely in the gov-
erness’s consciousness. The important issue is whether she is imagining things
or not, and not whether the ghost exists or not. Similarly, while there is plenty
of action in almost every story James writes, what the reader is left with is
a strong sense of the “in”—as though that should be the highlighted word
in the title of the 1903 tale: “The Story in It.”
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James’s experiments in the political novel come at a crucial juncture in
his career in melodrama and also in his relationship to action. Beginning
in 1890, notably on the heels of what I have called his political period, James
wrote dramas for the stage that, in their efforts to please the audience, flirted
with the melodramatic conventions of the time.59 Rather tellingly,
Hyacinth Robinson meets the Princess Casamassima in the theater, at a melo-
drama boasting a “terribly complicated” plot in which “someone or other
was hurled over a precipice.”60 James means this as a joke, of course, but
however one wants to look at the role of action in The Princess
Casamassima, James’s story develops out of Hyacinth’s reaction to that meet-
ing. And Hyacinth is prepared for his encounter at the play by his own melo-
dramatic lineage: his aristocratic father was murdered by his seamstress mother,
who, like the contemporary melodrama, was a French import to England.
When he wrote the novel, James fully intended to emphasize its action.
Among the stranger literary friendships on record is that between the author
of The Portrait of a Lady and Robert Louis Stevenson, the great adventure
novelist. In December of 1884, Stevenson had expressed his wish that James
would produce “as it were an episode from one of the (so-called) novels of
adventure.”61 Soon after, James began work on The Princess. In a letter to
his brother William, he indicated his plan to make his new novel more excit-
ing than The Bostonians, which had been something of a popular failure.
Henry recalled how William had voiced objection to that book’s “redun-
dancy . . . in the way of descriptive psychology &c.,” a flaw that arose from
his desire “to establish his people solidly.” Henry admits, “I have overdone
it,” but reassures William that The Princess “will be found less tedious, owing
to my having made to myself all the reflections your letter contains, several
months ago, & never ceased to make them since.”62
Still, if this was to be an adventure novel, it was to be a strange one. In
his comments in the Preface to The Princess, written years later for the New
York edition, James remembers that another problem he faced in writing
had to do with how properly to combine its elements of “bewilderment”
and “intelligence.” Readers like bewilderment, so long as it is not accom-
panied by too much intelligence, because intelligence can “endanger” the
action, or “slashing,” “the subject-matter of any self-respecting story.”63 James’s
nervousness about overt action comes out in his use of the word “slashing,”
which suggests the unattractive and dangerous violence of plot. Unusually,
these remarks seem to align “bewilderment” with action rather than with
consciousness, as though hinting that “what happens” will be more confusing
in the novel than “what is thought.” And while (as he indicates in the Preface
by comparing Hyacinth’s situation to that of the Prince of Denmark) we
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are indeed once more in the world of the nineteenth-century Hamlet, where
intelligence threatens to close off the possibility for action, James seems to
be just as concerned that action could close off the possibility for consciousness.64
Nevertheless, contemporary readers recognized the shift in James’s per-
spective in The Princess. The critic for the Saturday Review responded with
excitement to the new form of Jamesian adventure:
Hitherto he has been the poet of the Fine Shades, . . . [He] might be com-
pared with that other philosopher whose aim it was to bring his horse to
live upon a straw per diem. . . . He reduced his readers to a straw (of inci-
dent) per volume, and the novel expired—or went near to expiring—in
his hands. He is now a changed man. He has taken a nearer view of his
art, and has found that the good novelist with decency may comprehend
in his scheme such qualities as action, vigorous emotion, brave incident,
and even romance.65
The Critic gushed about the book in a similar fashion. “Who would ever
have believed that the author of Daisy Miller would ever condescend to
make a real story,” the reviewer asked. Indicating that he had been put to
sleep by The Portrait, he noted how different this latest work was: “Here
is a genuine romance, with conspirators, and harlots, and stabbings, and
jails, and low-lived men and women who drop their h’s, and real incidents,
and strong emotions, and everything ‘in a concatenation accordingly.’”66
Here is a plot-driven novel. Still, there were many dissenting voices. A crit-
ic in the Graphic remarked that while James had “evidently done his
utmost to write a novel with a story in it” (recall the title of James’s late
tale), he had, “to put the case as mildly as possible, not succeeded. . . .
[N]ot the most scornfully plotless of all his works has ever been so vapid
or so dull.”67 The Times protested that “the plot is fearfully stationary,”68
while the reviewer in Punch went a little deeper into the source of the
problem when he argued that James had “used Socialism mainly as a sort
of peg on which to hang certain curiously-conceived and delicately exe-
cuted character-paintings of his own peculiar genre. Possibly that is all
that he wanted it for.”69 Such complaints have persisted. W. J. Harvey
explains, “One way of stating the failure of The Princess Casamassima
would be to say that James is no Dickens, while this is the most
Dickensian of his novels.”70 In other words, he was a writer of novels of
character (“character-paintings of his own peculiar genre”) rather than
those of plot, and he should have stuck to what he knew best.
The unusual ambivalence of the response to The Princess Casamassima
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owes much to James’s choice of the plot at its center. The Princess can be
thought of as James’s attempt to envision action—an attempt that parallels
Eliot’s foray into visionary action in Daniel Deronda. And like Daniel Deronda,
The Princess has elicited an extraordinary amount of attention from critics
concerning either the viability or the historical specificity of the revolutionary
movement at its center. As readers of Eliot’s novel complain about the details
of Daniel’s plans in the East, so commentators on The Princess have won-
dered whether James was depicting anarchists or nihilists or socialists.71 We
saw how obscurity was an essential component of Eliot’s great proto-Zionist
plan in Daniel Deronda. James also chose to focus on a plot that is more or
less impossible to see; in the Preface to the New York edition, he commented
on his hero Hyacinth’s “subterraneous politics and occult affiliations.”72 I
suggested that behind Eliot’s unwillingness to particularize the methods of
Deronda’s revolution lay her desire for that revolution to signify broadly—
to express the possibility for revolutionary idealism in general. James, on
the other hand, kept his plot underground not because of a lack of knowl-
edge about revolutionary activity, nor because of any specific understand-
ing of anarchist groups, but because by doing so, he was once again able to
keep consciousness at the center of his narrative.
The plot in The Princess functions much like the ghost in The Turn of
the Screw: by keeping it invisible and unknowable, James was able to main-
tain his focus on Hyacinth’s sense of the plot, even as he explored the polit-
ical realm. Irving Howe has written that “there are times when The Princess
Casamassima seems almost to evade its own theme. Everything is prepared
for but little is revealed, doors open upon doors, curtains onto curtains.”
Yet this process of delving deeper and deeper into our fundamental igno-
rance of the reality of the situation (an examination of consciousness)—and
not “the nature and power of social radicalism” (an examination of
action)—represents what I would call, using Howe’s phrase, “the central brute
fact of the novel.”73 This is not to say that the decision to focus on con-
temporary radical politics was a random one; rather, James was interested
in the relationship between the structure of such plots and action more gen-
erally, in both the modern world and the fictional realm. James’s claim is a
truly startling one: that action is essentially unknowable, that all we can really
know about is a mind conscious of a plot.74 And while, in this novel from
his middle phase, James supports his point about action by leaning upon a
“real” underground plot, in his later works, he will expand his claim about
the inscrutability of deeds and events. Much simpler “happenings” will be
presented as impossible to establish. In fact, his extraordinary late style can
be thought of in part as a development of his struggle to envision the new
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forms of action. So underground revolutionary activity can stand in for action-
in-general in the Epipolie of our daily lives. Realistic action is inscrutable
action, what the Preface to The Princess so curiously calls “bewilderment.”
Politics also provided James with a particularly convenient venue in which
to stage a contest between action and vision. If the shape of action has indeed
changed, then the competition between the life of action and the life of
the mind is no longer the simple opposition between external and inter-
nal that it once seemed to be; recall how the Preface remarks upon “the
unreality of the sharp distinction, where the interest of observation is at
stake, between doing and feeling.”75 In fact, in James’s writing one could
argue that the categories have been transposed. We are as far as we could
possibly be from the clarity of Homeric epic action. It is the life of the mind,
as represented by Hyacinth’s typically Jamesian aestheticism, that is visi-
ble; the life of action, in contrast, is impossible to see. Indeed, the real “plot”
of The Princess consists of Hyacinth’s choice between action and vision, between
the invisible plot in which he engages himself and the vision of culture he
comes to love: “It made him even rather faint to think that he must choose;
that he couldn’t (with any respect for his own consistency) work, under-
ground, for the enthronement of democracy, and continue to enjoy, in how-
ever platonic a manner, a spectacle which rested on a hideous social inequality”
(165). Spectacles, and all forms of the specular, abound in the novel, but
they have little to do with politics.76 James’s frequent focus on the visual
arts (sculpture, painting, architecture, even bookbinding) as opposed to
less material forms of culture such as music and poetry is notable in this
regard. His characters sometimes seem to hold on to objects as anchors of
knowledge in an unknowable and ever-changing universe.
So by pulling his action underground, James, like Eliot (whom he again
invokes in this Preface77), succeeds in placing “a lively inward revolution”
at the center of even his most overtly political novel.78 He transforms action—
what was once an external, objective category—into something that is very
much subjective. And once again, this transformation of action results in a
novel in which the political becomes subsumed by the personal. In a world
“where ignorant armies clash by night,” being “true to one another”
becomes the most essential form of morality.
The Princess Casamassima
To understand how the contest between action and vision plays out, one
must turn to the plot at the center of The Princess Casamassima. We first
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hear of the plot when Muniment asks Hyacinth whether he can “keep a
secret”—that is, keep something hidden. Hyacinth replies with excite-
ment, “Is it a plot—a conspiracy?” He expresses a longing for a reason to
act: “If you have some plan, something to which one might give oneself, I
think you might have told me” (128). “Will you tell me all about your
plot?” he implores. But the response could have come from James himself:
“Oh, it’s no plot. I don’t think I care much for plots” (130). What it is
instead, Paul tells Hyacinth, is a “little movement”—reminding one of
James’s comment on the current state of England: “The air is full of events,
of changes, of movement (some people would say of revolution, but I don’t
think that).” The word is intentionally indeterminate: plot suggests an
organized plan; movement can be not only haphazard but even aimless. In
fact, Hyacinth’s political naiveté is indicated by his asking Muniment,
“Don’t you belong to the party of action?” Muniment responds scathing-
ly: “Look at the way he has picked up all the silly bits of catchwords! . . .
You must have got that precious phrase out of the newspapers, out of some
driveling leader. Is that the party you want to belong to?” (151).
The simple answer to this question is “yes.” Hyacinth’s yearning for mem-
bership in the party of action becomes evident in the scene at the Sun and
Moon in which he commits himself to the plot. The scene closely parallels
the discussion at the Hand and Banner in Eliot’s Daniel Deronda.79 But the
clubs’ names reveal the differences between the political stances of their authors:
if Eliot called her club the “Hand and Banner” in an effort to suggest, ulti-
mately, that raising a banner might effect the raising of hands and the form-
ing of nations, James’s “Sun and Moon” intimates that the club members
might as well be stargazing, for all their discussion is likely to achieve. After
all, the real revolutionary threat of the novel is well hidden from such bright
lights. And while Eliot respected her club, filling it with intelligent, sincere
men, James cannot avert his gaze from the “hideously papered walls” of his
“little clubroom” (251).
The difference between the two scenes also comes out in James’s distant
echo of Eliot’s use of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound. I argued how impor-
tant Shelley and his poem were to Eliot’s vision of political idealism. As Daniel
first enters the room, she has a character quote the avalanche metaphor from
the poem, precisely those lines that most reflect idealistic hope: “As
thought by thought is piled, till some great truth / Is loosened and the nations
echo round.”80 As though he had read Eliot’s novel, Hyacinth imagines an
answer to the great question (familiar to readers both of Eliot and of James),
“Ah, what could he do?”:
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If he had a definite wish while he stood there it was that that exalted,
deluded company should pour itself forth, with Muniment at its head, and
surge through the sleeping city, gathering the myriad miserable out of
their slums and burrows, and roll into the selfish squares, and lift a
tremendous hungry voice, and awaken the gorged indifferent to a terror
that would bring them down. (293)
In stirring language, James has Hyacinth refigure Shelley’s avalanche of
thought as a supremely physical revolutionary riot that will sweep through
the land, a second French Revolution in all its glory. That is to say, he is
imagining the very force from which Eliot backed away with a fear that
led her to replace it with revolutions of thought. What terrified Eliot,
James fantasizes about along with his hero.
But only because he cannot really believe that things would happen this
way. Nothing could be farther from such a conception of heroic revolutionary
action than the plot at the center of The Princess. Straightforward revolu-
tion belongs to the distant past; it has become the subject of nostalgia. Even
Poupin, who is described as “a Republican of the old-fashioned sort, of the
note of 1848” (114), recalls fondly the “irresistible force” of “’89” (125).
Paul mockingly expresses Hyacinth’s naïve views for Lady Aurora by refer-
ring to the French Revolution: “The principal conclusion that Mr.
Robinson sees his way to . . . is that your father ought to have his head chopped
off and carried on a pike” (139). Hyacinth, the grandson of a Parisian rev-
olutionary, goes to Paris (like Clough) as a tourist rather than a political
activist. There, far from the field of his own particular battle (and only after
he has lost his revolutionary faith), he experiences his strongest impression
of what he calls “the great legend of the French Revolution, sanguinary and
heroic,” which he describes in terms of the language of nostalgia so rele-
vant to the tourist’s mode that I explored in chapter 2.
If the French Revolution stands for action, inaction characterizes the mod-
ern revolution. Paul carelessly defends his willingness to allow Hyacinth to
join the plot by pointing to his friend’s love of action: “You like a lot of things
I don’t. You like excitement and emotion and change, . . . whereas I go in
for a holy calm, for sweet repose.” Hyacinth counters, “If you object, for
yourself, to change, and are so fond of still waters, why have you associated
yourself with a revolutionary movement?” Paul’s response sounds a death
knell for Hyacinth: “Just for that reason! . . . Isn’t our revolutionary move-
ment as quiet as the grave?” (442). And it is—precisely because of the way
in which James has buried his plot. When Hyacinth later demands, “in God’s
name, why don’t we do something? . . . There are plenty of us ready,” Paul
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replies, “Ready for what? There is nothing to be done here” (295). In his
review of the novel, R. H. Hutton made the connection between James’s
revolutionists and the rest of society explicit in his analysis of Paul
Muniment: “Yet so far as Mr. Henry James permits us to judge of his char-
acters, no one of them is more completely adrift, no one of them knows less
what he intends to do by way of revolutionizing society, or how it can be
done so as to substitute a more tolerable system for the existing system of
laissez faire, than this same hero of the revolutionary party, Paul
Muniment.”81 By invoking the specter of laissez-faire in his discussion of
the plot, Hutton shows how James’s imagination of revolution resembles
Carlylean “Donothingism”: his radicals have evolved out of the society against
which they are fighting. Paul himself explains, “an economy of heroism was
an advantage to any cause” (288; emphasis added).
Perhaps the clearest sign of the gap between the new revolutionists and
the old comes from James’s insistence that the real modern expression of
the French Revolution can be found in that working-class Britannia of the
Market Place, Millicent Henning.82 If Paul is indeed the apostle of
donothingism, Millicent is a Marianne dressed in the most up-to-date fash-
ions: “Hyacinth could easily see her (if there should ever be barricades in
the streets of London), with a red cap of liberty on her head and her white
throat bared so she should be able to shout the louder the Marseillaise of
that hour, whatever it might be” (161). As a department-store employee,
she shows how the river of revolution has been redirected into the less dan-
gerous streams of consumer politics. Nevertheless, Hyacinth recognizes in
Millicent a “primitive, half-childish, half-plebeian impulse of destruction,
the instinct of pulling down what was above her, the reckless energy that
would, precisely, make her so effective in revolutionary scenes” (268). Her
undeniable attraction to readers stems from the contrast between her
energy and the enervated world in which she moves.
The confusion of heroic roles in James’s novel can seen more clearly by
comparison with another political work from the period. In Disraeli’s
Lothair (1870), which deals in part with the real role of secret societies in
the establishment of an Italian nation, these societies are known as Mary-
Anne associations.83 They are given a visible leadership more important to
the cause than even Garibaldi in Theodora, the tragic heroine of the novel.
The modern incarnation of Marianne, Theodora leads her troops forward,
as in Delacroix’s great painting of 1830.84 But for all his legendary political
acuity and his famous restlessness, even Disraeli has trouble envisioning a
successful political plot. While his discipleship under Aristotle is evident in
the General’s motto—“Action may not always be happiness, . . . but there
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is no happiness without action”85—Theodora herself is like Paul an “admirer
of repose,” acknowledging, “I dislike plots . . . ; they always fail.”86 Indeed
the plot does fail, and Theodora dies of wounds received on the battlefield.
The underground revolutionary movement Hyacinth joins has little to
do with Marianne-like heroism. Hyacinth longs for the day on which Muniment
will reveal all to him, will choose to “exert” his “influence”: “it would not
be till then, he was sure, that they would all know where they were, and
that the good they were striving for, blindly, obstructedly, in a kind of dirty
intellectual fog, would pass from the stage of crude discussion and mere
sharp, tantalizing desirableness into that of irresistible reality” (281). But
that day never comes. Rather, as Paul notes, it is precisely the “very fact of
the impunity, the invisibility, of the persons involved in it” that gives the
movement its force (288). This force leads the Princess to ask her great ques-
tion:
I want to know à quoi m’en tenir. Are we on the eve of great changes, or
are we not? Is everything that is gathering force underground, in the dark,
in the night, in little rooms, out of sight of governments and policemen
and idiotic “statesmen”—heaven save them!—is all this going to burst
forth some fine morning and set the world on fire? Or is it to sputter out
and spend itself in vain conspiracies, be dissipated in sterile heroisms and
abortive isolated movements? (200)
The Princess appears as unsure of what is happening as readers of James’s
late novels tend to be. In fact, such a feeling of not knowing what is going
on is the great underlying condition of James’s novel.
In this work from his middle period, James repeatedly describes the plot
in an opaque, indefinite language that anticipates his late style—as though
that style were itself a version of a nostalgia for comprehensible action, incor-
porating the new sense of action as fundamentally unknowable and invis-
ible. Paul admits, “I quite agree with you that the time has come to settle
upon it and to follow it” (290), but what is the “it” to be settled, and how?
The conspirators at the Sun and Moon expound similar abstractions:
“What they wanted was to put forth their might without any more palaver;
to do something, or for someone; to go out somewhere and smash some-
thing, on the spot—why not?—that very night” (291). Only the “fat man”
voices a (surely understandable) desire for more specifics: “I want to have
it all drawn up first; then I’ll go in” (289). His words recall by contrast James’s
own comments on his intention in The Portrait not to constrain his hero-
ine in a plot, where his resistance to plot expressed his wish to preserve his
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characters’ free agency. But James is not unlike the fat man; he wrote with
some worry in his notebooks for The Princess, “I have never yet become engaged
in a novel in which, after I had begun to write . . . the details remained so
vague.”87 And while Hyacinth also expresses his urge toward action in vague
terms (“I am ready to do anything that will do any good; anything, any-
thing—I don’t care a rap” [294]), he yearns after something more definite:
an embodied leader.
Muniment lures him into the web of plot with the promise of visible lead-
ership: “Should you like to see the genuine article, Robinson?” (295). Hyacinth
does eventually see the genuine article, although the reader is not privy to
the meeting, hearing about it only afterward. To get to the real thing, Hyacinth
must be led through a physical manifestation of the mists in which it is shrouded:
by the time the cab taking him to Hoffendahl stops, “Hyacinth had totally
lost, in the drizzling gloom, a sense of their whereabouts” (296).
Hoffendahl stands in the novel as a surrogate for God, a kind of Prime Mover
of the movement.88 When Hyacinth later describes his encounter with the
great man to the Princess, he tells how he has now “been in the innermost
sanctuary—I have seen the holy of holies” (330). The revolution is “real”
and “solid,” he insists, though well hidden. In Hoffendahl, Hyacinth
thinks he finds just what he was looking for: “a man who was the very incar-
nation of a programme” (328). This embodiedness is what makes him “jump
at” participation in the plot; “it was just what I was looking for,” he tells
Paul (447).
Such visibility matters because of the relationship between belief and action.
To see is to believe, and Hoffendahl, once seen, represents something Hyacinth
can have faith in. After the Princess tells Hyacinth that “You make me believe
it”—that is, believe the revolution will happen—Hyacinth replies, “It mat-
ters little whether one believes it or not!” (330). Yet it could not matter more.
The Princess says of “convictions,” “Having them is nothing. It’s the act-
ing on them” (451). But (as the case of Arthur Hugh Clough demonstrates)
it can be hard to act without them. Questions of belief play a central role
in many late-nineteenth-century novels about underground political
movements precisely because of their concern for the possibility of politi-
cal action. In part, anarchist movements were seen as the direct develop-
ment of the loss of religious conviction. Julia Wedgewood (the niece of Charles
Darwin) noted in her review of James’s novel that it explored one of the
kinds of faith with which religion was replaced: “Princess Casamassima is
. . . a picture of the seething revolutionary energy and feverish destructive-
ness which has, to many in our day, taken the place of the Christianity they
have abandoned.”89 In Ivan Turgenev’s Virgin Soil (1877) the hero
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Nezhdanov pledges himself to an underground cause but later commits sui-
cide when he discovers that he has lost faith in it—“I don’t believe in it! I
don’t believe in it!”90—in part because, like Hyacinth, he has a delicate appre-
ciation for culture. Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Demons (1872), another novel that
explores contemporary radical politics, describes how Pyotr Verkhovensky,
the chief instigator and archplotter of the local underground movement,
looks to the hero Stavrogin to play the lead. As Stavrogin puts it, he is “con-
vinced that I could ‘raise their banner.’ . . . He’s taken it into his head that
I could play the role of Stenka Razin for them.”91 For all his charisma, Stavrogin’s
extreme ennui, his passivity, and his inability to commit himself to any cause
or purpose would seem to rule him out for the role of revolutionary hero.
But as Verkhovensky recognizes, all that is really required is a semblance of
leadership—for a few people to be able to say, “We’ve seen him, we’ve seen
him”—“The main thing is the legend!”92 Demons finally suggests that the
only solution to social injustice is to be found through a return to native
religion.
James is by far the most secular of the writers I have looked at, yet ques-
tions of belief are crucial to him, not least because, as his brother William
also recognized, conviction and action are intrinsically related. In “The Will
to Believe,” his best-known treatment of the relationship between faith and
action, William James pointed out that all action depends upon a form of
belief: “The maximum of liveness in a hypothesis means willingness to act
irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing ten-
dency wherever there is willingness to act at all.”93 Appropriately, William
turned repeatedly in the essay to the poetry of Clough to argue his central
premise. Referring to the line “If hopes are dupes, fears may be liars” (from
“Say not the struggle naught availeth”), William commented: “Dupery for
dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than
dupery through fear?”94
“Dupery through hope” would be one way in which to express
Hyacinth’s tragedy. Hoffendahl’s very name—hoffen means “to hope” in German—
indicates the degree to which he figures as the promised redeemer. But like
Christ’s, his heroism lies as much in his suffering as in his deeds. When the
members at the Sun and Moon ask, “What the devil has he done then?”
Muniment replies that “he had spent twelve years in a Prussian prison” (287).
James tells us of Hyacinth’s “intense desire to stand face-to-face with the
sublime Hoffendahl, to hear his voice, to touch his mutilated hand” (291).
Again, the expressed desire for a visible leader, but Hoffendahl’s mutilation
suggests a limited ability to act; Hyacinth calls him “extraordinarily quiet”
during their meeting (331). Hence his own role in the plot. When the Princess,
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thinking of Hoffendahl’s order, asks Paul, “Wouldn’t someone else do his
work just as well,” Paul pretends to see in her question a reference to Hyacinth’s
skills as a bookbinder: “His work? Why, I’m told he’s a master hand” (453).95
But Paul knows perfectly well what the Princess meant, and the only kind
of “hand” he needs Hyacinth to be is a decidedly servile one to act as a pros-
thetic for Hoffendahl.
Like Daniel Deronda, Hyacinth feels himself to be chosen: “I struck him
[Hoffendahl] as the right person” (331). He speaks in the excited tones of
the religious convert, exclaiming that he “had taken a vow of blind obedi-
ence, as the Jesuit fathers did to the head of their order” (333). But unlike
in Eliot’s work, here such sense of a vocation brings no safety for action here.
Ominously, Hyacinth himself describes the plot as a theatrical dress
rehearsal—hardly the most ennobling of comparisons:
In silence, in darkness, but under the feet of each one of us, the revolu-
tion lives and works. It is a wonderful, immeasurable trap, on the lid of
which society performs its antics. When once the theater is complete,
there will be a great rehearsal. The rehearsal is what they want me for. The
invisible, impalpable wires are everywhere, passing through everything,
attaching themselves to objects in which one would never think of look-
ing for them. (330)96
While the image suggests the kind of melodrama that made theater such
a frequent metaphor for the great actions of the French Revolution,
Hoffendahl’s plot plays itself out on a diminished stage, and Hyacinth is
to appear rather as a puppet understudy than as a genuine actor.97
Hoffendahl handles the wires of Hyacinth’s movements—the threads of the
web of action reenvisioned—like a puppeteer, reigning supreme over his
little theater of revolution: “he made me see, he made me feel, he made me
do, everything he wanted” (330). Yet what Hoffendahl wants will in effect
turn one of those “innumerable” wires into a “noose” to slip over
Hyacinth’s head (331). One is reminded of the puppeteer metaphor used
by Thackeray in Vanity Fair (1848). Or, given that Hyacinth insists that
the plot depends upon “immense coincidence” (334), of the intricacies of
Dickensian plotting. Such forms of control, though, are the opposite of the
freedom that James had envisioned for his characters.
As the stage metaphor also suggests, Hyacinth needs to have faith
because of a problem of perspective: he can’t see everything that is happening.
But then again, no one can: not the audience, not the performers, not even
the director or puppetmaster. And this problem is due to the nature of 
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collective action. Irving Howe complains that “[James] had no larger view
of politics as collective action.”98 But part of what James wanted to show
was precisely that collective action cannot be “viewed” in the same way one
views the deeds of an individual. In his review of The Princess, R. H. Hutton
pointed to the paradox inherent in James’s hidden plot—the way it simul-
taneously represents an increased focus on action and the repudiation of
it—by looking at the role of “incident” in the novel: “It has hardly any inci-
dent, unless the tendency of the whole network of circumstance and char-
acter to the tragedy with which the third volume abruptly closes [that is,
Hyacinth’s suicide] may be regarded as in itself constituting a single mas-
sive incident.”99 Hutton’s use of the word network here is striking. His descrip-
tion of the plot recalls Hyacinth’s: “he didn’t pretend to know what good
his little job might do, or what portee it might have; he hadn’t the data for
appreciating it. . . . The thing was to be a feature in a very large plan, of
which he couldn’t measure the scope—something that was to be done simul-
taneously in a dozen different countries. The effect was to be very much in
this immense coincidence” (334).
Advocacy of such cell-like action, where agents perform in isolation, unaware
of the overall structure of the plan, was a well-known and distinguishing
feature of radical political organizations. In Demons, Dostoevsky described
in detail the workings of a “program of action” composed of individual “knots”
in “an infinite network of knots,” owing “blind obedience to the center.”100
But such networking can also be thought of as typical of the way action
works in the laissez-faire world. We saw in chapter 2 how E. S. Dallas attrib-
uted the rise of the novel to the predominance in the modern world of acts
whose force is cumulative rather than individual—like the working of the
marketplace—a shift that brought “the little men and the private men and
all the little incidents of privacy” “into repute.”101 The language of social
science, which we have already encountered in James’s description of Paul
Muniment, also slips into Hyacinth’s description of the plot, with its depen-
dence on “data.” And “Little Hyacinth”—whose smallness renders him suit-
able to the “little job” (334) at hand—represents the modern little man.
Like conspirators in an anarchist plot, all of us can have but the faintest
conception of how our little piece of the web of action fits into the whole.
The kind of “half knowledge” that such plotting allows must have fas-
cinated James, given his artistic concern with point of view. So often, the
moral interest in his novels comes from characters’—and readers’—
attempts to grasp the nature of the thoughts and actions of others: how much
does Milly Theale see of Merton and Kate’s plan? What does Maisie know?
The way that an understanding of The Golden Bowl (1904) can be pieced
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together only by assimilating partial knowledge from a variety of positions
resembles the way that actors in anarchist plots can have only partial knowl-
edge of how their deeds fit into the overall plan of action. Plot occurs on
a different level from that occupied by the individual consciousness, exist-
ing both outside its control and beyond its knowledge. So Hyacinth does
not get to see beyond his little piece of the action. But neither do we as read-
ers. To see the whole plot would be to destroy its power. No one really knows
everything that is happening, not even (Paul’s ambitions suggest)
Hoffendahl. One must act on faith.
Yet Hyacinth’s tragedy arises explicitly from a crisis of belief, and this cri-
sis derives from the problem of invisibility. His attraction to the products
of culture—the attraction that causes him to lose faith in a movement that
would willingly sacrifice such products—stems from his susceptibility to
the sensory, his supreme capacity for “watching” (34), his participation in
his author’s delicate sensitivity to beauty. As James writes, expressing the
purest form of the conflict between action and vision presented by the novel,
“the growth of his reluctance to act for the ‘party of action’” had been “the
simple extension of his observation” (582). How can someone so commit-
ted to the sensory attach himself to a movement that not only has no appre-
ciation for the sensory, but that he is unable to see?
One way to express the strangely apolitical affect of The Princess is to say
that the Hoffendahl plot, while formally interesting to James, serves as a
kind of screening mechanism, covering the emotional heart of the novel.
This, it turns out, is personal rather than political—although these two cat-
egories will prove hard for James to differentiate between. The crisis of
belief his hero suffers demonstrates the conflation. Hyacinth cannot help
asking Paul for an explanation of the effect of his part of the plot, “exact-
ly what good” he thinks “it will do” (444). The question indicates how
belief becomes tenuous in an atmosphere of obscurity. And Paul recognizes
the problem: “If you’ve ceased to believe we can do anything, it will be
rather awkward, you know” (445). Hyacinth responds by declaring his
religion: “I don’t know that I believe exactly what you believe, but I believe
in you, and doesn’t that come to the same thing?” (446). It doesn’t, as
Hyacinth himself discovers. James tells us that in Paris, when Hyacinth
undergoes that great change of opinion that marks the “inward revolution”
described by the Preface to the novel, he asks himself a question: “‘How
could he—how could he—?’ It may be explained that ‘he’ was a reference
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to Paul Muniment; for Hyacinth had dreamed of the religion of friendship”
(393–94). The end of this dream marks the end of Hyacinth’s faith in his
part of the plot.
His dilemma comes from his awareness that in Paul Muniment, he has
been betrayed by the only real embodiment of the revolution. He may have
met Hoffendahl once, but the physical presence of the movement—and the
moral weight of James’s story—rests squarely on Muniment’s monumental
shoulders. Paul personifies the revolution not only for Hyacinth, but also
for Christina. Even her great question—“I want to know à quoi m’en tenir.
Are we on the eve of great changes, or are we not?”—suggests that the polit-
ical plot needs to be approached from a personal angle. She expresses her-
self in the language of pent-up sexual energy, of a growing underground
“force” that she fears will never “burst forth,” but will “sputter out and spend
itself,” leaving “heroism” “sterile” and “movement” “abortive” (200). So while
the novel strangely lacks menace in regard to the possible onset of revolu-
tion, it succeeds in presenting both the prevailing mode of invisible power
and Hyacinth and the Princess’s joint longing for a leader who can give expres-
sion to that obscure force: that is, their longing for Paul Muniment.
James would have agreed with E. M. Forster’s oft-quoted declaration: “if
I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I
hope I should have the guts to betray my country.”102 The emphasis on per-
sonal betrayal sets The Princess Casamassima apart from many contempo-
rary works that deal with radical political movements.103 For all the novel’s
posited opposition between culture and anarchy, it is not really, or at least
primarily, about ideology; the moral sense of the novel feels oddly discon-
nected from its radical politics. To employ the distinction Dostoevsky sets
forth in Demons, James seems to have eaten—rather than have been eaten
by—an idea.104 Usually, the central ethical dilemma presented by novels of
radical politics lies in the threat of random violence. In swearing to take
part in an anarchist plot, one demonstrates not only a willingness to sacri-
fice oneself but also a willingness to sacrifice the innocent. Demons concludes
with a barrage of deaths—murders, accidents, and suicides—all the result
of a botched conspiracy. Among the dead are several significant characters
in the novel and many innocents, including a newborn baby. Similarly, in
Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent, a young man, Stevie, is blown to bits while
unknowingly helping his anarchist brother-in-law Verloc set a bomb in the
Greenwich Observatory. Conrad emphasizes Stevie’s guiltlessness to the point
of making him an “innocent”—“half an idiot.”105 So while the public cost
of Conrad’s anarchist plot does turn out to be a private one (as the
Assistant Commissioner puts it, “From a certain point of view we are here
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in the presence of a domestic drama”106), Conrad leaves the reader with a
strong sense of concern for the phenomenon of collateral damage. In con-
trast, in James’s novel the only innocent really harmed by the plot is Hyacinth
himself. James’s imagination of good and evil is so intensely personal that
although Hyacinth has been asked to kill a man, this death seems hardly
to figure in the moral balance. Unlike Dostoevsky and Conrad, James never
introduces us to the nameless intended victim, who, to an even greater extent
than the conspirators, remains in the shadows.
That Hyacinth’s recognition that his friendship has been betrayed—not
only by Paul, but also by the Princess and by Millicent—stands as the cli-
max of the novel suggests a deep connection between its private and polit-
ical plotlines. James hints at this link in his Preface in arguing that
Hyacinth needed to be given “a social—not less than a socialist connexion.”107
As W. J. Harvey remarks of James’s comment: “The word social, then, in
one direction, leads off to socialite and the Princess, in another to socialist
and Paul Muniment. Trapped in this pun is the hero, Hyacinth
Robinson.”108 Yet the pun also contains in it a pointed commentary on the
position of politics in modern society. Consider Hannah Arendt’s analysis:
“with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the ‘household’ (oikia) or of eco-
nomic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining
formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a ‘collective’ con-
cern.”109 As George Eliot’s writing demonstrated, the tendency to conflate
the social and political realms played a large role in the Victorian political
imagination, especially with regard to the elevation of the domestic sphere.
In this novel, however, the domestic realm is as embattled as the politi-
cal realm. Those few biological families we encounter seem doomed to dis-
aster: Lady Aurora feels herself an alien in her own home,110 and Millicent
comes from a house of poverty and chaos to which she never wishes to return.
Notably, the strongest family unit we encounter—that of Paul and Rosy—
is also the most sinister. Hyacinth, as an orphan, an individual separate from
all collective concerns, becomes involved in a series of groups that stand in
lieu of a family. He sometimes seems to be “shopping for a family,” as Americans
now sometimes speak of shopping for a church. Miss Pinnie and Mr. Vetch,
the Poupins, Paul and Rosy, the Princess and Madame Grandoni,
Millicent, even Lady Aurora: each offers Hyacinth an opportunity to cre-
ate a substitute family of his own. As the list suggests, these societies do not
necessarily exist in opposition to the secret society of the conspirators; Arendt
describes how “in the modern world, the social and the political realms are
much less distinct.” In The Princess, family structures appear as flowing and
indeterminate—and as insecure—as political ones.
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Like family, marriage does not fare well in the novel. The Princess is in
England playing at revolution in order to escape from an unhappy marriage.
The Poupins, the only really contented couple in the book, are not legally
married. Hyacinth’s father’s unwillingness to marry his mother occasioned
the tragedy of his birth. And the potential for marriage seems oddly absent
from the work, especially given its strong atmosphere of sexual attraction.
In The Princess, James has created a complex web of overlapping desire. Everyone
desires the Princess, except, maybe, Paul—and he wants her money.
Several characters—Christina, Lady Aurora, and Hyacinth—desire Paul. Captain
Sholto and Hyacinth also seem to want Millicent. And Millicent feels attracted
to both of them, in different ways. She offers Hyacinth the most promis-
ing prospect of a love interest—at least she is single—but the prevailing atmos-
phere of attraction is too confusing to stimulate any particular action. Nor
does the reader sense genuine potential for legally sanctioned sexual con-
nections.
In fact, James refuses to indulge in the idea of safe domesticity that so
fascinated Eliot, a refusal he indicates in part by conflating his private and
his political plot. Both these forms of action are subject to the same dan-
ger we saw in The Portrait of a Lady: the transformation of a “doing” into
a “doing with.” In the closing pages of book 1, Mr. Vetch demonstrates the
link between the two modes. Worrying about Hyacinth’s connection to Millicent,
Mr. Vetch turns to the familiar formulation: “‘What will she do with you?’
he inquired at last” (172). Yet the degree to which the revolution also treats
people as means to an end is emphasized by the fact that the Princess, who
quite happily considers Hyacinth as a valuable addition to her collection of
democrats (346), remains valuable to Paul only as long as her husband’s money
keeps flowing: “when I find you have nothing more to give to the cause I
will let you go” (576), he tells her. Her response: “You are only using me—
only using us all” (578). And for all Mr. Vetch’s fears that Hyacinth will be
trapped in a marriage plot, he recognizes an even greater danger with regard
to revolutionary plots. He almost immediately repeats his question, this time
turning his attentions toward Paul: “And what will he do with you?” (173;
James’s emphasis).
The conflation between the two plots, political and private, emerges in
the metaphor of the “vow” by which Hyacinth enters into his “engagement”;
James uses both words to describe Hyacinth’s pledge to Hoffendahl. After
Hyacinth declares that “he would never marry at all—to that his mind was
absolutely made up” (105), the vow to act for the revolution takes the place
of a marriage vow in the narrative. The most famous example of the speech
act is the “I do” of the marriage vow. Yet a political vow like that pledged
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by Hyacinth can also be thought of as “the ultimate political speech-act,”
as Taylor Stoehr has characterized it.111 So Hyacinth’s promise can be looked
on as a kind of bridge between word and deed, one James must have found
very attractive as a novelist concerned with the moral dilemmas posed by
the commitment of one’s life to words rather than deeds. The political vow
at the center of The Princess occasions the same moral dilemma as the mar-
riage vow at the center of The Portrait: both Hyacinth and Isabel find them-
selves pledged to commitments in which, because of personal betrayals, they
no longer believe. The connection demonstrates once again the intimacy of
the link between revolutionary and courtship plots; the focus on the act of
avowal also shows how for James, issues of both ethics and action often become
issues of language.
James repeatedly emphasizes the sacramental quality of Hyacinth’s vow.
Consider Hyacinth’s formulations of it: “I pledged myself, by everything
that is sacred,” “I took a vow—a tremendous, terrible vow—in the pres-
ence of four witnesses” (327). Later, the Princess tries to play down the sig-
nificance of the “famous engagement” or “vow” by comparing it to “some
silly humbug in a novel” (485). And if it does often sound as if we were in
a novel by Trollope, say, in which Hyacinth finds he has proposed to the
wrong girl. His Sun and Moon friends attempt to release him from his pledge—
notably, by advocating passivity: “We want you to do nothing, because we
know you have changed. . . . [T]hat alters everything.” But Hyacinth, as a
man of honor, sees things differently: “Does it alter my engagement? There
are some things in which one can’t change. I didn’t promise to believe. I
promised to obey” (551)—as if asserting the bride’s vow of obedience from
the traditional marriage ceremony. Moreover, the positioning of the vow in
the narrative contributes to the reader’s sense of the political plot as an ersatz
marriage plot. After Hyacinth’s confused cab ride through the streets of London
to meet Hoffendahl, book 2 ends abruptly. When the narrative resumes,
we see Hyacinth awakening in the Princess’s home at Medley, as though on
the first morning of their honeymoon—and in fact, the stay at Medley has
something of the sweetness of a honeymoon, a lull before the action of real
life must recommence. As James tells us, “Hyacinth . . . felt at times almost
as if he were married to his hostess” (482).
But the private aspects of Hyacinth’s engagement can also be considered in
light of another social phenomenon: that of dandyism. Like Isabel Archer’s,
Hyacinth’s yearning for action belies a deep-seated passivity, an association with
“the idea of suffering” (159). But Howe’s rather typical complaint about this
passivity suggests the new context for understanding it: “Hyacinth Robinson
. . . is one of the most passive of James’s heroes. . . . It is his languorous 
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passivity, far more than anything he actually says or does, that constitutes his
snobbism.”112 Manfred Mackenzie has argued that Hyacinth’s desire for exclu-
sivity (a manifestation of his “snobbism”) leads to his desire to belong to a secret
society.113 Such “exclusivism” has been identified by Ellen Moers as an essen-
tial component of the dandy’s code.114 And James actually describes the Sun
and Moon as a kind of “gentleman’s club”; as Muniment puts it, it is like one
of those “flaming big shops, full of armchairs and flunkies, in Pall Mall” (209).
Indeed Hyacinth’s very name brands him a dandy.
Moers also points out that “throughout the nineteenth century the rising
majority called for equality, responsibility, energy; the dandy stood for supe-
riority, irresponsibility, inactivity.” Refusing other forms of action, “the
dandy’s achievement is simply to be himself.” And as Moers recognizes, this
insistence on selfhood contains in the denial of conventional standards its own
element of revolution.115 It also represents a preeminently visible statement of
identity; the dandy’s creed can be seen in the clothes he wears. In fact, Hyacinth
becomes more of a dandy after he has taken his revolutionary vow to action.
Moers’s analysis of the paradox inherent in dandyism—the way in which it
implies a form of revolution based on inaction rather than action and closely
related to the preservation of a coherent and independent self—suggests why
dandies figure so prominently in the works I have considered. The dandy’s
reign overlaps precisely with the timeframe of this study: it begins in the Romantic
period and concludes with the great aesthetes of the fin de siècle—as Moers
has it, it lasts from “Brummel to Beerbohm.” Hyacinth is a descendant both
of Byron’s Don Juan and of Clough’s Claude, who share many of his dandy-
ish qualities. But Hyacinth’s passivity also characterizes many other heroes of
revolutionary novels—including, for that matter, Paul Muniment.
Nezhdanov’s Hamletism (that is, active consciousness and passive body) has
already been noted, as has Verloc’s luggish laziness. Dostoevsky’s Stavrogin,
the antihero of Demons, also displays both the fastidiousness and the ennui
of the dandy. The passive revolutionist represents a personification of the lit-
erary trend toward internalizing revolution in order to assert character.
But for all that Hyacinth asserts his identity through his dandyish quality,
his membership in the collective of the (albeit exclusive) secret society of rev-
olutionists also divests him of his individual agency. Mackenzie remarks on
Hyacinth’s desire to enter the plot in order to make up for his orphaned, out-
sider position in society: “Committing himself to Hoffendahl . . . he might at
last be ‘more.’ He is. It is a pathetic and terrible autonomy that James expresses
by a remarkable withdrawal; for a moment it is as if there were no story. How
can a nobody, who in the effort to give himself a story only depersonalized
himself, quite have a story?”116 Mackenkzie recognizes that the form of self-
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hood (“terrible autonomy”) that Hyacinth’s membership in the secret society
leads him to is a nightmarish rendition of Moer’s selfhood divorced from action
or story. “He is” rather than “he does”—he is patient rather than agent, hav-
ing lost his agency to the group to which he belongs.
Gilbert Osmond’s dandyism (itself a reflection on the dandyism of Eliot’s
Grandcourt) demonstrates that James was well aware of the moral limita-
tions of the type, and we should remember that Hyacinth questions and
combats his own inclinations to be a dandy. James’s interest in the dandy
continues in his next political novel, The Tragic Muse, in which the hero,
Nick Sherringham, is convinced by a dandy friend, Gabriel Nash, to give
up his political career in order to become an artist. Nash’s creed can per-
haps best be summed up by himself: “People’s actions, I know, are, for the
most part, the things they do, but mine are all the things I don’t do. . . .
My only behavior is my feelings.”117 Calling upon that great Jamesian capac-
ity, consciousness, Nash defines what he means by “the agreeable”: “Oh,
the happy moments of our consciousness—the multiplication of those moments.
We must save as many as possible from the dark gulf.”118 Yet while James
may agree with Nash’s version of “the agreeable,” he would wish it to be
expanded to include a moral dimension. Hence James’s significant irony in
his treatment of Nash, who when asked whether he intends to write, to trans-
form those moments of consciousness into something of more lasting (and
communicable) value, responds dismissively in the negative.
Of Hyacinth, in contrast, we hear that “in secret, he wrote” (112).119 Like
James, he values this form of “doing.” Turgenev’s Nezhdanov is a poet, and
James seems to have kept this in mind when he created Hyacinth. James
fashioned Hyacinth to serve as his “vessel of consciousness” precisely
because of his fine nature, the quality of his crystal, because he is “the per-
son capable of feeling in the given case more than another of what is to be
felt for it.”120 Hyacinth is like a Wordsworthian poet, one who sees not dif-
ferently from other men, but more deeply, “endued with more lively sensi-
bility”—with a greater capacity to feel.121 Referring to Hyacinth’s wish to
move from bookbinding to book writing, James informs us that “it had occurred
to Hyacinth more than once that it would be a fine thing to produce a bril-
liant death-song” (404). Whether or not Hyacinth achieves his goal, his final
pose in suicide is that of a poet—of Chatterton, the archetypal Romantic
icon of wasted youth and genius, as captured in the famous Pre-Raphaelite
painting by Henry Wallis (1856): “Hyacinth lay there as if he were asleep.
. . . His arm hung limp beside him, downwards, off the narrow couch; his
face was white and his eyes were closed” (590).
The act of suicide represents Hyacinth’s magnum opus: it is the one thing
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he does, the one work he completes. It is also the end of his action, as it is
the end of his story. We are in fact privy, leading up to the suicide, to a series
of requests that Hyacinth refrain from action. First the Princess, respond-
ing to Mr. Vetch’s sense that she wants Hyacinth “to commit some atroc-
ity, some infamy,” insists, “I don’t want him to do anything in all the wide
world” (468–69).122 Then Hyacinth’s friends at the Sun and Moon tell him
“we want you to do nothing, because we know you have changed” (551).
Finally, in the boldest statement of this sentiment, Mr. Vetch demands a
new vow of Hyacinth: “promise me that you will never, under any circumstances,
do anything” (564). Hyacinth qualifies his promise by responding, “I shall
never do any of their work” (565). But does his suicide qualify as an act?
Derek Brewer sees the suicide as comparable to James’s “retreat from the
life of action” into the world of art—a way out of the “terrible dilemma[s]”
one inevitably faces in the practical realm.123 Like Francis in The White Doe
of Rylstone, Hyacinth faces a situation in which his loyalties conflict. On
the one hand, he wishes to remain true to his vow to Hoffendahl; on the
other hand, his revised beliefs, both political and personal, do not allow him
to fulfill his commission honorably. Suicide stands as “the solution of his
difficulty” (568). Ironically, the act of suicide, the cessation of all possible
future action and vision, replaces that “vision of a great heroism” with which
Hyacinth had been so fatally enamored at the Sun and Moon. He fulfills
his engagement to murder by turning the weapon inward, upon himself.
The temptation to suicide figures prominently not only in the revolu-
tionary novels of the late-nineteenth century but also in many of the ear-
lier works that deal with the crisis in action. It can be found in characters
as diverse as Hamlet, Werther, Arnold’s Empedocles, and Eliot’s Mirah. Demons
contains three suicides, of very different natures: a casual incident describ-
ing a youthful act of desperation, which is treated as a kind of aesthetic enter-
tainment by the gentry of Dostoevsky’s imagined town; Kirillov’s
ideological suicide—suicide as a Schopenhauerian gospel of “self-will”124;
and finally, Stavrogin’s hopeless garret hanging, the discovery of which (like
that of Hyacinth’s suicide) concludes the novel. Turgenev’s Nezhdanov also
finds suicide to be the only escape from his own version of Hyacinth’s dilemma:
“But what could I do? I could find no other way out of it. I could not sim-
plify myself; the only thing left was to blot myself out altogether.”125 Action,
he seems to imply, requires a “simplification” of self that is impossible for
the complex—and often, as with Nezdhanov and Hyacinth, hybrid—mod-
ern individual.126 Caught by the web of Hoffendahl’s plot, Hyacinth
escapes it the only way he knows how, by blotting himself out. Having learnt
that action and vision are incommensurable, he decides to forgo both.
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Departing from his initial position as advocate for the party of action,
Hyacinth has come to recognize that “we must have patience” (517). Henrietta
Stackpole’s concluding advice to Caspar Goodwood also concerned the need
for patience, a patience that Isabel seemed to embrace. Isabel inherited from
Mr. Touchett those very means to liberty that James withholds from
Hyacinth: “freedom and ease, knowledge and power, money, opportunity,
and satiety” (34). But she sacrificed herself to her marriage vow as surely
as Hyacinth sacrifices himself to his political pledge. Yet Hyacinth’s suicide
also parallels Isabel Archer’s decision to return to her marriage in a more
positive sense: it can be thought of as a gesture of authenticity, a reclama-
tion of his own agency from the hands of the puppeteer Hoffendahl. As
Kirillov argues, suicide represents the supreme act of self will, a triumph of
the individual in the face not only of the collective conspiracy of the move-
ment, but also of family history. Hyacinth kills himself precisely to avoid
repeating the story of his mother’s life—“the horror of the public reappearance,
on his part, of the embrued hands of his mother.” As James tells us,
This loathing of the idea of a repetition had not been sharp, strangely
enough, till his summons came; in all his previous meditations the growth
of his reluctance to act for the ‘party of action’ had not been the fear of a
personal stain, but the simple extension of his observation. Yet now the
idea of the personal stain made him horribly sick; it seemed by itself to
make service impossible. (582–83; original emphasis)
In the end, Hyacinth kills himself to reassert himself; the “personal”
trumps the political. By proving an ability to act independently of both
familial precedent and the structure of Hoffendahl’s plotting, Hyacinth
creates a space for truly independent action. To steal a phrase from James’s
description of Isabel, he affronts his destiny.127 Of course in the process, and
to an even greater degree than Isabel Archer did, he destroys himself, and
with that, the potential for future action. It is at best a pyrrhic victory.
James’s experiments in the realm of action in The Princess Casamassima
lead him only farther and farther underground: to the subterraneous pol-
itics of his plot, and ultimately, to Hyacinth’s burial.
Coda: “The Beast in the Jungle”
James’s attitude toward the dialectic between character and action finds its
most allegorical instantiation in “The Beast in the Jungle” (1902). As
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Ruth Bernard Yeazell has put it, “it is almost a parody of the classic
Jamesian plot, and Marcher, that sensitive, passive, and deeply reserved
gentleman, is the quintessential Jamesian hero.”128 Like The Princess
Casamassima, “The Beast” is structured around a secret: while our first
sign of the plot in the novel came when Muniment asked Hyacinth if he
could “keep a secret,” James’s later story develops because John Marcher
had “so breathed his secret” to May Bartram.129 But if The Princess
Casamassima represented a failed revolutionary plot, this tale represents
the apotheosis of the failed marriage plot. Marcher’s discovery after May’s
death that “she was what he had missed” proves to be the only thing to
“happen” in the story (489). So the beast in the jungle can be thought of
as a metaphor for nefarious plot—or really, as it turns out, nefarious plot-
lessness—finally emerging from the darkness.
“The Beast in the Jungle” is also the work that most frequently tempts
James’s critics into the realm of biographical speculation. Leon Edel uses it
as a model upon which to build his voluminous biography: “Was it true
for Henry James, as some have insisted, that like his protagonist in ‘The
Beast in the Jungle’ he was ‘the man of his time, the man, to whom noth-
ing on earth was to have happened’?”130 He then quotes Percy Lubbock in
defense of a biography based on such a premise: “Looked at from without
[James’s] life was uneventful enough. . . . Within, it was a cycle of vivid and
incessant adventure, known only to himself except insofar as he put it into
words.”131 Note how both Lubbock and Edel invoke James’s own aesthetic
creed of internalized adventure in order to render his life interesting. The
corollary of such a reading of James’s life is that his repressed active princi-
ple must find a way out, and that it does so by being sublimated into his
art. So, for example, Edel calls Henry James “a man of action in art”: “he
was an active and masculine individual who finding direct action impossi-
ble . . . realized this activity and individuality through a prodigiously cre-
ative and highly productive art.”132
Many modern critics of James also see repression—especially sexual repres-
sion—as essential to his artistic power. Recently, reflecting contemporary
cultural concerns, they have concentrated on the issue of his possible homo-
sexuality.133 Indeed the question of James’s sexuality has continued to fasci-
nate, I think legitimately, because of the way suppressed action—sexual and
otherwise—figures so prominently in his work. Hyacinth’s friendship with
Paul provides one example of a homoerotic relationship in James’s work that
has drawn attention,134 and The Princess Casamassima’s obsession with
questions of action in the political realm is closely linked, both structurally
and linguistically, to its vision of action in the sexual realm, as I have argued.
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But with the avoidance of marriage at its center, “The Beast in the Jungle”
has become a focus for the discussion. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s groundbreaking
essay of 1986, “The Beast in the Closet: Henry James and the Writing of
Homosexual Panic,” suggests that the tale represents not Marcher’s failure
to recognize the marriage plot as the event he had been awaiting, but rather
his inability—I think the implication is also James’s, although Sedgwick does
not state this explicitly—to see in himself an unsanctioned and unspeak-
able homosexual desire that precludes the successful completion of the mar-
riage plot. The failure results from what Sedgwick calls “homosexual
panic”: “In the last scene of ‘The Beast in the Jungle,’ John Marcher becomes,
in this reading, not the finally self-knowing man who is capable of hetero-
sexual love, but the irredeemably self-ignorant man who embodies hetero-
sexual compulsion.”135 In other words, he has buried his desires so deep that
they remain hidden not only on the level of action (he does nothing) but
even on that of consciousness (he sees nothing). For all that I think James
possesses more self-knowledge than Sedgwick appears to grant him, I believe
her reading responds to a real truth about “The Beast in the Jungle,” one
that would be missed by aligning the tale too closely with works like The
Portrait of a Lady, in which what is lost in terms of action can be recom-
pensed, at least in part, by gains of consciousness. The question of buried
desire remains central to the story: hence its conclusion in the graveyard.
In “The Beast in the Jungle,” James recognizes with unprecedented clarity
that the burial of plot can easily come to coincide with the death of char-
acter.
Curiously, James implicitly connects Marcher’s views with his own artis-
tic methods. In fact, while Marcher is crucially different from his author
(as we shall see), James seems to write the tale in order to confront his per-
sonal “beast”—as though to say with Prospero, “This thing of darkness I
acknowledge mine.” James loads “The Beast” with the terms of his critical
writings, words like real, truth, natural, suspense, catastrophe, sequel, page, story,
forms, climax, anticlimax, consciousness, and imagination. Such self-reference
also appears in the Jamesian centrality of metaphor to the tale. As Yeazell
has commented, Marcher is “a man obsessed with a metaphor.”136 But while
James manipulates violent metaphors to stress that “our ordinary lives can
be as precarious and breathtaking as any melodrama,”137 Marcher turns to
metaphor precisely in order to escape ordinary life, “to evade immediate real-
ity and its demands.”138 One can in fact think of the central metaphor in
“The Beast in the Jungle” as a stage on which James plays out a contest between
the kinds of action associated with realism or naturalism and those associ-
ated with more extravagant forms like romance and melodrama. When he
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speaks almost incessantly of the “real” (461, 462, 463) and the “natural”
(457), Marcher directs his imagination toward an externalized under-
standing of the beast. But he is looking the wrong way, gazing out at the
jungle when he should be focusing closer to home, both at what is right
before his eyes (May) and at what lies within himself. As he finally
acknowledges, “he had seen outside of his life, not learned it within” (488).
Consider, for example, Marcher’s first response on again meeting May
Bartram: “Marcher said to himself that he ought to have rendered her some
service—saved her from a capsized boat in the Bay, or at least recovered her
dressing-bag, filched from her cab, in the streets of Naples, by a lazzarone
with a stiletto” (452). In an admittedly limited and ironized manner (the
purse snatcher represents a wonderful reduction of the villain of adventure
narratives), Marcher imagines the alternative plot of action with which James
has so frequently flirted. James believes, though, that these are matters to
be understood metaphorically rather than literally—that is, in an internal-
ized manner. In his distinction between realism and romance in the Preface
to The American, James refuses to recognize as genuine romance adventures
like those mentioned by Marcher: “there have been, I gather, many defin-
itions of romance, as a matter indispensably of boats, or of caravans, or of
tigers, . . . or of pistols and knives, but they appear for the most part reducible
to the idea of the facing of danger.”139 Marcher’s false romanticizing of the
beast in the jungle leads to his avoidance of a far more ordinary romance
with May, what she calls “the expectation—or, at any rate, the sense of dan-
ger familiar to so many people—of falling in love” (456).
James’s story can be read as an attempt to come to grips with the true
meanings of expectation and danger. Indeed one way to get to the heart of
“The Beast” is to ask: why does James let May point right to the moral of
the story in part 1? Even if one agrees with Sedgwick’s argument that the
love Marcher has failed to recognize is homosexual, May’s perceptiveness—
the accuracy of her early questions and comments—seems to disrupt the
ordinary methods of narrative suspense. And yet Marcher’s own life is char-
acterized by a “perpetual suspense” (459) (like that experienced by
Hyacinth once he is subject to Hoffendahl’s plot [335]), by “the simplifi-
cation of everything but the state of suspense” (465), which one usually thinks
of as a condition of plotting. It represents a form of pure expectation, of
“something evermore about to be,” as Wordsworth put it.
One could argue that suspense functions on two levels in the tale: on
the first, Marcher awaits the beast; on the second, we (and May) await Marcher’s
recognition of the beast. In this reading, we have a typically Jamesian ele-
vation of the internal plot of consciousness over the external plot of action.
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But such a reading misses an essential aspect of this tale: its critique of the
ordinary mechanisms of suspense and their dependence upon suspended
action. James proves once again that in a story, there can be as much adven-
ture in inaction as in action. Yet he also emphasizes that this same equiva-
lence does not necessarily hold for a life. Marcher’s state of inaction carries
with it none of those benefits of “pure being” that I have been tracing, of
which Emily’s blessed state in The White Doe of Rylstone provided the clear-
est example. And for all John Marcher’s attempt to win “back by an effort
of thought the lost stuff of consciousness” (484), James makes it quite clear
that he does not really think this kind of Romantic consolation is feasible,
that whatever Marcher’s final recognition, it cannot make up for “the sounded
void of his life” (488). Instead, as Marcher admits, his “was failure” not only
to do anything, but also “to be anything” (471). Oddly, complete plotless-
ness leaves as little room for consciousness as total plottedness. This must
surely be the point also of Marcher’s forgetfulness at the beginning of the
tale, the “unaccountably faded” memory of his earlier encounter with May
(454). Memory—that favorite device of solace for the poets of
Romanticism—can find no ground in an eventless life, a life based exclu-
sively on the principle of expectation; it requires richer soil.140
As though to drive home the contrast with Wordsworth, James concludes
his tale in the most Wordsworthian of settings (and the setting in which
The White Doe concludes): a graveyard. And as in Wordsworth, the grave-
yard is a place from which the stories of the dead speak forth. Yet remark-
ably, May’s grave tells not her own tale but Marcher’s. Marcher comes to
realize that the “plot of ground” (486) in which May’s body rests represents
the plot of his own life: it is what “happened” to him.141 He sees (in the
familiar literary terms of the tale) in “the graven tablet” of May’s tombstone
the “page” (486, 488) of his existence: “there were the facts of the past, there
the truth of his life, there the backward reaches in which he could lose him-
self ” (486)—as he tries to do at the end of the tale by flinging himself, “on
his face, on the tomb” (490). A total nonentity, Marcher must look upon
the monument to his friend to read from it “not only for a support but for
an identity” (486). And the name to which Marcher’s identity has been reduced
is not even his own: “he had before him in sharper incision than ever the
open page of his story. The name on the tablet smote him” (488). The reader
must assume that the slab reads “May Bartram,” but James makes it seem
uncannily as though Marcher were inhabiting a ghost story of the kind in
which the hero recognizes his own death only after encountering his name
on a tombstone. In the 1895 “germ” of “The Beast,” the woman outlives
the man; James records in his Notebooks that the “intensity” of the tale is
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to stem from the fact that “She is his Dead Self: he is alive in her and dead
in himself.”142 The tale as a whole can in fact be thought of as one of James’s
supernatural stories—a tale of the living dead. Marcher experiences such a
“shock” from his encounter with “the face of a fellow-mortal” (487) in the
graveyard precisely because he sees that he can claim no fellowship with
this man’s pain. His mortality is at best a bad joke; in himself, he has seen
a ghost.
So the plot of John Marcher’s life of studied inaction lies in the plot of
May Bartram’s grave. And James affords Marcher none of that partial com-
pensation that he allotted to Isabel Archer and to Hyacinth Robinson. The
tale concludes with an admission of the same “abject anticlimax” of which
critics had so often accused James’s novels (470). In this late story, which
critics have been tempted to read as a parable of its author’s life, James seems
to have revised subtly his position on inaction. He recognizes that taken to
an extreme, the demise of action entails the demise of character. And Marcher
is forced to ask his own version of a question that we have encountered many
times before: instead of the “What can I do?” of one of Eliot’s heroines or
James’s earlier question of Isabel—“What will she do?”—here, in this tale
of expectation, he can only wonder about possible past actions: “What could
he have done . . . ?” (483).
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Afterword:
Adventure Fiction
Action is consolatory. It is the enemy of thought and the friend of flatter-
ing illusions. Only in the conduct of our action can we find the sense of
mastery over the Fates.
—Joseph Conrad, Nostromo
I WISH IN conclusion to consider—albeit very briefly—a competing
genealogy. It, too, can be seen to have roots in a branch of Romanticism:
this time, in the romances of Scott. I refer to the adventure novel, the pop-
ularity of which came to something of a head around the turn of the cen-
tury, under the auspices of writers like Robert Louis Stevenson, Rudyard
Kipling, H. Rider Haggard, and G. A. Henty. As this list suggests, the par-
ticular genealogy I am considering here has a very boyish slant to it. One
can think of a line leading from the naval tales of Marryat, through to the
schoolboy novels that developed midcentury, in the wake of Tom Brown’s
Schooldays (1857) and the movement that came to be known as muscular
Christianity, and into the fully developed adventure novel. Indeed, Elaine
Showalter has argued that the subgenre is born in response to fear of the
feminization of literature: “The revival of ‘romance’ [a term synonymous
in the context with adventure story] in the 1880s was a men’s literary rev-
olution intended to reclaim the kingdom of the English novel for male
writers, male readers, and men’s stories.”1 But it might be worth mention-
ing that a parallel line of plot-oriented fiction could be drawn from the sen-
sation novels of the sixties through to the “New Woman” narratives of the
fin de siècle, many of them written by and for women—a line leading to
books like Grant Allen’s suggestively entitled The Woman Who Did
(1895).2 Moreover, I also think it is important to recognize the distinction
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between men and boys: as Showalter herself notes, to a remarkable degree,
these books were written for the latter.3
The blossoming of the genre at the end of the century was no doubt due
to several converging forces. Robert Fraser has pointed to a material cause
in the collapse, in 1894, of the agreement between publishers and the cir-
culating libraries under which triple deckers that first appeared in serial-
ized form flourished. When publishers withdrew their subsidies to the libraries,
“shorter, one-volume novels with incisive plots became newly attractive.”4
But above all, the rise of adventure fiction can be seen as contiguous with
the growth of imperialism; as Martin Green has argued, “to celebrate adven-
ture is to celebrate empire, and vice versa.”5 It is surely no coincidence that
muscular Christianity developed alongside the end of the Pax Britannica
that had followed the Napoleonic Wars, just as the nation was reentering
an imperialist and militaristic mood with the advent of the Crimean War
(1854–56), soon to be followed by the Sepoy Uprising or Indian Rebellion
(1857).6 The term “muscular Christianity” was coined in reference to Charles
Kingsley’s Two Years Ago (1857), a novel set in England during the
Crimean War, and Kingsley’s earlier Westward Ho! (1855), a tale of impe-
rialist Elizabethan heroics against the Spanish at home and in the New World,
was written in part as wartime propaganda. But the connection between
romances and imperialism is an old one: the two great patriarchs of the adven-
ture novel in British literature are Daniel Defoe and Sir Walter Scott, who
both wrote stories that reflected on English dominion over other nations,
economic and cultural. Still, the dual parentage (like the paradox inherent
in the idea of muscular Christianity) suggests that this form, too, was not
free from the crisis in action. After all, Scott was the father of the waver-
ing hero, and the Defoe of Robinson Crusoe (1719) championed those very
economic forces that nineteenth-century writers would see as restraints to
epic heroism.
And while imperialism plays a large role in the development of the genre,
we can also see adventure fiction in terms of the crisis in action: as John R.
Reed puts it, “The popularity of adventure stories late in the century indi-
cates that readers wanted a rendering of the world that allowed for inde-
pendent and determining action on the part of individual heroes and heroines.”7
In what follows, I want to look at Stevenson’s Treasure Island (1883)—per-
haps the purest example of the adventure novel to be written in English—
in light of the issues I have been outlining in these pages.
F
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Henry James’s friendship with Robert Louis Stevenson actually developed
out of a debate concerning the role of action and character in literature,
occasioned by what Stevenson saw as James’s too-quick comments in “The
Art of Fiction” about Treasure Island. The title of James’s essay refers in part
to his attempt to avoid the “clumsy separations” suggested by such cate-
gories (listed here as a chiasmus) as “the novel and the romance, the novel
of incident and that of character,” an argument he bolsters by denying that
there is any less “story” in Edmond de Goncourt’s Chérie (1884), which
tells the tale of “the development of the moral consciousness of a child,”
than in Stevenson’s very different (and according to James, much more
successful) tale of a very different child’s adventures in Treasure Island.8 But
in “A Humble Remonstrance,” Stevenson insists on a distinction: his kind
of “story” demands a much more basic—and externalized—conception of
character:
Character to the boy is a sealed book; for him, a pirate is a beard, a pair
of wide trousers and a liberal complement of pistols. . . . [F]or in this ele-
mentary novel of adventure, the characters need to be presented with but
one class of qualities—the warlike and formidable. . . . [T]he characters
are portrayed only so far as they realize the sense of danger and provoke
the sympathy of fear.9
The idea is important to Stevenson, who had already outlined a version of
it in the modestly entitled “A Gossip on Romance” (1882), which can be
seen as a defense of the genre. There he acknowledged that “English peo-
ple of the present day are apt, I know not why, to look somewhat down on
incident, and reserve their admiration for the clink of teaspoons and the
accents of the curate. It is thought clever to write a novel with no story at
all, or at least with a very dull one.” But the mistake of this attitude can
be registered, he argues, by the fact that Clarissa goes more or less unread
in the present, while Robinson Crusoe has retained all its charms to con-
temporary readers. “It is not character but incident that woos us out of our
reserves,” he concludes, perhaps surprisingly; readers enter into the fiction
of a novel only when they place themselves into an exciting story: “Then
we forget the characters; then we push the hero aside.” It is this effect that
the romance can achieve.10
Such an understanding of the novel or, rather romance, reader should
be contrasted with theories of identification based on character, which, I
have argued, ultimately stem from ideas of the Romantic sympathetic imag-
ination. But while Stevenson’s theory instead highlights activity, it should
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be noted that both reader and hero are active only in certain, limited ways.
What he (and it is predominately a he) is not asked to do is think, and in
particular, to think about moral issues:
There is a vast deal in life and letters both which is not immoral, but sim-
ply a-moral; which either does not regard the human will at all, or deals
with it in obvious and healthy relations; where the interest turns, not
upon what a man should choose to do, but on how he manages to do it;
not on the passionate slips and hesitations of the conscience, but on the
problems of the body and of the active intelligence, in clean, open-air
adventure, the shock of arms or the diplomacy of life.11
This “vast deal” is the stuff out of which Stevenson crafts the world of
Treasure Island. His story describes the adventures of a boy, young Jim
Hawkins, on the quest for treasure—a boy surrounded by men, both gen-
tlemen and pirates, and far away from the protective confines of home (it
was written to amuse his twelve-year-old stepson, who insisted that there
be no women or girls in it; petticoats might hamper the action12). The
novel begins by telling how Jim comes to be in possession of a pirate’s map
and how he gains the support of the local squire and doctor, who put
together a ship and crew to sail after the treasure. But most of it takes place
around and on the titular “Island,” as the crew—which has been divided
into two groups after a mutiny onboard has shown the masquerading
pirates for who they are and forced the rest of the crew to choose their alle-
giances—attempt first to find and then to hold on to the loot. Yet while
the tale is full of action and “active intelligence,” it achieves action only
through its willingness to dispense not only with the home front but also
with the moral reasoning that had become associated with the domestic
space. And even given this omission, the novel is able to create an amoral
(rather than an immoral) universe only by simultaneously jettisoning
adulthood and its problems.
The amorality of the tale comes out most forcefully in the fact that, as
Robert Fraser has pointed out, it is often difficult to distinguish between
the gentlemen and the pirates in the story.13 Long John Silver’s name for
pirate—“gentleman of fortune”—may initially confuse Jim, but the novel
does not altogether undermine the designation.14 After all, neither group is
truly entitled to the silver, and once the action has shifted out of England,
the distinctions break down even further. When Silver speaks to the pirates
under his command, he reminds them (in “King George’s English”) of his
rights as an elected official (165). Silver’s own shifting back and forth between
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the groups—his double and even triple agency, so to speak—is actually linked
to the novel’s wider treatment of its characters. Indeed, both groups are seen
as representative of “Englishness”; in the very first chapter of the novel, the
terrifying “Old Sea-dog” (Billy Bones), whose arrival at Jim’s father’s inn
sets the tale in motion, is spoken of by the locals as “the sort of man that
made England terrible at sea” (6). Of the infamous pirate Flint, the squire
remarks how “Spaniards were so prodigiously afraid of him that . . . I was
sometimes proud he was an Englishman” (33).15 If you compare this world
to that in which Francis was forced to operate in The White Doe of Rylstone,
say, it becomes clear how much easier agency is; if even enemies are really
on the same side, deep conflicts of allegiance—such as make it impossible
to know the right thing to do—are impossible.
Since the quest is “morally void,” as Fraser puts it, “the point of the jour-
ney is not to win, or even to prove a point: it is to play.”16 So it comes as
no surprise that a boy should be the hero of this story. His skills are those
best suited to the game. In the midst of a tussle with one of the pirates, Jim
reminds us of this fact:
Seeing that I meant to dodge, he also paused; and a moment or two passed
in feints on his parts and corresponding movements upon mine. It was
such a game as I had often played at home about the rocks of Black Hill
Cove, but never before, you may be sure, with such a wildly beating heart
as now. Still, as I say, it was a boy’s game, and I thought I could hold my
own at it against an elderly seaman with a wounded thigh. (150)
Henry James, in reflecting on the absence of “moral motive” in Stevenson’s
novels, counters that Stevenson’s rhapsodic appreciation of “the romance
of boyhood,” of “the age of heterogeneous pockets,” indeed of a boyish
pluck that is perhaps the purest form of the “heroism” that James sees as
Stevenson’s ultimate subject, stands in the novels in lieu of the usual mor-
alizing.17 In the context of the crisis of action I have been outlining in these
pages, we can begin to see James’s point; these qualities appear rarely in
nineteenth-century British fiction, and their very presence can operate
normatively. Reading Treasure Island, the fresh sea air seems palpable.
Stevenson describes action as natural and unforced—and often unwilled.
To quote a characteristic passage of Jim’s narration of his adventures:
Mechanically, I obeyed, turned eastwards, and with my cutlass raised, ran
around the corner of the house. Next moment I was face to face with
Anderson. He roared aloud, and his hanger went up above his head, flashing
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in the sunlight. I had not time to be afraid, but as the blow still hung
impending, leaped in a trice upon one side, and missing my foot in the soft
sand, rolled headlong down the slope. (121)
This is the kind of brisk, unmeditated, and effective action that has been
missing in the pages of the works I have looked at thus far, and Treasure
Island is chock-a-block full of it.
But the force of the action—the whole impetus of the story—depends
entirely upon Jim, who (like Daniel Deronda, in a more troubled version
of a romance plot) is described as a “born favorite” (198). Jim says as much
in his longest speech in the book, which captures beautifully the fantasy of
boyish agency even as it recapitulates the plot of the novel (thus demon-
strating the close connection between these two things):
“Well,” said I, “I am not such a fool but I know pretty well what I have
to look for. Let the worst come to the worst, it’s little I care. I’ve seen too
many die since I fell in with you. But there’s a thing or two I have to tell
you,” I said, and by this time I was quite excited; “and the first is this: here
you are, in a bad way—ship lost, treasure lost, men lost, your whole busi-
ness gone to wreck; and if you want to know who did it—it was I! I was
in the apple barrel the night we sighted land, and I heard you, John, and
you, Dick Johnson, and Hands, who is now at the bottom of the sea, and
told every word you said before the hour was out. And as for the schooner,
it was I who cut her cable, and it was I that killed the men you had aboard
of her, and it was I who brought her where you’ll never see her more, not
one of you. The laugh’s on my side; I’ve had the top of this business from
the first; I no more fear you than I fear a fly. Kill me, if you please, or spare
me. But one thing I’ll say, and no more; if you spare me, bygones are
bygones, and when you fellows are in court for piracy, I’ll save you all I
can. It is for you to choose. Kill another and do yourselves no good, or
spare me and keep a witness to save you from the gallows.” (164)
“It was I,” Jim keeps on repeating, and the story is most emphatically his.
He narrates it (with the exception of a brief episode in the middle of the
novel where the doctor takes over to describe events to which Jim could
have no access, because he is off saving the day elsewhere), and—as this
speech shows—he also enacts it. Although it should be added that for all
his centrality to the tale, we don’t get much of a sense of him as an indi-
vidual character. This is because he acts rather as an avatar for our own boy-
ish selves, as Stevenson’s theory of readerly identification had suggested.
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And perhaps the greatest charm of the novel lies in its willingness to let
Jim—and us—maintain this kind of control. He is never forced to learn a
lesson—not even the lesson of growing up. Jim starts the tale a boy and
finishes it a boy; he has not really matured, although he has become more
practiced at playing the game. He has also been made richer, but we don’t
hear how he spends his loot, just that “All of us had an ample share of the
treasure and used it wisely or foolishly, according to our natures” (202). To
say more would have been to enter the sordid world of everyday action and
consequence, of adult responsibility.
So the remarkable freshness of Treasure Island depends upon its boy-pro-
tagonist and its fundamental unwillingness to acknowledge the adult
world of choice and morality. It’s a precarious formula. Stevenson himself
never replicated the breeziness of this first foray into the novel. David Balfour,
the slightly older protagonist of Kidnapped (1886), already has something
of the wavering hero about him (Stevenson’s Scottish setting and his per-
sonal awareness of national history no doubt add to the influence of Scott
over the book). Compare this typical moment of action, in which David
comes face-to-face with one of his kidnappers, to that quoted above:
[T]he glass of the skylight was dashed in a thousand pieces, and a man
leaped through and landed on the floor. Before he got to his feet, I had
clapped a pistol to his back, and might have shot him, too; only at the
touch of him (and him alive) my whole flesh misgave me, and I could no
more pull the trigger than I could have flown.18
The shipboard setting and accoutrements of action remain, but the tone
has changed. While David does eventually shoot his attacker, he is able to
do so only after deliberation and hesitation that stems from moral con-
sciousness and self-consciousness (“and him alive”).
And while Treasure Island spawned a slew of adventure novels,19 it can
also be seen to have influenced works of a very different nature, including,
I would argue, those of Joseph Conrad, whose own stories in this line are
very much matter for grown-ups.20 At the turn of the century, even the adven-
ture novel was capable of taking a turn inward. So in Lord Jim (1900) (whose
hero shares Stevenson’s hero’s name), Jil Larson has argued that “the
romantic sea story/adventure novel of the sort Jim himself read as a boy becomes,
in Conrad’s hands, a narrative that skeptically questions many traditional
moral notions—heroism, the effectiveness of a code of conduct, the value
of sympathy—by violating the narrative conventions that typically under-
gird these ethics.”21 Similarly, in Nostromo (1904), which picks up on Stevenson’s
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treasure island motif and transplants it into an altogether different artistic
landscape, “a novel about political history . . . is reduced, over the course
of several hundred pages, to a condition of mind, an inner state,” as Edward
Said has put it.22 Once again, the action is internalized, and once again, the
story becomes one of failed revolutions and failed marriages. In Nostromo,
Conrad’s eponymous hero (really, one of three central figures, none of whom
deserves the title), who begins as much a chosen son as was Jim Hawkins
(and as much a figure of action: Harold Bloom calls him a “pure Homeric
throwback”23), ends up dead, after having been corrupted by the treasure.
Conrad’s experiences with revolution and imperialism have left him
acutely aware of the fact that “There was something inherent in the neces-
sities of successful action which carried with it the moral degradation of
the idea”; while “Action is consolatory,” as Nostromo recognizes, it is not nec-
essarily a consolation to be wished. Still, Conrad also understands that “In
our activity alone do we find the sustaining illusion of an independent exis-
tence as against the whole scheme of things of which we form a helpless
part.” When the dandyish Martin Decoud loses “all his belief in the real-
ity of his action past and to come,” he commits suicide.24 Conrad’s fiction
is suffused with such ambivalence about the moral status of action.
And while Stevenson’s Treasure Island manages to preserve its atmosphere
of free and unfettered action, its very composition contains a final irony:
Stevenson’s own substantial travels were not entered on in search of buried
treasure but rather in quest of elusive health. His books may reflect a per-
sistent interest in action, but in his life, his invalidism becomes the source
(because it fosters his imagination) of what Henry James identifies as his
character:
“Character, character is what he has!” These words may be applied to Mr.
Robert Louis Stevenson; in the language of that art which depends most
on direct observation, character, character is what he has. He is essential-
ly a model, in the sense of a sitter.25
Even though Stevenson’s own writing may embrace the idea of a literature
of action, under James’s gaze, he is transformed into the hero of a novel:
one whose inability to run allows him to sit still enough for the por-
traitist—or the novelist: it comes to much the same thing here—to cap-
ture his essence.
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his more honest fictional selves—suffer: “The tranquil shores / Of Britain cir-
cumscribed me; else perhaps / I might have been entangled among deeds, / Which
now, as infamous, I should abhor.” See William Wordsworth, The Excursion,
III.812–25, in William Wordsworth: The Poems, 2 vols., ed. John O. Hayden (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), II: 115. All future references to The Excursion
will be to this edition and will be internally documented by book and line num-
ber.
22. William Wordsworth, Fenwick Note to The Borderers, reprinted in The
Borderers, ed. Osborn, 814–15, 815.
23. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), in Prose, I: 128.
24. See Bromwich, “The French Revolution and ‘Tintern Abbey,’” in
Disowned by Memory, 69–91.
25. William Wordsworth, “On the Character of Rivers,” in The Borderers, ed.
Osborn, 65.
26. Othello, I.iii.319–20, in The Riverside Shakespeare (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1974). All future references to Shakespeare’s plays will be to this edi-
tion. William Wordsworth, “On the Character of Rivers,” in The Borderers, ed.
Osborn, 66.
27. See Immanuel Kant, “The Analytic of the Sublime,” in Critique of
Judgement, trans. and intro. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951), esp.
§26.
28. Bromwich, Disowned by Memory, 62, 63.
29. See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, With Selections from
the Objections and Replies, trans. John Cottingham, intro. Bernard Williams
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 20–23. Descartes’s cogito, his
discovery that he can defeat skepticism by building upon his conviction that “I
think, therefore I am,” marks a radical shift from earlier belief systems, such as
Aristotle’s, in which actions generate a sense of character. In a way, the Cartesian
world picture lies behind the work of all the writers I consider in this study.
30. See Johnston, William Wordsworth, 503.
31. Mary Wollstonecraft, “Letter on the Present Character of the French
Nation,” in A Wollstonecraft Anthology, ed. and intro. Janet M. Todd
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(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1977), 122. Quoted in Johnston,
William Wordsworth, 339.
32. For Wordsworth’s ongoing interest in the concept of habit, see James
Chandler, Wordsworth’s Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984). Chandler points out that Wordsworth’s
emphasis on habit in his poetry increases after 1797—that is, after the revolu-
tionary period (xviii).
33. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), in Prose, I: 126.
34. William Wordsworth, “On the Character of Rivers,” in The Borderers, ed.
Osborn, 63.
35. Shakespeare, Macbeth, II.ii.70.
36. Nevertheless, Mortimer regrets the forgetfulness more than any other
aspect of his crime, because it shows that he did not commit fully to his act of
abandonment and so decreases the recompense available to him: “If I had done it
with a mind resolved, / There had been something in the deed / To give me
strength to bear the recollection” (V.iii.109). The implication is that an action
committed halfheartedly can only half-fill with self-consciousness the vacancy it
creates. Crimes of omission will also play an essential role in George Eliot’s imag-
ination of action, as we shall see.
37. Wordsworth, A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff, in Prose, I: 48.
38. Wordsworth, “Home at Grasmere,” lines 989–90; the latter comment is
quoted in Martin Greenberg, The Hamlet Vocation of Coleridge and Wordsworth
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), 147.
39. Shakespeare, Hamlet, III.i.86–87.
40. Coleridge, “The Character of Hamlet” (1813), in Lectures 1808–1819 on
Literature, 2 vols., ed. R. A. Foakes, Volume 5 of The Collected Works of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), II: 539.
41. Erdman, “Wordsworth as Heartsworth,” 17.
42. Rzepka sees a comparable echo of Hamlet’s father’s ghost in
Wordsworth’s repeated invocations to Dorothy in “Tintern Abbey” to remember
him (Self as Mind, 88).
43. See Roe, Wordsworth and Coleridge, 73–75.
44. See “The Ruined Cottage,” MS. B, in William Wordsworth, The Ruined
Cottage and The Pedlar, ed. James Butler (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979),
58, and “Hart-leap Well,” line 97. The phrase echoes Othello, I.iii.97: “Of mov-
ing accidents by flood or field.”
45. For a discussion of The Borderers as closet drama, and of closet drama in
general, see Studies in Romanticism 27.3 (Fall 1988), especially William Jewett,
“Action in The Borderers” (399–400); and David Marshall, “The Eyewitnesses of
The Borderers” (391–98); see also Mary Jacobus, Romanticism, Writing, and Sexual
Difference.
46. William Wordsworth, the 1842 Note to The Borderers, in The Borderers,
ed. Osborn, 813.
47. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), in Prose, I: 128.
48. Charles Lamb, “On the Tragedies of Shakspeare Considered with
Reference to their Fitness for Stage Representation,” in The Collected Works of
Charles Lamb, 8 vols., ed. E. V. Lucas (London: Methuen, 1912), I: 114–15.
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49. Lamb, “On the Tragedies,” 123.
50. As Annabel Patterson has pointed out to me, “unjust tribunals” echoes
Milton’s “unjust tribunals, under change of times” in Samson Agonistes. Milton is
generally taken to be referring to the trials and executions of regicides such as Sir
Henry Vane; Wordsworth may well have had in mind connections with the
English Treason Trials of 1794, in which radicals like Thomas Holcroft and John
Thelwall were arrested and charged. Like The Borderers, Samson Agonistes is a clos-
et drama very much concerned with the roles of action and inaction in the politi-
cal realm. As we shall see in relation to The White Doe, Milton’s influence on
Wordsworth’s treatment of action is considerable. John Milton, Samson Agonistes,
in Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York: Macmillan,
1957), line 695. All future references to Milton will be to this edition.
51. Hannah Arendt, Thinking, in The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt
Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), 185.
52. Arendt alludes to the connection between these two mental categories,
noting that “It took language a long time to separate the word ‘consciousness’ from
‘conscience,’ and in some languages, for instance, in French, such a separation was
never made” (Thinking, 190). Consider Hamlet’s “conscience”—really “con-
sciousness”—that causes the current of his resolve to turn awry in the great solil-
oquy.
53. Bromwich, Disowned by Memory, 137.
54. S. T. Coleridge, letter to George Coleridge, 10 March 1798, in The
Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 6 vols., ed. Leslie Griggs (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1956–71), I: 397; emphasis added.
55. Arendt, Thinking, in The Life of the Mind, 192; emphasis added.
56. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), in Prose, I: 126.
57. Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (London: Secker and Warburg,
1964), xi.
58. Mortimer’s response to Rivers’s suggested crusade is much expanded in
the later version of the play. This brings the end of the drama more in line with
Wordsworth’s later, more coherent, anti-action stance, which I will discuss in rela-
tion to The White Doe of Rylstone.
59. From Moral Essays, Epistle I. Wordsworth, The Borderers, ed. Osborn, 72.
60. William Wordsworth, letter to Francis Wrangham, 19 February 1819, in
The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth: The Middle Years, 2 vols., ed.
Ernest de Selincourt, rev. Mary Moorman and Allan Hill (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1969), II: 524. Hereafter Middle Years.
61. The purpose behind this abandoned framing narrative is rather perplex-
ing, but it seems to function in part as a warning not to treat the Doe as a sym-
bol of hermeneutic uncertainty. We are left in no doubt as to the real center of truth
in the poem, rather as in the case of Pompilia’s narrative in Robert Browning’s The
Ring and the Book (1868–69).
62. Milton, Sonnet XIX, “When I consider how my light is spent.” William
Wordsworth, The White Doe of Rylstone; or The Fate of the Nortons, ed. and intro
Kristine Dugas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), line 1070. All further ref-
erences to this text will be to this edition of the text, based on the 1815 printed
version, and will be internally documented by line number (unless reference is
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made to other versions, in which case a page number will be given, indicating the
footnoted amendment in Dugas’s edition).
63. S. T. Coleridge, letter to William Wordsworth, 21 May 1808, in Collected
Letters, ed. Griggs, III: 107–8. Kristine Dugas points out in her introduction to
The White Doe how close the terms of Coleridge’s objections to Wordsworth’s
poem are to Wordsworth’s criticisms of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” of
whose principal character he famously complained: “he does not act, but is con-
tinuously acted upon” (“Note to the Ancient Mariner” in the 1800 edition of
Lyrical Ballads) (Introduction, 12). The White Doe and “The Rime” bear compar-
ison, perhaps unsurprisingly given how fundamentally problems of action and the
will figure in both. Obviously, we should note the ballad form and the central
importance of a white beast that acts as genius loci to both poems. But
Wordsworth also seems to invoke Coleridge’s ballad at two crucial moments in his
text: first, when Francis stands apart gazing on the field of battle and the banner
below him, as solitary and alone as ever the Mariner is on his “wide, wide sea,” he
is compared to a “tutelary Power” (Coleridge calls the albatross a “Tutelary Spirit”)
and to “mariners” gazing for guidance at a distant light (775ff.); second, when
Emily sees the White Doe after her return from her Mariner-like wanderings, her
relief in tears recalls the relief the Mariner finds when he blesses the sea monsters
“unawares.” See also David Bromwich’s discussion of the relationship between
“The Rime” and The Borderers (Disowned by Memory, 66–68). Wordsworth laid
claim to suggesting to Coleridge the nature of the Mariner’s original sin, and, as
Bromwich argues, both works are interested in examining the consequences of acts
of motiveless malignity. Bromwich goes so far as to ponder the possibility that the
Ancient Mariner was a portrait of Wordsworth (116 n. 7)—a reading that resonates
with the theme of betrayals into action that I explore here.
64. Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry, 325.
65. William Wordsworth, letter to Coleridge, 19 April 1808, in Middle Years,
I: 221–22.
66. Much of the criticism of The White Doe has treated the relationship
between the banner and the Doe, symbols of the Catholic and Protestant imagi-
nation, respectively (see, for example, Martin Price, “Imagination in The White Doe
of Rylstone,” Philological Quarterly 33.2 [April 1954]: 189–99). The Doe’s white-
ness in this context emphasizes its lack of thingliness, so indicating the lesser
dependency of the Protestant imagination on gross materiality (and thus its vision-
ary superiority). While I will not concentrate my discussion on these two objects,
it should be noted that the banner is also associated closely with battle and the
world of external action, while the Doe is linked to passivity and inaction by its
ties to Emily.
67. Wordsworth, letter to Coleridge, 19 April 1808, in Middle Years, I:
221–22.
68. [Josiah Condor], review of The White Doe, The Eclectic, n.s. 5 (January
1816): 38. Quoted in Dugas, Introduction, 61.
69. Dugas reproduces the Fenwick Note in her Introduction, 62–63; I quote
from page 62.
70. William Wordsworth, The Convention of Cintra, in Prose, I: 339.
71. See Christopher Wordsworth, Memoirs of William Wordsworth, 2 vols., ed.
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Henry Reed (New York: AMS Press, 1966), II: 313. This edition is a reprint of the
1851 original.
72. Shakespeare, Hamlet, III.ii.213.
73. See Christopher Wordsworth, Memoirs, II: 313. Quoted in Mary
Moorman, William Wordsworth, II: 113.
74. Willing can be thought of as self-empowered hoping—we will something
to happen when we not only hope that it happens, but engage in an act of mind
that could contribute to its happening. In contrast, when we hope that something
will happen, our act of mind is not causally related to the occurrence or non-
occurrence of the desired outcome, which depends upon the activities of forces out-
side our control. Wordsworth plays with these two categories in a sophisticated
fashion not only in The White Doe but also elsewhere in his poetry. Here it is
enough to note that both willing and hoping are in themselves internal activities.
75. Spiegelman, Wordsworth’s Heroes, 168.
76. In regarding the “debate” between the forms of action espoused by the
brother and sister as the central concern of Wordsworth’s poem, I am agreeing with
Evan Radcliffe’s treatment of action in The White Doe (“Wordsworth and the
Problem of Action”). For Radcliffe’s suggestive remarks on Spiegelman, see his
note 8. I do not include the Doe herself in the list of protagonists, as she lacks the
capacity for struggle implicit in the term (from agon, “contest”). Nevertheless, her
role is central to Wordsworth’s narrative, as we shall see.
77. As we shall see, Clough places the hero of Amours de Voyage in a similar
situation, atop the Pincian Hills, sightseeing alongside his fellow tourists at the war
below. While the two passages differ vastly in tone, they both represent the hero’s
disengagement from the traditional life of action: battle.
78. Jewett, “Action in The Borderers,” 409.
79. Marshall, “The Eyewitnesses of The Borderers,” 398.
80. I quote from the expanded 1827 version of the text, although the impli-
cations are the same in earlier drafts. Note that the dating still places the compo-
sition of the passage before the time at which Wordsworth affixes the epigraph from
The Borderers to The White Doe.
81. Robert Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience (New York: W. W. Norton
and Co., 1963), 63.
82. Immanuel Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis
White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1959), 23.
83. Radcliffe makes the same observation: “as a woman she has in the poem
no martial role, no clear avenue for action” (“Wordsworth and the Problem of
Action,” 176). The exemption from battle also extends to the old; hence the pres-
ence of the elderly man Emily sends out to scout on the events at the front.
Wordsworth’s concern in his poetry for female and elderly subjects is linked to his
interest in the merits of inaction.
84. Wordsworth’s choice of a female center of consciousness for his narrative
connects it to the genre of the novel, where female characters will play an increas-
ingly important role. In her seminal study, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political
History of the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Nancy Armstrong
considers in detail the implications, political and cultural, of the rise of domestic
fiction (that is, fiction that centers on and exalts the figure of the domestic
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woman). Like Armstrong, I am interested in the new attention granted to “quali-
ties of mind” in such fiction. But while Armstrong contrasts these qualities with
the earlier focus on social status as constitutive of selfhood, I wish to contrast the
nineteenth-century concern for a life of the mind with the earlier focus on a life
of action (4–5).
85. Milton, Paradise Lost, VIII.173.
86. Wordsworth, The White Doe, ed. Dugas, Introduction, 63.
87. Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry, 324.
88. See Radcliffe, “Wordsworth and the Problem of Action,” 172–73.
89. Radcliffe considers Wordsworth’s attitude toward the relationship
between art and action by looking at the role of the narrator of the tale, whom he
sees as “passive” in a way that differentiates him from many of Wordsworth’s other
narrators (“Wordsworth and the Problem of Action,” 178–80).
90. Milton, Paradise Lost, I.19–22)
91. The phrase is best known from the patriotic conclusion of Tennyson’s
Maud (1855). In Tennyson’s Poetry, ed. Robert W. Hill Jr. (New York: Norton,
1971), 248.
92. Price, “Imagination in The White Doe,” 193.
93. Wordsworth, letter to Coleridge, 19 April 1808, in Middle Years, I: 222.
94. Radcliffe, “Wordsworth and the Problem of Action,” 169.
95. Wordsworth, “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface,” in Prose, III: 81–82.
96. Wordsworth, letter to Anne Taylor, 9 April 1801, in Early Years, 327.
97. Wordsworth, letter to Coleridge, 19 April 1808, in Middle Years, I:
222–23.
98. As always in reading Wordsworth, one should note his use of the word
revolution.
99. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1850), in Prose, I: 138.
100. John Keats, letter to the George Keatses, 14 February–3 May 1819, in
The Letters of John Keats: A Selection, ed. Robert Gittings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970), 249–50.
101. Lionel Trilling, “The Morality of Inertia,” in The Moral Obligation to be
Intelligent, ed. and intro. Leon Wieseltier (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
2000), 337.
Chapter Two
1. Arthur Hugh Clough, “Lecture on the Poetry of Wordsworth,” in The
Poems and Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough, 2 vols., ed. and intro. Blanche
Clough (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), I: 315. Hereafter, these volumes will
be referred to as PPR and will be internally documented. For the quotation, see
chapter 1 n. 44.
2. For an early source of the distinction between subjective and objective
poetry that influenced Arnold, see Friedrich Schiller’s On Naive and Sentimental
Poetry (1795) (naive poetry is objective; sentimental poetry is subjective).
3. A. H. Clough, letter to F. T. Child, 16 April 1858, in The Correspondence
of Arthur Hugh Clough, 2 vols., ed. F. L. Mulhauser (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
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1957), II: 546. Hereafter Correspondence. There is no complete edition of Clough’s
letters. Where possible, I will quote from Correspondence, but it is often necessary
to turn to other sources for letters not included by Mulhauser.
4. See, for example, Henry Sidgwick, review of Clough’s life and work,
Westminster Review 92 (October 1869): 382; rpt. in Arthur Hugh Clough: The
Critical Heritage, ed. Michael Thorpe (London: Routledge, 1972), 287. See also
J. M. Robertson, “Clough” (1887), which includes an extended reflection on
Clough’s relationship to contemporary novelists. In John Mackinnin Robertson,
New Essays towards a Critical Method (London: The Bodley Head, 1897); rpt. in
The Critical Heritage, ed. Thorpe, 343–65.
5. The standard biography of Clough is Katherine Chorley’s Arthur Hugh
Clough: The Uncommitted Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Critical
monographs that incorporate significant amounts of biographical material
include: R. K. Biswas, Arthur Hugh Clough: Towards a Reconsideration (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972); Wendell V. Harris, Arthur Hugh Clough (New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1970); Michael Timko, Innocent Victorian (Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1966); Paul Veyriras, Arthur Hugh Clough (Paris: Didier,
1964); and Isobel Armstrong, Arthur Hugh Clough (London: Longman, 1962).
One notable exception to this biographical trend is Walter E. Houghton’s The
Poetry of Clough: An Essay in Revaluation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963). Houghton begins his study with the bold declaration: “I am not concerned
in this book with Clough’s poetry as a biographical document, or as a record of his
thought, or as an index to the age” (xi).
6. Timko, Innocent Victorian, 3.
7. Matthew Arnold, “Thyrsis,” lines 221–26, in The Poetical Works of
Matthew Arnold, ed. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry (London: Oxford University
Press, 1950). All future references to Arnold’s poetry will be to this edition and
will be internally documented by line number.
8. For a discussion of the events surrounding the renaming of this poem,
originally published as The Bothie of Toper-na-Fuosich—literally, the hut of the
bearded well, and a euphemism for the female genitalia—see Biswas, Arthur Hugh
Clough, 264–66. Clough’s poems routinely underwent processes of editing for
their frequently explicit sexual content, especially under the direction of his wife,
Blanche.
9. G. H. Lewes, review of Poems (1862), Cornhill Magazine 6 (September
1862): 398; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Thorpe, 155.
10. Clough would come to describe Dr. Arnold as one of those men who are
“too . . . practical to be literally theoretical; too eager to be observant, too royal to
be philosophical; too fit to head armies and rule kingdoms to succeed in weigh-
ing words and analyzing emotion; born to do, they know not what they do”
(“Review of Mr. Newman’s The Soul,” in PPR I: 294). With its invocation of the
language of Jesus on the Cross (Luke 23.34), the statement shows the characteris-
tic ambivalence Clough felt toward his teacher in later life, and also how much of
that ambivalence centered on the relationship between action and speculation.
The great schoolmaster represented for Clough uncomplicated action of a kind he
found it hard to imagine. While Clough always recognized that useful activity is
central to the living of a good life (his debt to Aristotle’s Ethics, as will become
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apparent, was enormous), he implied that Dr. Arnold’s kind of activity has some-
thing childlike, even unwilled about it—not only innocent but also ignorant.
There is no struggle in such activity, and for this reason, it seems almost involun-
tary, and less valuable for that. As Clough wrote in a review entitled “Recent Social
Theories,” “There are many, surely, who looking back into their past lives, feel
most thankful for those acts which came least from their own mere natural voli-
tion” (PPR I: 414). In the postlapsarian world, action is most valuable when it runs
counter to desire, perhaps because it is then that one feels one’s moral freedom.
11. Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays in Six
Volumes: Volume Five, Volume 10 of The Library Edition of the Collected Works of
Thomas Carlyle, 30 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1869), 381. The section is
entitled “Not laissez-faire.”
12. A. H. Clough, letter to Anne Clough, 4–23 May 1847, in Correspondence,
I: 149.
13. “He who does not pray, does not labor.” Unsigned review of Ambarvalia
and The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems, in The Guardian 4 (28 March 1849):
209; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Thorpe, 83.
14. Thomas Carlyle, “Characteristics” (1831), in Critical and Miscellaneous
Essays in Six Volumes: Volume Three, vol. 8 of The Library Edition (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1869), 361–62.
15. William Hazlitt, An Essay on the Principles of Human Action (Gainsville,
Fla.: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1969), 66–67.
16. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), especially chapters 1–3, and
Alasdaire MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1984), and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988).
17. Arthur Hugh Clough, letter to E. Hawkins, 23 January 1848, in
Correspondence, I: 196.
18. Quoted in Evelyn Barish Greenberger, Arthur Hugh Clough: The Growth
of a Poet’s Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 161; from
“Fragment on America.” Clough’s first major poem, The Bothie, composed imme-
diately after his renunciation of his fellowship, concludes with its heroes’ marriage
and emigration to New Zealand, to begin a new life there. The emigration is based
on that of Clough’s friend Tom Arnold, and Clough himself seriously considered
following the same route. The Bothie stands alone in Clough’s canon of longer
works as a poem in which action is allowed to be realized—Tom Arnold com-
mented on its “action,” calling it “among the boldest and purest” he had known
(Tom Arnold, letter to Clough, 24 September 1849, in Correspondence, I: 272).
And even Matthew, after criticizing the poem for its use of slang, praises its “true
Homeric ring” of phrase and “out-of-doors freshness, life, naturalness, [and] buoy-
ant rapidity” (“On Translating Homer,” in On the Classical Tradition, vol. 1 in The
Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed. R. H. Super [Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1960], 216). Yet while the marriage plot finds a happy resolu-
tion, the real “actions” of its heroes cannot take place within the framework of the
narrative—or even of Great Britain. What Elspie and Philip will achieve on their
virgin soil must be left to the imagination. I will again consider this need for 
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virgin territory as a consequence of the crisis of action when I look at the conclu-
sion of Daniel Deronda. The impulse can be traced also from Coleridge and
Southey’s plans to create a Pantisocraticy on the banks of the Susquehanna; in fact,
Tom Arnold refers to Pantisocracy in writing of his emigration (Passages in a
Wandering Life [London: E. Arnold, 1900], 64–65).
Henry James’s novels on the clashing of cultures display the Victorian sense of
the difference between Europe and America as potential grounds of action. Isabel
Archer, the paradigmatically active American, becomes hopelessly entangled in the
web of past deeds when she goes to Europe.
19. A. H. Clough, letter to Tom Arnold, 16 May 1851, in Correspondence, I:
290.
20. Clough, letter to Blanche Smith, February 1852. Bodleian MS Eng. Lett.
e. 77, fol. 123—Feb. 1852. Original italics. Quoted in Evelyn Barish
Greenberger, Arthur Hugh Clough: The Growth of a Poet’s Mind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 130.
21. Descartes’s cogito is in some sense the epistemological root of Clough’s
problem, as it is the source of all modern definitions of consciousness. See chap-
ter 1 n. 29.
22. Clough’s one substantial late poem, Mari Magno (a series of tales of mar-
riage recounted by shipboard travelers and resembling Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales
in structure), on which he working at the time of his death, is generally regarded
by modern critics as lacking the interest and originality of his earlier work.
Blanche, though, approved of its conventionalities and positive expression of “the
daily problems of social life” (PPR I: 41).
23. George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. David Carroll, intro. Felicia Bonaparte
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 785.
24. A. H. Clough, letter to Blanche Smith, 4 February 1853, in
Correspondence, II: 376.
25. See esp. PPR I: 44–45. Biswas is particularly good at discussing Blanche’s
influence on her husband’s activity, both poetic and otherwise. See Biswas, Arthur
Hugh Clough, 417–69.
26. Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians (London: Penguin, 1948), 164. As
Nightingale herself argued in Cassandra, “The family? It is too narrow a field for
the development of an immortal spirit, be that spirit male or female.” Florence
Nightingale, Cassandra and other selections from Suggestions for Thought, ed. Mary
Poovey (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1991), 216.
27. Arthur Hugh Clough, Dipsychus and the Spirit, in Clough’s Selected Poems,
ed. J. P. Phelan (London: Longman, 1995), 3.2.131–34. Further references to
Clough’s poems will be to this edition and will be internally documented (by sec-
tion and line number, as appropriate), unless otherwise noted.
28. Strachey, Eminent Victorians, 165.
29. Carlyle, “Characteristics,” in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, 356. The
quotation alludes to the primary argument of Aristotle’s Ethics.
30. Thomas Carlyle, “The Everlasting No,” in Sartor Resartus, vol. 1 of The
Library Edition of the Complete Works, 30 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall,
1870), 159. Original emphasis.
31. Carlyle, “The Everlasting Yea,” in Sartor Resartus, 188. Original emphasis.
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32. Joseph Bristow, “‘Love, let us be true to one another’: Matthew Arnold,
Arthur Hugh Clough, and ‘our Aqueous Ages,’” Literature and History 4.1 (Spring
1995): 36.
33. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, “On Epic and
Dramatic Poetry” (1797), in Goethe’s Literary Essays, ed. and trans. J. E. Spingarn,
intro. Viscount Haldane (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), 101.
34. [Clough], “Recent English Poetry,” North American Review 77 (1853): 3;
in PPR I: 360, 361.
35. Just to emphasize how remarkable—and how significant—the anticli-
max of this plot is, one can compare it to two preceding works: Longfellow’s
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M, followed by the page number.
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Letters, VI: 166.
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called her “argument from hygenic habits”: she advised her friend to “put the
words ‘cleanliness’ and ‘uncleanliness’ for ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ and consider how fully
you have come not only to regard cleanliness as a duty, but to shudder at unclean-
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29. Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present, volume 13 of The Library Edition
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30. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 2 vols.
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35. George Eliot, “The Antigone and Its Moral,” in Selected Critical Works, ed.
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Review 105 (October 1879): 563; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Carroll, 454.
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II: 213.
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interests” to his (M 587, 657). Eliot uses Rosamond to suggest a subtle critique of
the moral blankness of the Darwinian world.
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by Eliot’s use of a quotation from Wordsworth’s “Michael” as its epigraph—that is
particularly apparent in her earlier works. In fact, the story seems to revise (and
restore) “The Ruined Cottage.”
84. Note Eliot’s use of the metaphor that so appealed to Clough and Arnold.
85. Dorothea’s “unhistoric acts” are obviously related to Wordsworth’s “little,
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87. Arendt, The Human Condition, 9.
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in his analysis of Gwendolen, whom he also compares to the romance heroine
Undine. R. E. Francillon, “George Eliot’s First Romance,” review of Daniel
Deronda, Gentleman’s Magazine 17 (October 1876): 424, 414; rpt. in The Critical
Heritage, ed. Carroll, 382, 395, 386.
89. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 684; in Literary Criticism, 974.
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III: 31–37.
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92. Eliot, “Notes on The Spanish Gypsy,” in Browning, Life, 104.
93. Ibid.
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95. Eliot, “Notes to The Spanish Gypsy,” in Browning, Life, 106.
96. See Eliot’s journal entry of 6 September 1864 (in Cross, II: 305). But it
is “eminently suited for an opera,” according to Lewes, who wrote that he hoped
it would eventually be made to “take that shape.” George Henry Lewes, letter to
John Blackwood, 23 June 1868, in Letters, IV: 453.
97. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 690; in Literary Criticism,
985; Blackwood, letter to Eliot, 10 November 1875, in Letters, VI: 182.
98. Auguste Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, ed., trans., and intro.
Frederick Ferré (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 19. In a letter to Mrs.
Congreve of 16 December 1868, Eliot referred to The Spanish Gypsy as a “mass of
Positivism.” In Letters, IV: 496; in Cross, III: 54.
99. Eliot, letter to John Blackwood, 4 October 1872, in Letters, V: 314.
100. These include the Romantic Pantisocratics, Clough, and his hero Philip
Hewson of The Bothie. The colonies frequently provide characters in Victorian lit-
erature with an escape from their pasts. Before writing Daniel Deronda, Eliot had
herself used the idea of a fresh start on virgin territory: at the end of Adam Bede,
Arthur runs away to France while Hetty avoids death by being sent to one of the
penal colonies. Nevertheless, Eliot shows her awareness of the difficulties of build-
ing a “second life” in Middlemarch when Bustrode discovers (through Raffles’s
return from America) that “a man’s past is not simply a dead history . . . : it is a
still quivering part of himself ” (M 605).
101. Early on, there was actually some talk (probably initiated by Lewes) of
writing Daniel Deronda as a dramatic piece. See Haight, Biography, 471–72.
102. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 686; in Literary Criticism,
978.
103. Suicide represents both the cessation of all action and the culmination of
it. I will return to the theme of suicide in chapter 4.
104. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, Reasons for the Enfranchisement of Women
(1866); rpt. in Victorian Prose: An Anthology, ed. Rosemary J. Mundhenk and
LuAnn McCracken Fletcher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 379.
An activist in women’s causes, philanthopist, landscape painter, and cofounder of
Girton College, Cambridge, Bodichon herself is notable for having come up with
a good solution to the problem she described.
105. Her name represents another take on the active woman as “archer.”
106. Eliot’s own attitude toward nursing is revealing. In January 1843 she
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wrote to a friend: “I think it almost enviable as far as one’s self is concerned not of
course when the sufferer is remembered, to have the care of a sickroom, with its
twilight and tiptoe stillness and helpful activity” (Eliot, letter to Sara Hennell, 7
January 1843, in Letters, I: 156). Nursing is perhaps the apotheosis of the kind of
activity Eliot favors—it is both sympathetic and habitual—but her awareness of
the degree to which it depends on the suffering of others seems to trouble her. For
more on Eliot’s attitude toward nursing, see also Catherine Judd, “Nursing and
Female Heroics: George Eliot and Florence Nightingale (1835–1837),” in Bedside
Seductions: Nursing and the Victorian Imagination, 1830–1880 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1998), 123–52. Judd tells how disappointed Nightingale was by
Dorothea’s “home epic” in Middlemarch; Eliot should have shown a more success-
ful outcome for youthful idealism, one more clearly grounded in socially useful
“work” (124). Judd sets Nightingale’s sense of the nurse as a symbol of activity
against Eliot’s sense of her as the embodiment of “the patience and self-sacrifice
necessary for ideal social change” (151). In a footnote, she even speculates that
Florence and her sister Parthenope may have been the models for Dorothea and
Celia Brooke (182).
107. Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 234.
108. This phrase also contains an allusion to Carlyle’s “Donothingism,” or
laissez-faire, which I discussed in reference to Clough. Eliot’s casual use of the
term hints at how Gwendolen’s crisis of action reflects contemporary cultural
forces.
109. Eliot actually suggests a comparison between Gwendolen’s and Hamlet’s
crimes: “There is a way of looking at our daily life as an escape, and taking the
quiet return of morn and evening . . . as a salvation that reconciles us to hardship.
Those who have a self-knowledge prompting such self-accusation as Hamlet’s can
understand this habitual feeling of rescue” (DD 682). Hamlet’s self-accusation
(“O what a rogue and peasant slave am I!” [II.ii.550 ff.]) is, of course, prompted
by his inaction, linking it to Gwendolen’s more complicated crime of inaction, the
“murder” of Grandcourt. Moreover, for both, inaction creates self-knowledge.
Here, as elsewhere in Eliot, habit serves as a balm to ease the frustrations inherent
in action.
110. Shifra Hochberg, “Daniel Deronda and Wordsworth’s The White Doe of
Rylstone,” English Language Notes 31 (March 1994): 46.
111. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 687–88; in Literary Criticism, 981.
112. The idea of a “banner” once again surfaces here in the context of the cri-
sis of action, as it did in the writings of Wordsworth and Carlyle.
113. Alexander Welsh helpfully uses the term “ideology” to describe the
nature of Daniel’s mission. But there is one place in his account on which I would
put a slightly different emphasis: his assertion that the ideas of the mission are
“explicit.” Although it is true, as Welsh notes, that the ideas are written down by
Mordecai, I think that Eliot strives to preserve some of their vagueness precisely
because she is much more interested in the general concept of ideology than in the
specific ideology of Zionism. See Alexander Welsh, George Eliot and Blackmail
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 314.
114. Graham Martin, “Daniel Deronda: George Eliot and Political Change,”
in Critical Essays on George Eliot, ed. Hardy, 149.
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1927), 496, 136.
116. Disraeli, Tancred, 473, 499–500. The novel closes abruptly when
Tancred’s parents’ arrival in Jerusalem is announced just after Eva has fainted on
hearing his declaration.
117. Robert Preyer—like Alexander Welsh, a critic who sees Daniel Deronda
as Eliot’s effort at redefining and so revitalizing political activism—argues that the
novel is her attempt to show, in what could be called proto-Marcusean fashion,
how ideas presented in the form of visions can help “us to break free from the
tyranny of habitual responses” and effect significant change. See “Beyond the
Liberal Imagination: Vision and Unreality in Daniel Deronda,” Victorian Studies 4
(September 1960): 48.
118. Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, II.iii.36–42, in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed.
Reiman and Powers, 169.
119. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement (New York: Hafner Press, 1951),
150ff.
120. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 686; in Literary Criticism,
981.
121. The novel was also accused of wanting in plot, although Richardson
defended the slow progress of the story by arguing it was necessary to allow for
development of character: “The letters and conversations, where the story makes
the slowest progress, are presumed to be characteristic.” Samuel Richardson,
Clarissa, ed. and intro. Angus Ross (London: Penguin, 1985), 1499, 425.
122. Jay Clayton, Romantic Vision and the Novel (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 32.
123. R. E. Francillon, review of Daniel Deronda, 420; in Critical Heritage,
391.
124. Caserio, Plot, Story, and the Novel, 129.
125. Eliot, letter to Sara Hennell, 26 December 1862, in Letters, IV: 71.
126. [R. R. Bowker], review of Daniel Deronda, International Review iv
(January 1877), 70; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Carroll, 435.
127. Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting
Consciousness in Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 5.
128. M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michaelt Holquist, trans.
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981),
37.
129. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 692; in Literary Criticism,
990.
130. See Hannah Arendt, Thinking, in The Life of the Mind (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 190–93.
131. See also David Bromwich’s comments on this passage: “The possibility
that Wordsworth’s dread may have sprung from an obscure self-knowledge, or
from something about his past that he now wished forgotten or undone, is sug-
gested by the hope earlier in the poem that, in judging him now, we will hold in
mind ‘that best portion of a good man’s life; / His little nameless unremembered
acts / Of kindness and of love’” (Disowned By Memory, 72).
132. Eliot, letter to John Blackwood, 18 February 1857, in Letters, II: 299.
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133. James, “Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,” 692; in Literary Criticism,
998–99.
134. James mentions Gwendolen (in a list of Eliot’s heroines) in his Preface to
The Portrait of a Lady (in Henry James, The Art of the Novel, intro. Richard P.
Blackmur [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962], 49). Many critics have also
noted the obvious connection. See, for example, Richard Freadman, Eliot, James
and the Fictional Self: A Study in Character and Narration (London: Macmillan,
1986), 62ff.
135. James, Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, in The Art of the Novel, 53.
Chapter Four
1. Henry James, “The Art of Fiction,” in Henry James, The Future of the
Novel, ed. Leon Edel (New York: Vintage, 1956), 15–16.
2. Henry James, letter to Mrs. Humphry Ward, 3 July 1888, in The Letters of
Henry James, 4 vols., ed. Leon Edel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974–84),
III: 235 (hereafter HJL). Robert Elsmere, the story of a young minister’s crisis of doubt
and subsequent work in London as a social reformer, reflects in part its author’s desire
to revise the public perception of men like Clough, to whom the novel makes sever-
al oblique and explicit references and who was a good friend of Ward’s father and
uncle. Mrs. Ward’s novel argues that inner doubts need not hamper outward deeds.
James’s comments play down the social-activist tendencies of the book.
3. George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 102–3.
4. See Leon Edel, Henry James, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,
1953–72), I: 175 (hereafter Life). Henry James, Preface to Portrait of a Lady, in
Henry James, The Art of the Novel, intro. Richard P. Blackmur (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1962), 47–48 (hereafter Blackmur).
5. Henry James, Preface to Portrait of a Lady, in Blackmur, 48
6. [W. C. Brownell], “James’s Portrait of a Lady,” Nation 34 (2 February
1882): 102. Reprinted in Henry James: The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Kevin J.
Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 146.
7. See also Dorothea Krook’s account of F. R. Leavis’s reading of James,
which she sees as criticizing him for “an excess of ‘doing’ over what is actually
‘done.’” Dorothea Krook, The Ordeal of Consciousness in Henry James (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1962), 11; F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition (New
York: Doubleday, 1954), esp. 196.
8. Henry James, Preface to Roderick Hudson, in Blackmur, 8. See also
James’s letter to Henry Adams of 21 March 1914: “You see I still, in presence of
life (or of what you deny to be such), have reactions—as many as possible—and
the book I sent you [Notes of a Son and Brother] is a proof of them. It’s I suppose,
because I am that queer monster the artist, an obstinate finality, an inexhaustible
sensibility. Hence the reactions—appearances, memories, many things go on play-
ing upon it with consequences that I note and ‘enjoy’ (grim word!) noting. It all
takes doing—and I do. I believe I shall do yet again—it is still an act of life” (HJL
IV: 706). The “act of life,” the “doing” that is writing, comes from a reaction to
the world rather than an action in the world.
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Emphasis in original.
10. George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 382; Middlemarch, 27, 272.
11. Henry James, Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, in Blackmur, 55.
12. Yvor Winters, In Defense of Reason (London: Routledge, 1960), 308.
Note how Winters suggests that (as in Eliot and Wordsworth) the internal process
of “choice” stands at the center of James’s sense of freedom of action. See also
Richard Freadman’s account, “Choice: ‘Daniel Deronda’ and ‘The Portrait,’” in
Eliot, James and the Fictional Self: A Study in Character and Narration (London:
Macmillan, 1986), 87–122.
13. W. D. Howells, “Henry James, Jr.,” Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine
3 (November 1882): 28. Reprinted in Henry James: The Critical Heritage, ed.
Roger Gard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 133–34.
14. Unsigned review of American fiction, in Quarterly Review 114 (January
1883); rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 137.
15. William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” in The Will to Believe
and Human Immortality (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), 146.
16. In his biography of Henry James, Leon Edel frequently uses William,
whom he tends to regard as a “man of action,” as a foil to Henry, a “man of art.”
As what follows should indicate (and as Edel often suggests), such a strict contrast
of the brothers irons out many of the complexities inherent in Henry’s position
(and no doubt also in William’s). But for an example of William James’s beliefs
about the life of action, consider the following: “There is no more contemptible
type of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who
spends his life in a sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly con-
crete deed” (William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. [New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1950], I: 125). William appears to have recognized the threat
to action posed by current cultural forces, and his philosophy of pragmatism—with
its emphasis on praxis—was developed largely in response. The fundamental con-
clusion he drew regarding modern physiology concerned the primacy of action, the
recognition that “consideration or contemplation or thinking is only a place of tran-
sit, the bottom of a loop, both of whose ends have their point of application in the
outer world” (William James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” in The Will to Believe
and Human Immortality, 114).
17. Henry James, Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, in Blackmur, 56.
18. Ibid., 51.
19. Ibid., 56.
20. Ibid., 57. Isabel’s midnight vigil can be compared both in its climactic
centrality and in its emphasis on the internal acts of consciousness to Dorothea’s
after she discovers Ladislaw and Rosamond in a compromising position (chapter
80).
21 Ibid., 48.
22. Ibid., 42.
23. Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New
York: Vintage, 1985), 12.
24. Because of the links I have been drawing to the Preface, I have decided
to use the revised New York edition of The Portrait. Internal page references are to
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the Norton reprint of this edition, which includes an appendix of alterations made
to the text (ed. Robert D. Bamberg [New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975]).
As Anthony J. Mazzella’s analysis of James’s revisions indicates, James makes sev-
eral slight but significant changes to his novel that increase its tendency to empha-
size internalized action. Mazzella points to two moves that are particularly relevant
to my argument: first, the later Isabel seems more explicitly invested in her “free-
dom” on the level of consciousness; second, the later Isabel has a greater tendency
to see life “through the pages of a book.” See Mazzella, “The New Isabel,” in
Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady, ed. Bamberg, 611–13. I believe, though, that
James was honest to the spirit of his work when he altered it for the New York edi-
tion. The changes seem to me not to introduce new elements to The Portrait but
rather to highlight preexisting elements. For further analysis of James’s revisions,
see Philip Horne, Henry James and Revision: The New York Edition (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1990).
25. See Richard Freadman, Eliot, James and the Fictional Self, 62ff., and Life,
II: 432. George Levine makes the connection not only to Gwendolen but also to
Dorothea in “Isabel, Gwendolen, and Dorothea,” ELH 30 (September 1963):
244–57. Contemporary critics also linked Isabel to Eliot’s heroines. See the
unsigned review in the Californian 5 (January 1882): 87; rpt. in The
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 139 (comparison to Gwendolen); and William
Dean Howells, “Henry James, Jr.,” 26; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 130
(comparison to Dorothea).
26. James’s attitude toward the courtship plot is mixed. As critics have noted,
he breaks from the conventional wedding-bells ending in most of his major novels.
I have been arguing all along that the successful courtship plot tends to coincide with
a positive realization of the concepts of plot and action, while the unsuccessful mar-
riage or the failed courtship plot often indicates an underlying fear of action. For
women, though, the active avoidance of the marriage plot of the kind Gwendolen
Harleth and Isabel Archer seem initially to undertake usually suggests, in its expres-
sion of a desire to escape the bonds of conventional action, a particularly aggressive
pursuit of free agency. Just how adroit James is at manipulating the marriage plot to
suit his interests can be seen in The Bostonians (1885–86). James plays upon the fact
that as novel readers, we have been trained both to expect and to desire the story to
end in marriage. By making Basil and Verena’s wedding such an unattractive option,
he forces us to reconsider our usual habits of reading the courtship plot. Of course,
the political plot of The Bostonians, in which Verena serves rather as a passive than
as an active participant, does not really provide a more attractive option.
27. Isabel’s response, “No I haven’t the least idea, and I find it very pleasant
not to know. A swift carriage, of a dark night, rattling with four horses over roads
that one can’t see—that’s my idea of happiness,” resembles Henry James’s often-
quoted remarks on history: “I regard the march of history very much as a man
placed astride of a locomotive, without knowledge or help, would regard the
progress of that vehicle. To sit on, somehow, and even to enjoy the scenery as we
pass, is the sum of my aspirations” (Henry James, letter to Charles Eliot Norton,
31 March 1873, in HJL I: 362–63). The crucial difference, of course, is that
James’s eyes are wide open to what goes on outside. But for both author and hero-
ine, the stance is one of a passive experience of great activity.
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28. Henry James, letter to A. C. Benson, 1896, in Henry James, Letters to A.
C. Benson and August Monod, ed. E. F. Benson (London: Elkin Matthews and
Marrot, 1930), 35. Lionel Trilling picks up on and makes use of the phrase in his
essay, “The Princess Casamassima,” in The Liberal Imagination (London: Secker
and Warburg, 1964), 60.
29. Isabel’s feelings about Rome seem to have resembled closely those of her
author, although the young James rang a slightly more worldly note in describing
his responses to the city by actually quoting Clough: “I do find Rome ‘rubbishy’—
magnificently, sublimely so.” Henry James, letter to Grace Norton, 11 November
1869, in Henry James: A Life in Letters, ed. Philip Horne (New York: Viking,
1999), 29. Hereafter Life in Letters.
30. The most shocking of these narrative gaps concerns the birth and death
of Isabel’s baby, which we hear of only through a casual remark of Madame Merle’s
to Ned Rosier (305).
31. Many critics have noticed the connection between Grandcourt and
Gilbert Osmond, beginning with the critic in the Saturday Review 52 (December
1881): 703; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 99.
32. Henry James, letter to Mrs. Humphry Ward, March or April 1888, in Life
in Letters, 203.
33. Henry James, Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, in Blackmur, 43.
34. George Eliot, Middlemarch, 183. For discussion of the relationship
between James’s and Eliot’s metaphors, see Barbara Hardy, The Novels of George
Eliot: A Study in Form (London: Athlone Press, 1959), 222, and Ruth Bernard
Yeazell, Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 49–51.
35. See Milton, Paradise Lost, XII.646–47.
36. [R. H. Hutton], review of The Portrait of a Lady, Spectator 54 (26
November 1881): 1506; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 96.
37. Unsigned review of The Portrait of a Lady, Athenaeum 2822 (26
November 1881): 699; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 121.
38. [John Hay], “James’s The Portrait of a Lady,” New York Tribune (25
December 1881), 8; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 134.
39. Leavis, The Great Tradition, 116.
40. Henry James, letter to Edith Wharton, 13 October 1908, in HJL IV: 495.
Note the striking resemblance to so many of George Eliot’s letters to her suffering
friends, brought out in particular by the notion of “hygiene.”
41. Henry James, letter to T. S. Perry, 24 January 1881, in HJL II: 332–34.
42. Henry James, letter to T. S. Perry. Quoted in Edel, Life, III: 84. I have
been unable to locate a more specific source or date for this letter.
43. Jacques Barzun seems to be the source of most modern critics’ applica-
tion of the term “melodrama” to James’s work. See “Henry James, Melodramatist,”
in The Question of Henry James, ed. F. W. Dupee (New York: Holt, 1947). See also
Dorothea Krook, The Ordeal of Consciousness, 195. The most extensive discussion
of James’s use of melodrama comes in Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic
Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
44. George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 615.
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45. Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 142. As Joyce Taylor Horrell puts it, “It
has long been recognized that his plots are mainly reworkings of such never-fail
formulas as seduction with sentiment, and his characters have their origins in the
villains, heroes, and poor little rich girls common to novelists of all ages.” Joyce
Taylor Horrell, “A ‘Shade of Special Sense’: Henry James and the Art of Naming,”
American Literature 42 (1970): 212.
46. Krook, The Ordeal of Consciousness, 20–23.
47. Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 157.
48. Ibid., 157.
49. Caserio adopts this story’s title for his chapter analyzing James’s stance
toward action.
50. Henry James, “The Story in It,” in Daisy Miller, Pandora, The Patagonia,
and Other Tales, vol. 18 of The New York Edition of the Novels of Henry James (New
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1971), 424–25.
51. James, “The Story in It,” 434–35.
52. See also Ruth Bernard Yeazell, “Podsnappery, Sexuality, and the English
Novel,” Critical Inquiry 9 (December 1982): 339–357. Yeazell uses the tale to
demonstrate the tension in James’s work between the Continental “adultery-plot”
and the English “courtship-plot.”
53. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 65.
54. Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 206. His reading has particular
force in the context of the crisis of obscurity I discussed in regard to Clough.
55. This general tendency in James has been called many things: difficulty,
obscurity, and ambiguity, to name but a few of the labels. See, for example,
Edmund Wilson, “The Ambiguity of Henry James,” in The Triple Thinkers: Ten
Essays on Literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), 122–64;
and Allon White, The Uses of Obscurity: The Fiction of Early Modernism (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
56. The parallel has been much commented upon. See, for example, Hugh
Stevens, Henry James and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 34.
57. Robert Caserio, in a compelling discussion of the role of action in
James’s work, suggests that one can trace a distinct change from the earlier works,
such as The Portrait, which advocate passivity because of its relationship to con-
sciousness, to the later works in which action figures positively: “He shifts his alle-
giance from subjects and persons who are valuably innocent by virtue of their
freedom from plot, understood as intrigue and action, to those who are valuably
experienced by commitment to the intriguing and plotting enactments of story.”
Caserio chooses to build his argument on what he sees as Milly’s education in
intrigue and Densher’s final act of quasi-refusal to the marriage with Kate. I think
that a stronger basis for claiming a shift could be found in the more sympathet-
ic portrayals of schemers, from Kate to both Charlotte Stant and Maggie Verver,
in late James—as well as a slightly more sinister view of passive characters,
including Merton (and even, I believe, contra Caserio, the blessèd Milly Theale).
But in general, the move in James from his earlier to his later work is not so much
a move from the passive to the active stance but rather a greater and greater sense
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of the complexities and dangers of both. Caserio, Plot, Story, and the Novel, 199,
220–22.
58. Arnold Kettle, “Henry James: The Portrait of a Lady,” in Henry James,
The Portrait of a Lady, ed. Bamberg, 674. Actually, George Meredith was working
with methods of opacity even before James. He also shared James’s concern with
the role of action in modern life. Consider the protagonist of Beauchamp’s Career
(1874–75). Nevil Beauchamp begins his career as a hero of the Crimean War but
dies in a boating accident after a failed attempt at politics. Meredith describes his
life as a failed attempt at epic: “His indifferent England refused it [that is, a hero’s
role in an epic] to him. That is all I can say. The greater power of the two, she
seems, with a quiet derision that does not belie her amiable passivity, to have
reduced in Beauchamp’s Career the boldest readiness for public action, some stout
good efforts besides, to the flat result of an optically discernable influence of our
hero’s character in the domestic circle.” George Meredith, Beauchamp’s Career
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 34–35.
59. Leon Edel notes of the reception of the dramatic version of The
American, “A. B. Walkley, admiring the amount of busy action Henry had infused
into his drama, exclaimed: “What, Mr. James? All this ‘between dinner and the
suburban trains’?” (Life, III: 298). James’s relative failure as a writer of dramas owed
much to his difficulty with representing action, as Edel relates, but his desire to do
work for the stage, while partially motivated by pecuniary concerns, also attests to
his genuine interest in the realm of action.
60. As Ruth Bernard Yeazell has pointed out to me, this plot closely resem-
bles the conclusion to James’s own earlier novel, Roderick Hudson (1876). Henry
James, The Princess Casamassima, ed. and intro. Derek Brewer, notes Patricia Crick
(London: Penguin, 1986), 195. This edition uses the text of the 1886 first edition.
Future references to this text will be internally documented.
61. R. L. Stevenson, letter to Henry James, 8 December 1884. Quoted in Life
in Letters, 167.
62. Henry James, letter to William James, 9 October 1885, in HJL II: 101–2.
63. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 64.
64. Ibid., 62. But Hamlet’s slashing out in Act V of the play finds only a
rather meager equivalent in Hyacinth’s suicide at the end of James’s novel. In
Turgenev’s Virgin Soil (1877), a novel long recognized as an inspiration for The
Princess Casamassima, the revolutionary hero’s relationship to Hamlet is even more
pronounced. The connection of The Princess to Turgenev’s novel via the link of
Hamletism was made by a critic in The Saturday Review 62 (27 November 1886):
229; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 183. Oscar Cargill also explores
the relationship in “The Princess Casamassinia: A Critical Reappraisal” PMLA 71
(1956): 97–117, especially 114–16.
65. Unsigned review of The Princess (and three other novels), Saturday
Review 62 (27 November 1886): 728; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed.
Hayes, 182.
66. “H. B.,” “London Letter,” Critic, n.s. 6 (December 1886): 252–53; rpt.
in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 179.
67. Unsigned review of The Princess, Graphic 35 (18 December 1886): 646;
rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 184.
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68. Unsigned review of The Princess, Times (London) 26 (November 1886):
13; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 181.
69. “Socialism in Three Volumes,” unsigned review, Punch 911 (20
November 1886): 245; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 178.
70. W. J. Harvey, Character in the Novel (London: Chatto and Windus,
1965), 89.
71. This concern is especially strong in the work of critics of the postwar
period, for whom radical ideology was very much a live issue. Is the plan James
devised for his revolutionaries a realistic one, what Lionel Trilling calls “a bril-
liantly precise representation of social actuality,” or does it reflect his ignorance of
the real methods of the time and his lack of genuine interest in the political scene,
as Irving Howe argues? For discussions of these issues, see, among others, John
Lucas, “Conservatism and Revolution in the 1880s,” in Literature and Politics in
the Nineteenth Century, ed. and intro. John Lucas (London: Methuen, 1971),
173–219; Irving Howe, Politics and the Novel (New York: Horizon, 1957), esp.
145–46; Lionel Trilling, “The Princess Casamassima,” esp. 74; and Derek Brewer
in the Introduction to the edition I am using (28).
72. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 77.
73. Howe, Politics and the Novel, 146.
74. His description of hidden action has become sadly resonant in the cur-
rent political climate. For many of us who were lucky enough to escape unscathed
from the more immediate horrors of September 11, 2001, one of the most intel-
lectually disturbing elements of the experience was its impenetrability: what was
happening behind the scenes? Was bin Laden a mastermind? Did the government
have information it was keeping from us, or were our leaders just pretending to
know something, to avoid mass hysteria? In the aftermath of September 11, The
New York Times published an article on The Princess Casamassima, Demons, and
The Secret Agent. See Emily Eakins, “Novels Gaze into Terror’s Dark Soul,” New
York Times, September 22, 2001. The article cites James’s lack of “a clear political
agenda” as one of the elements that make his novel seem “unnervingly up to date.”
75. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 65.
76. In his Foucauldian reading of the novel, Mark Seltzer has pointed to the
prevalence of images and instances of spying in The Princess Casamassima. He
argues that James’s book, while it may advertise “a radical conflict between poli-
tics and the novel”—where the novel represents the world of culture embraced by
Hyacinth as he loses faith in the revolutionary enterprise—works “against this
simple polarization” by suggesting “a criminal continuity between the techniques
of the novel and the social technologies of power that inhere in these techniques.”
For it is in the “vigorous continuity established in James’s novels between seeing,
knowing, and exercising power that the politics of the Jamesian text appears.”
While I think that Seltzer focuses on the correct paradigm, I would like to shift
the emphasis slightly: real political power is represented in this book not so much
by surveillance (which we rarely get to experience in the novel, although we can
intimate it) as by its counterpart, invisibility, and in particular, by invisibility iden-
tified with plot in contrast to the Jamesian visionary consciousness. Both plot and
consciousness are “techniques of the novel,” in Seltzer’s sense, but James finds that
his preferred technique of vision is threatened by the underground plotting of
215Notes to Chapter Four
Markovitz_Notes_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:27 PM  Page 215
modern politics—just as Hyacinth, who like his author is “a youth on whom noth-
ing was lost” (164), who has “more impressions than he knew what to do with”
(158), discovers that his entanglement within such a plot threatens his vision.
Mark Seltzer, “Surveillance in The Princess Casamassima,” in Henry James: A
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Ruth Bernard Yeazell (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1994), 117, 164, 158.
77. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 70
78. Ibid., 72; emphasis added. See George Eliot, Felix Holt, the Radical for
Eliot’s use of the same phrase (388).
79. It represents one of several connections between the novels. I have already
suggested a similarity in the kind of critical debate the two novels opened up. One
should also note the role of “race” (62) in Hyacinth’s destiny. The degree to which
his fate is determined by the “extraordinarily mingled current in his blood” (165)
recalls Deronda’s blood-legacy of Judaism. But Deronda, being a purebred Jew
(although one raised in a Christian environment) escapes the kind of schizophre-
nia poor Hyacinth faces.
80. George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 445.
81. [R. H. Hutton], review of The Princess, Spectator 60 (1 January 1887):
15; rpt. in The Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 186, 188.
82. See Kate Croy’s name for Mrs. Lowder in The Wings of The Dove.
83. See Benjamin Disraeli, Lothair (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press,
1970), 273–74.
84. Ibid., 310.
85. Ibid., 422.
86. Ibid., 101–2.
87. Henry James, The Notebooks of Henry James, ed. F. O. Matthiessen and
Kenneth B. Murdock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 68.
88. See Mark Seltzer, who is interested in “Hoffendahl’s god-like power of the
omniscient narrator, a power of unlimited overseeing” (“Surveillance,” 115).
89. Julia Wedgewood, from a review of social novels, Contemporary Review 1
(December 1886): 900; rpt. in The Critical Heritage, ed. Gard, 174.
90. Ivan Turgenev, Virgin Soil, trans. Constance Garnett, intro. Charlotte
Hobson (New York: New York Review Books, 2000), 332.
91. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa
Volokhonsky (New York: Knopf, 2000), 253. The title of this novel is also trans-
lated as The Possessed or The Devils. Stenka Razin was a Robin Hood-like hero of
the Russian peasant revolt of 1670.
92 Ibid., 422.
93. William James, “The Will to Believe,” 2–3.
94. Ibid., 27.
95. In spite of the fact that many revolutionists of the period belonged to the
class of skilled tradesmen (as we see at both the Hand and Banner and the Sun
and Moon), James emphasizes that Hyacinth’s two “trades”—the bookbinding and
the revolution making—represent incommensurable alternatives for him.
96. In The Secret Agent (1907), Joseph Conrad’s later novel about under-
ground radical politics, the Assistant Commissioner of Police—who is in charge
of an investigation into the anarchist bombing that stands in place of the plot in
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James’s novel—yearns for the control that Hoffendahl is said to possess: “Here I
am stuck in a litter of paper . . . supposed to hold all the threads in my hands, and
yet I can but hold what is put in my hand, and nothing else. And they fasten the
other end of the threads where they please.” The Assistant Commissioner unmasks
the fiction of such control precisely by demonstrating his reliance on his own
“agents,” including the pedestrian Chief Inspector Heat (indicated by his “they”
in the quotation). Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, ed. Roger Tennant (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 115.
97. As in so many of the works of the period, attitudes to the theater in this
novel reveal attitudes about action both generally and in relation to character.
Hyacinth is at best an unnatural actor. Consider his response to Millicent’s com-
ment that he would do well in fancy dress: “he was on the point of replying that
he didn’t care for fancy costumes, he wished to go through life in his own charac-
ter. But he checked himself, with the reflection that this was exactly what appar-
ently he was destined not to do. His own character? He was to cover that up as
carefully as possible; he was to go through life in a mask, in a borrowed mantle,
he was to be, every day and every hour, an actor” (109). To Hyacinth, action is
essentially unnatural because it does not reveal genuine character. The Princess,
though, is a consummate actor, unsurprisingly, given that in Roderick Hudson we
learnt that “she’s an actress, but she believes in her part while she’s playing it.”
Henry James, Roderick Hudson, volume 1 in The New York Edition (New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1971), 196.
98. Howe, Politics and the Novel, 150.
99. [R. H. Hutton], review of The Princess Casamassima, 14; rpt. in The
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Hayes, 186.
100. Dostoevsky, Demons, 546–47.
101. Dallas, The Gay Science, II: 186, 251.
102. E. M. Forster, “What I Believe,” in Two Cheers for Democracy (London:
Edward Arnold and Company, 1951), 78.
103. For the role of betrayal in the novel, see also Peter Faulkner, “The Princess
Casamassima and the Politics of Betrayal,” Durham University Journal 80 (June
1988): 287–93. Faulkner argues that the novel portrays “a culture of betrayal”
engulfing both the social and the political realms (293).
104. See Pyotr Verkhovensky’s comment to Kirillov regarding the latter’s ide-
ology of suicide: “I also know that it was not you who ate the idea, but the idea
that ate you, and so you won’t put it off.” Dostoevsky, Demons, 558.
105. Conrad, The Secret Agent, xxxiv. Conrad’s novel bears more than a pass-
ing resemblance to James’s—one metaphoric echo has already been discussed (see
note 96). Both novelists claim that their works were born out of walks through the
streets of London (James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 59;
Conrad, The Secret Agent, xxxvii)—and for both novelists, these perambulations
produced novels with uncharacteristic settings. But a broader similarity appears in
James and Conrad’s shared concern for the role of action in the moral life. Verloc’s
indolence, his “inert fanaticism” (12) appears as a negative reading of Hyacinth’s
more inwardly lively inaction. And when Conrad says of him that “his part in rev-
olutionary politics having been to observe, he could not all at once . . . take the
initiative of action,” he seems to be offering a parodic reinterpretation of James’s
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more likable hero (52). For connections between the two novels, see also Eileen
Sypher, “Anarchism and Gender: James’s The Princess Casamassima and Conrad’s
The Secret Agent,” The Henry James Review 9.1 (Winter 1988): 1–16, and Eloise
Knapp Hay, The Political Novels of Joseph Conrad (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1963), esp. 237–38.
106. Conrad, The Secret Agent, 222.
107. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 73.
108. W. J. Harvey, Character in the Novel, 81.
109. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 33.
110. Lady Aurora represents a different model of political action in the novel,
one closer to the small acts of benevolence advocated by George Eliot. Her role as
nurse is notable in this regard. As the Princess recognizes in a sentence that sounds
like it belongs in an Eliot novel, “She has merged herself in the passion of doing
something for others” (451). It might be fairer to say, though, that she tries to lose
herself in this passion.
111. Taylor Stoehr, “Words and Deeds in The Princess Casamassima,” ELH 37
(March 1970): 126. Stoehr has demonstrated that late-nineteenth-century anar-
chists and nihilists, whose writings James may well have read in preparation for
The Princess, frequently debated the relationship between words and deeds as
forms of propaganda. In particular, they were interested in what Henry B.
Brewster called (in 1887) “propaganda by the deed” (125).
112. Howe, Politics and the Novel, 152.
113. In Communities of Honor and Love in Henry James (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1976), Manfred Mackenzie claims that the secrecy of
Hoffendahl’s movement attracts Hyacinth to it: “But what finally draws him to
the conspirators is their use of secrecy” (10). In another take on the collapse of
political and private spheres in the book, Mackenzie sees it as “a story of society
qua secret society” (17) in which “James, as a social observer of his time, can imag-
ine a secret society so well that he inevitably borders on the political” (184 n. 7).
While it appears a lot like the obscurity by which I see Hyacinth as being so dis-
turbed, secrecy actually suggests a kind of “being-in-the-know” that represents the
opposite condition of the unknowability I am describing.
114. Ellen Moers, The Dandy: Brummel to Beerbohm (New York: The Viking
Press, 1960), 25. She does not mention Hyacinth.
115. Moers, The Dandy, 13, 18, 13.
116. Mackenzie, Communities, 17.
117. Henry James, The Tragic Muse (London: Rupert Hart-Davies, 1948), 29.
118. Ibid., 30.
119. He also works at bookbinding. As he tells Millicent, who seems to con-
sider manual labor beneath Hyacinth, “you must understand I like my work. You
must understand that it’s a great blessing for a young fellow like me to have it”
(252). James’s description of Hyacinth’s attitude toward his trade may be under-
stated, but it actually makes the work sound rather like Jane Austen’s famous
labors over her “little piece of ivory”: “the only faculty he possessed was the facul-
ty of doing his little piece of work, whatever it was, of liking to do it skillfully and
prettily, and of liking still better to get his money for it when he was done” (266).
The bookbinding trade seems to connect Hyacinth to Eliot’s good workers (like
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Adam Bede) and the Carlylean gospel of work that they espoused, but the new
emphasis on aesthetic concerns does mark a shift in the type.
120. Henry James, Preface to The Princess Casamassima, in Blackmur, 63, 67.
121. Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1850), in The Prose Works of
William Wordsworth, ed. Owen and Smyser, I: 138.
122. Note how similar Mr. Vetch’s worry is to Caspar Goodwood’s remark to
Isabel: “One would think you were going to commit some atrocity” (143).
123. Derek Brewer, Introduction to The Princess Casamassima, 17.
124. “It is my duty to shoot myself because the fullest point of my self-will is—
for me to kill myself.” Dostoevsky, Demons, 617.
125. Turgenev, Virgin Soil, 342.
126. It is worth highlighting the number of such hybrid (of mixed cultural or
racial background) individuals, both successful and unsuccessful, we have encoun-
tered in the course of examining the nineteenth-century crisis of action. In addi-
tion to Nezdhanov and Hyacinth, these include Francis and Emily in The White
Doe, Deronda, and Fedalma.
127. James, Preface to The Portrait of a Lady, in Blackmur, 48.
128. Yeazell, Language and Knowledge, 40.
129. Henry James, “The Beast in the Jungle,” in Great Short Works of Henry
James, intro. Dean Hower (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 454. This text is
based on the original edition. All future references to it will be internally docu-
mented.
130. Edel, Life, I: 13; he is quoting page 489 of the edition used.
131. See Edel, Life, I: 14.
132. Edel, Life, I: 311, I. 65. Perhaps the event in James’s life that has drawn
the most speculative interest, from an early date, is the “obscure hurt” that he suf-
fered in the spring of 1861. The phrase is his own, from Notes of a Son and Brother
(1914), and his description of the accident rivals The Princess Casamassima for
obscurity of plot. One thing, though, is clear: James associates his memory of the
injury (which has long been rumored to be some form of castration, but which
Edel premises to have been a back injury [see Edel, Life, I: 176]) with his memo-
ry of the Civil War. The “passage of personal history the most entirely personal”
in his life connects ineluctably to “the great public convulsion” by which he was
surrounded. Edel argues that “in some way [James] seems to have felt that by
vagueness and circumlocution he might becloud the whole question of his non-
participation in the Civil War” (I: 175). He describes a form of guilt that recalls
Wordsworth’s more complex guilt (because it was as much for what he did as what
he refrained from doing) over his complicity with the forces of the French
Revolution; both writers develop their attitudes toward action in response to polit-
ical upheavals. Henry James, Notes of a Son and Brother, in Henry James:
Autobiography, ed. and intro. F. W. Dupee (New York: Criterion, 1956), 914–15.
133. See, for example, Donna Przybylowicz, Desire and Repression: The
Dialectic of Self and Other in the Late Works of Henry James (University, AL:
University of Alabama Press: 1986). For a clear instance of this kind of critical dis-
course, consider Nicholas Buchele’s comments on James’s artistic motivation:
“James, being a non-penetrative sort [i.e., an abstinent homosexual], had mixed
responsibilities: he could not pretend to penetrate as other men penetrate (in the
219Notes to Chapter Four
Markovitz_Notes_3rd.qxp  10/16/2006  3:27 PM  Page 219
sexual sense), hence the lack of confrontations. Yet the books were the only place
where he could do his penetrating (in the cognitive sense): hence the internal rev-
elations” (“Renunciations in James’s Late Novels,” in Henry James and Homo-
Erotic Desire, ed. John R. Bradley, intro. Sheldon M. Novick [New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999], 37–38).
134. See Joseph Litvak, Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-
Century English Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 235–40;
Wendy Graham, “Henry James’s Subterranean Blues: A Reading of The Princess
Casamassima,” in Modern Fiction Studies 40.1 (1994): 51–84; and Hugh Stevens,
Henry James and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp.
chapter 5, “Queer Plotting: The Princess Casamassima and The Bostonians.”
135. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “The Beast in the Closet,” in Henry James: A
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Ruth B. Yeazell, 168.
136. Yeazell, Language and Knowledge, 37.
137. William Veeder, Henry James—The Lessons of the Master: Popular Fiction
and Personal Style in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1975), 131.
138. Yeazell, Language and Knowledge, 37.
139. James, Preface to The American, in Blackmur, 32.
140. James places an unusual emphasis on time in the story. The atmosphere
is suffused with Marcher’s sense of Romantic belatedness: “What did everything
mean . . . unless that, at this time of day, it was simply, it was overwhelmingly too
late?” (471). But here, the focus on temporality hints toward future artistic move-
ments more than past ones. As in so many modernist texts, time in “The Beast”
seems almost to substitute for plot. Just think of the “Time Passes” section of To
the Lighthouse (1927), in which so many events of the novel, including Mrs.
Ramsay’s death, occur offstage. Marcher and May meet at Weatherend in October,
and James carefully conveys all the seasons of their subsequent encounters. As
Marcher reasons, “Since it was in Time that he was to have met his fate, so it was
in Time that this fate was to have acted” (471). James’s allegorical capitalization,
unusual for him, turns “Time” into a major figure—almost an agent—in the
drama. Time marches on while Marcher waits.
141. In Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks argues for a connection between
plots of land and the plotting of stories through his reading of Arthur Conan
Doyle’s “The Musgrave Ritual” as “an allegory of plot” (26): “The central part of
the tale displays a problem in trigonometry in action, as Holmes interprets the indi-
cations of the ritual as directions for laying out a path on the ground, following
the shadow of the elm when the sun is over the oak, pacing off measurements, and
so forth: he literally plots out on the lawn the points to which the ritual, read as
directions for plotting points, refers him, thus realizing the geometrical sense of
plotting and the archaic sense of plot as a bounded area of ground” (24). I am sug-
gesting that James’s story can be read similarly as an allegory of Jamesian plot. If
Conan Doyle’s plots demonstrate his commitment to reenactment as a form of
action, James’s plot reveals the connection between inaction and death.
142. Henry James, The Notebooks, 184. See also Sedgwick, “The Beast in the
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Afterword
1. Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the fin de siècle
(New York: Viking, 1990), 78–79.
2. Recall E. S. Dallas’s comments about active women in fiction: “When
women are . . . put forward to lead the action of a plot, they must be urged into
a false position. . . . This is what is called sensation” (The Gay Science, II: 296–97).
Allen’s book, telling the story of a “New” woman who decides to live with her lover
and bear his children out of wedlock, ends in tragedy. It was something of a suc-
cès de scandale. Jil Larson considers the role of agency in the New Woman novel
(especially in relation to marriage) in her third chapter: “New Woman writing
betrays an insecurity about choice and agency, provoked in this case by the polit-
ical and social consequences of gender inequity” (44). For her, far from showing
unfettered female action, these novels demonstrate the fictiveness of the new free-
dom. She also notes that “It is no coincidence that the New Woman materialized
alongside the decadent and the dandy” (45)—all three pose threats to Victorian
gender stereotypes (angel in the house and muscular Christian). I might add here
that in its attitude toward plot, one can think of the detective tale as the offspring
of sensation fiction and the adventure story.
3. Showalter argues that the focus on boys came in part from male writers’
desire to exclude the feminine: “Boyhood, for these writers, was also an allusion
to the boyish world of male bonding.” But her concern is primarily with the sex-
ual politics of the form, so its gendering is far more interesting to her than its
“aging.” Showalter, Sexual Anarchy, 80.
4. Robert Fraser, Victorian Quest Romance: Stevenson, Haggard, Kipling and
Conan Doyle (Plymouth: Northcote Publishing House, 1998), 11.
5. Martin Green, Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1980), 37. Showalter also remarks that “boys’ fiction was the
primer for Empire.” Showalter, Sexual Anarchy, 80.
6. Suggestively, the periodical debates about the status of action in literature
that I discussed in chapter 2 directly preceded these momentous events; the call
for action was not limited to the literary front but can also be seen as having
helped propel the nation into the Crimean War.
7. John R. Reed, Victorian Will (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 384.
8. Henry James, “The Art of Fiction,” in Henry James, The Future of the
Novel, ed. Leon Edel (New York: Vintage, 1956), 23.
9. Robert Louis Stevenson, “A Humble Remonstrance,” in R. L. Stevenson on
Fiction: An Anthology of Literary and Critical Essays, ed. Glenda Norquay (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 87. Note again the echoes of Aristotle.
10. Stevenson, “A Gossip on Romance,” in R. L. Stevenson on Fiction, 57, 61.
11. Ibid., 54.
12. See Stevenson, letter to W. E. Henley, August, September 1881, reprint-
ed in Robert Louis Stevenson: The Critical Heritage, ed. Paul Maixner (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 125.
13. See Fraser, Victorian Quest Romance, 20–21.
14. Robert Louis Stevenson, Treasure Island, intro. R. H. W. Dillard (New York:
Signet Classic, 1998), 63, 165. Hereafter internally documented by page number.
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15. For all the general amorality of the tale, it is possible to read it as com-
mentary on—and even perhaps a critique of—English imperialism. If we stand
outside of the perspective of the novel and of the “fun and games” it describes, the
identification of gentlemen and pirates can be seen as quite disturbing, to say the
least. In this context, the description of the loot reads as an account (a “counting
up”) of the colonial project; in its diversity, the loot represents the breadth and
scope of British imperial history and ambition: “It was a strange collection, like
Billy Bone’s hoard for the diversity of coinage, but so much larger and so much
more varied that I think I never had more pleasure than in sorting them. English,
French, Spanish, Portuguese, Georges, and Louises, doubloons and double guineas
and moidores and sequins, the pictures of all the kings of Europe for the last hun-
dred years, strange Oriental pieces stamped with what looked like wisps of string
or bits of spider’s web, round pieces and square pieces, and pieces bored through
the middle, as if to wear them round your neck—nearly every variety of money in
the world must, must have found a place in that collection; and for number, I am
sure they were like Autumn leaves, so that my back ached with stooping and my
fingers with sorting them out” (198–99). In this passage, Jim has been trans-
formed into a British colonial administrator, laboring (albeit with pleasure) under
the burdens of his dominions. In the context, the epic Virgilian metaphor of the
autumn leaves is particularly suggestive.
16. Fraser, Victorian Quest Romance, 22. In Kipling’s Kim (1901), the colo-
nial enterprise is also treated as a “Great Game,” although that novel seems far
more aware of the seriousness of the play.
17. Henry James, “Robert Louis Stevenson,” in Partial Portraits (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1888), 144, 146, 145, 147; first printed in Century
Magazine, April 1888.
18. Robert Louis Stevenson, Kidnapped, ed. Donald McFarlan (London:
Penguin Books, 1994), 68.
19. Including, for example, King Solomon’s Mines (1885), which was written in
response to a bet between Rider Haggard and his brother as to whether or not he
could equal Stevenson’s great achievement. See Fraser, Victorian Quest Romance, 28.
20. Conrad suffered throughout his career from comparisons to Stevenson,
which annoyed him greatly (he himself thought of Henry James as his “cher
maître”—see Ian Watt’s discussion in Joseph Conrad: Nostromo [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988], 83). Consider, for example, this response (in
an unsigned review in the National Observer, 18 April 1896, 680) to An Outcast
of the Islands (1896): “It is like one of Mr. Stevenson’s South Sea stories, grown
miraculously long and miraculously tedious. There is no crispness about it and the
action is not quick enough, a serious charge to make against a book of adventure.”
Reprinted in Conrad: The Critical Heritage, ed. Norman Sherry (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 70. For more on Conrad’s ambivalent rela-
tionship to Stevenson, see Hugh Epstein, “Victory’s Marionettes: Conrad’s
Revisitation of Stevenson,” in Conrad, James and Other Relations, ed. Keith
Carabine, Owen Knowles, and Paul Armstrong (Boulder: Social Science
Monographs, 1998).
21. Larson, Ethics and Narrative, 14. Suggestively, Larson’s treatment of
Conrad focuses not on bodily action but on the ethics of speech acts.
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22. Edward Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books,
1975), 110. As with James’s experience in writing The Princess Casamassima, such
internalization seems not to have been part of Conrad’s original plan of the novel.
On 2 January 1903 (in a letter to Ford Madox Ford) he was thinking of Nostromo
as something “silly and salable,” while by 4 June (in a letter to John Galsworthy)
he has recognized that “Nostromo grows . . . but the story has not yet even
begun.” The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad: Volume 3 (1903–1907), ed.
Frederick R. Karl and Laurence Davies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), 4, 40.
23. Harold Bloom, “Introduction,” in Joseph Conrad’s Nostromo, ed. Harold
Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), 4.
24. Joseph Conrad, Nostromo, ed. Martin Seymour Smith (London: Penguin
Books, 1990), 431, 86, 413.
25. Henry James, “Robert Louis Stevenson,” in Partial Portraits, 139.
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Dublin University Magazine, 71
Dugas, Kristine, 187n. 63
Durade, D’Albert, 97
duty: Carlyle on, 54; Clough on, 83,
110–11; vs. freedom in James’s
works, 10, 131, 139; as making
work noble, 104; as risk-free sub-
stitute for action, 10, 94, 110,
118; waiting as a, 30, 31–32, 40,
41; Wordsworth on, 29
The Eclectic, 32, 69, 70
Edel, Leon, 130, 166, 210n. 16,
214n. 59
Edmunds, C., 69
Egypt, 56, 83
“1849 (Roma) Notebook” (Clough),
73, 74
elective affinities metaphor (“juxta-
position”), 72–74, 81–82
Eliot, George, 2, 86, 87–128, 135,
142, 196n. 72; biographical
aspects of, 10, 95–98, 103; clue
metaphor used by, 60, 61, 107–8,
113, 139; conservatism of, 2, 89,
92–98, 108; efforts of, to envision
a safe form of political action, 10,
92–95, 97–101, 106–8, 110,
121–27, 150, 160, 200n. 7,
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